Quibbling over Semantics While Missing the Point
I’ve said it before and I’ll say it again. I’m a linguistic relativist. I don’t think words have objective meanings. I think the meaning of words is relative to time and place. So when I encounter someone who is adamant about defining a word in a different way than I do, I just shrug my … Quibbling over Semantics While Missing the Point
Are Atheism and Moral Realism Logically Incompatible?
I am a regular reader of Victor Reppert’s blog, Dangerous Idea. In the combox for one of his recent posts, Steve Hays claimed that atheism and moral realism are logically incompatible. I wrote a lengthy reply to Hays in the combox and have decided to republish it here. Before I republish my comments, I will make one … Are Atheism and Moral Realism Logically Incompatible?
Naturalism, Theism, and Moral Ontology: A Reply to William Lane Craig
(Reposting since this seems to be so popular. So far as I am aware, neither WLC nor anyone else has responded to this.)Abstract: This paper considers William Lane Craig’s metaethical argument for God’s existence. Roughly, the argument is that the existence of objective moral values provides strong evidence for God’s existence. I consider one by one … Naturalism, Theism, and Moral Ontology: A Reply to William Lane Craig
What is the Connection between Moral Values and Moral Duties?
I found this in my notes. I’m sure the idea isn’t mine, but my notes don’t indicate where I got the idea from or if this a quotation or merely a paraphrase. If an act A is forbidden, then doing A is bad and not doing A is good. If an act A is obligatory, … What is the Connection between Moral Values and Moral Duties?
Charles Pidgen on the So-Called “Naturalistic Fallacy” in Meta-Ethics
A common objection to reductive moral naturalism (aka ‘ethical naturalism’) is the so-called “naturalistic fallacy.” This fallacy comes into flavors: logical and semantical. The Logical Form This version of the naturalistic fallacy is normally referred to as the is-ought fallacy, the fact-value fallacy, or, in honor of its author, Hume’s Law. The source of this form … Charles Pidgen on the So-Called “Naturalistic Fallacy” in Meta-Ethics
Naturalism, Theism, and Moral Ontology: A Reply to William Lane Craig
Abstract: This paper considers William Lane Craig’s metaethical argument for God’s existence. Roughly, the argument is that the existence of objective moral values provides strong evidence for God’s existence. I consider one by one Craig’s various reasons in support of the argument’s major premise, namely, that objective moral values and the nonexistence of God are at … Naturalism, Theism, and Moral Ontology: A Reply to William Lane Craig
G&T Rebuttal, Part 6: Chapter 7
Chapter 7. Mother Theresa vs. Hitler In this chapter, G&T present a version of the moral argument for God’s existence which I call the “Moral Laws Require a Moral Lawgiver Argument,” which they formulate as follows. Like the earlier arguments, this argument is deductively valid. Like the earlier chapters about this argument, I plan to … G&T Rebuttal, Part 6: Chapter 7
Moral Objectivity vs. Moral Accountability
Some people confuse moral objectivity and moral accountability. To say that moral values are objective is just to say that moral values are not determined by what anyone thinks. Moral accountability, on the other hand, has to do with the consequences for people’s moral or immoral behavior. So saying that moral values are objective is … Moral Objectivity vs. Moral Accountability
Paul Copan’s Noseeum Argument Against Ethics Without God
Over the last fifteen or so years, Paul Copan has written a variety of articles, chapters, and books which argue against ethics without God. (To be precise, Copan argues against atheistic or naturalistic metaethics.) As I interpret him, Copan offers several independent arguments against ethics without God. I call one of those arguments “Copan’s Noseeum … Paul Copan’s Noseeum Argument Against Ethics Without God
Massimo Pigliucci on Metaethics, Part 1
William Lane Craig and Massimo Pigliucci debated the existence of God in 1998. (Click here to read the transcript.) In his opening statement, Craig presented his standard moral argument for God’s existence. (1) If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist. (2) Objective values do exist. (3) Therefore, God exists. In his … Massimo Pigliucci on Metaethics, Part 1