Jason Thibodeau


The Euthyphro Dilemma, Part 6: Arbitrariness and Normative Impotence

Here, again, are the two options of the Euthyphro dilemma: (I) The reason that God commands that we perform morally obligatory actions is that they are morally obligatory. (II) Morally obligatory actions are morally obligatory in virtue of the fact that God commands that we perform them. I have written five parts in this series The Euthyphro Dilemma, Part 6: Arbitrariness and Normative Impotence

The Euthyphro Dilemma, Part 1: The Question and the Options

The Euthyphro dilemma has been used for centuries as a basis for undermining theories that account for moral value in virtue of God’s will, activities, and/or nature, including various versions of Divine Command Theory (DCT)[1]. Beginning in the latter half of the 20th century the arguments directed against DCT that are grounded in this dilemma The Euthyphro Dilemma, Part 1: The Question and the Options