(Preliminary thoughts Part 1) How Johann Christian Friedrich Hölderlin Helped Us Rethink Ancient Thought

Wiki: Hölderlin by Franz Carl Hiemer, 1792

So, I’m going to be looking at ancient thought as it was reimagined by the German poet Hölderlin.  As a brief introduction I’d like to make a few remarks about the presocratic philosophers Heraclitus and Parmenides.

(1) Heraclitus/Euclid and the Rule of Opposites: “Something “as” Something Else”

In the 1926 lecture course on ancient philosophy Heidegger notes for Heraclitus λόγος (logos) is the principle of beings. ἕν πάντα [“all things one”]: frags. 50, 41. Frag. 1: λόγος:  Speech, word:

a) the disclosed, λεγόμενον [“the uttered”], what is in the proper sense, what is understandable, the meaning. The manifested being itself “as” manifest; binding on everyone as this very thing that has become understandable.

b) the “What” is addressed “as something,” the dog “as” brown: in relation to, relatedness, proportion.  This would later be applied in Euclid’s mathematics.

Euclid, as the foundational figure in geometry, provides a rich framework for exploring ideas about relatedness, proportion, and how we address or define things in relation to one another.   At its core, Euclidean geometry is about relationships—between points, lines, planes, and figures—and how these relationships are governed by proportion, symmetry, and congruence. For example,

Points and Lines. A point is defined not in isolation but in relation to other points (e.g., as the intersection of two lines). A line is understood as a path between points, inherently relational. 

Proportions. Euclid’s treatment of ratios and proportions (e.g., in Book V) shows how quantities are addressed as comparable to one another, defined by their relational properties rather than absolute values. 

Similarity and Congruence. Figures are addressed as similar or congruent based on their proportional relationships, not their absolute size or position.

Our question asks about what is addressed as something in relation to relatedness and proportion. Philosophically, this can be interpreted as a question about identity, categorization, and relational ontology: 

Identity as Relational. In Euclidean geometry, nothing exists in isolation. A triangle, for instance, is not just a shape but a set of relationships between three points.  Philosophically, this suggests that entities (or concepts) are often defined not by intrinsic qualities but by how they relate to other entities. For example, a person might be addressed as a “friend” not because of an inherent quality but because of their relational role in a social network. 

Proportion as a Mode of Understanding. Proportion in Euclid is a way of understanding how parts relate to a whole or to each other. Philosophically, this can extend to how we understand balance, justice, or harmony in human affairs. For instance, justice might be addressed as a proportional distribution of resources, where the “rightness” of the distribution is understood relationally.

Addressing “As” and Conceptual Frameworks. When we address something as a particular thing (e.g., a line as a boundary, a ratio as a measure of balance), we are imposing a framework of meaning. This act of addressing is inherently relational—it depends on the context, the observer, and the system of thought (e.g., Euclidean geometry, ethics, or language). Philosophically, this raises questions about how our frameworks shape our understanding of reality.  And so, the being is encountered in the light of (as)  einai, Being; choris, separate from; ton allown, the others; and kath auto, in itself.  We see this emerge when Antisthenes puts this into question and denies it by him thinking beings are addressed in simplicity, yet Antisthenes unwittingly adopts a whole slew of ontological determinations.  Antisthenes believed that “logos” fundamentally meant “speech” or “word,” focusing on the proper use of language to convey truth. He was known for arguing that language should correspond directly to reality. This is encapsulated in his famous saying, “I see a horse, but not horseness.” This reflects his wrong belief that we can only truly name what we can directly perceive, not abstract concepts or essences. So, we encounter the dog “as not me,” or the unity of the sock when it’s torn and so the unity “emerges” as a lost unity. 

From Euclid, we can extract the idea that what is addressed as something is fundamentally a matter of relatedness and proportion. This has broader implications:  Entities, concepts, and categories are not fixed or absolute but are defined by their relationships to other entities. A line is a line because it connects points; a person is a citizen because they relate to a state. This relational ontology challenges essentialist views of identity.  Knowledge and understanding are often proportional. We grasp concepts not in isolation but by comparing, contrasting, and relating them to others. For example, we understand “large” only in relation to “small.”  In human affairs, addressing something as just, fair, or good often involves proportionality—balancing competing claims, rights, or needs. This mirrors Euclid’s geometric proportions, where harmony arises from relational balance.

Euclid’s geometry offers a powerful metaphor for understanding how we address things as something: through relatedness and proportion. Philosophically, this suggests that identity, meaning, and value are not inherent but emerge from relationships—whether in geometry, language, or human society. By extracting this principle, we can reflect on how our frameworks of thought shape our understanding of the world and our place within it.

We see the relevance of opposites in everyday experience: day and night, death–life, waking and sleep, sickness–health, summer–winter. Not arbitrary, as for example stone and triangle, sun and tree. Heidegger notes Opposition is not mere difference; it is counter-striving within a unity. It is not the mere succession of changing things; instead, oppositionality constitutes the very Being of the being.

From beings to Being. Understanding, concepts; concept—λόγος. Truth. Addressing something as something, something, as what it is, which is not some being in it but is its Being, that which every being, as a being, always “is.”  Taking something “as” something is fundamental to how we relate to the world.  For example, if I hear a living thing at my feet in the forest only to look down and see I “mis-took” rustling dead leaves in the wind “as” a living thing, this mis-taking shows our usual stance toward beings is taking something as something.  Understanding “as,” insight. What alone makes beings accessible in their Being. The soul augments itself, uncovers from itself, and pursues what is still covered up, unfolding out of itself the richness of meaning.  All this amounts to a new philosophical position with the Greeks: the Being of beings, and sense, law, “rule.”

(2) Parmenides and Being:

When we consider the idea of justice, I may think of the relatively recent development in social justice of the traditional definition/disposition toward marriage being revised because it does violence to LGBTQ+ rights.  In this we are not creating justice out of whole cloth, but more carefully un-earthing (Aletheia) what justice really is and always was.  The idea of justice is thus tied together with a temporal presence, a being “at all times.”

Regarding Being itself, Parmenides thus noted it was ἀγένητον (frag. 8, v. 3)—“unborn”; it did not ever first come to be, at no earlier time was it not. ἀνώλεθρον (ibid.)—“undying”; it will never pass away, at no later time will it not be. οὖλον (v. 4 in 4th ed.61)—“a whole”; it is not patched together from parts, ones that could be added or subtracted.  μουνογενές (v. 4 in 4th ed.62)—“unique”; there are no more of the same, for whatever else could be or is, is uniquely Being. ἀτρεμές (v. 4)—“unshakable”; Being cannot be taken away. Being is nothing further than, and nothing other than, the fact that it is. ἀτέλεστον (ibid.)—“without end”; not a thing that somewhere or in some way comes to an end or to limits.  Being has nothing against which it could be delimited as a being. οὐδέ ποτ᾿ ἦν (v. 5)—“never was it”; in it there is no past, nothing that once was present earlier. οὐδέ ποτ᾿ ἔσται (v. 5: οὐδ᾿ ἔσται)—“never will it be”; in it there is no future, nothing that will only later be present. ἐπεὶ νῦν ἔστιν ὁμοῦ (ibid.)—“because it is the now itself”; only the now, constant presence itself.  πᾶν (ibid.)—“altogether”; through and through only now. ἕν (v. 6)—as this, it is pure now and nothing else. One, never other, no difference, no opposite. συνεχές (ibid.)—“self-cohesive”; in every now as now, in itself as itself.

One of Parmenides’s primary insights is Apprehending and Being are the same.  So, for instance, we may apprehend a line in terms of fractions, “as” fractional, and it is appropriate to do so.  This is basic to how we encounter the world “as.”  This is demonstrated when the process breaks down.  For example, If I am to traverse the line AD, I must first reach the middle point B.  However, before I can reach B, I must make it halfway to B, point C, and so on to infinity.  This absurdity shows us apprehending and Being are so powerfully connected that we deny the connection only by immediately contradicting ourself.  We can see, then, that we think things like motion only by contradicting ourselves.

 Heidegger notes Parmenides argues motion is put together out of very small motions. There is small transition from one motion to another; but within these transitions themselves are always more transitions. The closest nearness still infinitely distant. Prior to every place that needs to be traversed there always lies another one. “In thought” the moving body does not at all advance. Therefore, slower and faster cannot be distinguished. The fastest can never catch up to the slowest.  Aristotle notes four examples from Parmenides’s school refuting the possibility of motion: 1.  στάδιον: “You can never reach the end of a racecourse” (οὐκ ἐνδέχεται {…} τὸ στάδιον διελθεῖν). 2.  ᾿Αχιλλεύς: Achilles will never catch up to the tortoise.  3.  ἡ ὀϊστὸς φερομένη ἕστηκεν: “The flying arrow is stationary” (Phys. 239b30). 4.  χρόνος (cf. Phys. 240a1).

CONCLUSION:

Heraclitus taught the λόγος (logos) is the principle of beings. ἕν πάντα [“all things one”]. Parmenides, likewise, taught the simplicity of Being. Those are a couple of ideas I’d like to keep in mind about early Greek thought as we approach Hölderlin.