nontheistic metaethics

The Euthyphro Dilemma, Part 6: Arbitrariness and Normative Impotence

Here, again, are the two options of the Euthyphro dilemma: (I) The reason that God commands that we perform morally obligatory actions is that they are morally obligatory. (II) Morally obligatory actions are morally obligatory in virtue of the fact that God commands that we perform them. I have written five parts in this series The Euthyphro Dilemma, Part 6: Arbitrariness and Normative Impotence

Do our reasons depend on our desires?

NOTE: This post assumes an understanding of much of the terminology that I explain in my post, “On Reasons and What They Do?” In particular, this post uses the terms ‘reason,’ ‘objective,’ and ‘subjective’ in accordance with the explanations that appear in that article. Further, there are other important matters (such what it means for a reason to Do our reasons depend on our desires?

On reasons and what they do

This post is something of a follow-up to my recent post about Sean Carroll’s views concerning meaning and purpose. As I indicated at the end of that post, I used some concepts and made some claims that require development and defense and I promised that I would provide that development and defense in a future On reasons and what they do

Taking Atheism Ignorantly

Here is something that appeared recently in an article by one Michael Egnor on a site called “Evolution News.” He advocates taking atheism seriously. If you look closely you will see that the article has nothing directly to do with evolution. This really is not surprising since, despite its name, “Evolution News” is not a Taking Atheism Ignorantly