Richard Dawkins and Moral Realism
Christian apologists who love to substitute quote-mining for actual argumentation are fond of quotations like the following, in order to conclude that atheism somehow undermines morality. In a universe of blind physical forces and genetic replication, some people are going to get hurt, and other people are going to get lucky; and you won’t find … Richard Dawkins and Moral Realism
Are Atheism and Moral Realism Logically Incompatible?
I am a regular reader of Victor Reppert’s blog, Dangerous Idea. In the combox for one of his recent posts, Steve Hays claimed that atheism and moral realism are logically incompatible. I wrote a lengthy reply to Hays in the combox and have decided to republish it here. Before I republish my comments, I will make one … Are Atheism and Moral Realism Logically Incompatible?
Naturalism, Theism, and Moral Ontology: A Reply to William Lane Craig
(Reposting since this seems to be so popular. So far as I am aware, neither WLC nor anyone else has responded to this.)Abstract: This paper considers William Lane Craig’s metaethical argument for God’s existence. Roughly, the argument is that the existence of objective moral values provides strong evidence for God’s existence. I consider one by one … Naturalism, Theism, and Moral Ontology: A Reply to William Lane Craig
What is the Connection between Moral Values and Moral Duties?
I found this in my notes. I’m sure the idea isn’t mine, but my notes don’t indicate where I got the idea from or if this a quotation or merely a paraphrase. If an act A is forbidden, then doing A is bad and not doing A is good. If an act A is obligatory, … What is the Connection between Moral Values and Moral Duties?
Craig, Koons, and Divine Command Theory
Editor’s Note: This is a guest post by Taylor Carr republished on The Secular Outpost with permission. The original post may be found on his blog, The Godless Skeptic. In a recent episode of the Reasonable Faith podcast, William Lane Craig offers his thoughts on a 2012 paper by Jeremy Koons, Can God’s Goodness Save the Divine Command Theory from Euthyphro? Koons’ paper is another … Craig, Koons, and Divine Command Theory
Kai Nielsen on Natural Law and Divine Command Theory
Editor’s Note: This is a guest post by Taylor Carr republished on The Secular Outpost with permission. The original post may be found on his blog, The Godless Skeptic. It’s common to hear theists make the claim that there cannot be a moral law without a moral law-giver. C.S. Lewis, Ravi Zacharias, and several other prominent defenders of the Christian faith … Kai Nielsen on Natural Law and Divine Command Theory
Naturalism, Theism, and Moral Ontology: A Reply to William Lane Craig
Abstract: This paper considers William Lane Craig’s metaethical argument for God’s existence. Roughly, the argument is that the existence of objective moral values provides strong evidence for God’s existence. I consider one by one Craig’s various reasons in support of the argument’s major premise, namely, that objective moral values and the nonexistence of God are at … Naturalism, Theism, and Moral Ontology: A Reply to William Lane Craig
Paul Copan’s Noseeum Argument Against Ethics Without God
Over the last fifteen or so years, Paul Copan has written a variety of articles, chapters, and books which argue against ethics without God. (To be precise, Copan argues against atheistic or naturalistic metaethics.) As I interpret him, Copan offers several independent arguments against ethics without God. I call one of those arguments “Copan’s Noseeum … Paul Copan’s Noseeum Argument Against Ethics Without God
Atheism, Morality, and Divine Nature Theories vs. Ideal Observer Theories
This another item I found while organizing material on my hard drive. I think I am the author, but I am not certain of that. What is the advantage of divine nature theories over ideal observer theories? Consider, for example, a divine nature theory of moral value. On such a view, God’s nature, not God, … Atheism, Morality, and Divine Nature Theories vs. Ideal Observer Theories
What *Is* the Logical Structure of Mackie’s Anti-Moral Realism Argument?
Although the contemporary metaethics literature contains many references to (and discussions of) the late J.L. Mackie’s arguments against moral realism, I’ve never seen anyone formally analyze its logical structure. (If I’m mistaken and someone has done that, please provide a citation in the combox.) The goal of this post is to try to take first … What *Is* the Logical Structure of Mackie’s Anti-Moral Realism Argument?