Naturalism, Theism, and Moral Ontology: A Reply to William Lane Craig
(Reposting since this seems to be so popular. So far as I am aware, neither WLC nor anyone else has responded to this.)
Abstract: This paper considers William Lane Craig’s metaethical argument for God’s existence. Roughly, the argument is that the existence of objective moral values provides strong evidence for God’s existence. I consider one by one Craig’s various reasons in support of the argument’s major premise, namely, that objective moral values and the nonexistence of God are at odds with each other. I show that Craig’s supporting arguments play fast and loose with the meaning of objectivity, and that they have no force whatsoever. I conclude that Craig’s argument does not succeed in showing that the existence of objective moral values, by itself, makes God’s existence more probable than not.
Related Posts:
- Index: Atheist Error Theorists (a handy collection of links to critiques of atheists who’ve suggested that atheism / naturalism / evolution /etc. leads to error theory or moral nihilism)
- All Secular Outpost posts in category moral argument
- All Secular Outpost posts in category nontheistic metaethics
- All Secular Outpost posts tagged with William Lane Craig
- All Secular Outpost posts tagged with moral ontology
Recommended Posts from Other Sites:
- Wes Morriston’s Papers (includes many papers written specifically in response to W.L. Craig, especially this one)
- Erik Wielenberg’s Publications (see especially the books here and here and the papers here and here)
- WL Craig on Morality and Meaning (Series Index) by John Danaher at Philosophical Disquisitions
- “Craig, Kagan, and Significance” by Andrew Moon at The Prosblogion
- Angra Mainyu’s posts on Craig’s metaethical argument (see here, here, here)
Recommended Debates: