(11) Blogging Through Prof Martin Heidegger’s Interpretations of Greek Philosophy (Parmenides Part 2)
This is my second of two background pieces on Being that will prepare us to follow Heidegger along Parmenides’s path.
An understanding of Being is necessary for us to “encounter” beings “as such,” for them to make us happy, weigh on us in a troubled manner, sustain us, be interrogated by us or occupy us in any way: We could not wish a being to not be for how could we do this without an understanding of being and not being? An understanding of Being is needed for questioning, interrogating beings in terms of if they are and what they are. Experiencing Nothingness (not-Being), too, requires an understanding of Being.
Being is traditionally divided into essence “whatness” and existence “howness,” and so we might say a table is brown in terms of what it is, and badly positioned and exists in terms of how or the “manner” in which it is. Existence means present at hand, and so if we are questioning as to whether the table exists or not we appeal to it at hand. The Old French term for manner traces back to the Latin “manuarius,” which is related to “manus,” meaning “hand.” This reflects the original sense of “manner” as something that could be done by hand or manually, which over time broadened to encompass any way or method of doing things. As Aristotle noted existence is analogical rather than univocal, in that the dog doesn’t exist in the same manner or way God exists. To inquire in this way means to understand what “essencee” and “manner” mean even if we initially only know these in a vague and general way.
In the sentence “the ghost appeared in a spooky manner,” let’s break down the syntax and semantics of the word “manner” and explore its etymological roots. “Manner” in this sentence functions as a noun. It acts as the object of the preposition “in,” forming part of the prepositional phrase “in a spooky manner.” This phrase modifies the verb “appeared,” specifying how the ghost appeared. We have largely lost an understanding of this because we have forgotten the appearing nature of beings I outlined in previous post – Homer noting the gods don’t appear to everyone enargeis (in their fullness). The term “enargeis” (ἐναργής in Greek) means “clear, vivid, or manifest.” In this context regarding Odysseus and his companion seeing the young woman, Homer suggests that the gods do not reveal themselves with such vivid clarity to everyone; divine appearances are selective or dependent on specific circumstances or individuals. Odysseus sees the woman as a radiant goddess incarnate though his companion beside him does not.. We mean something similar when a tourist “encounters” Niagara Falls “as” a wonder of the world, while a local resident encounters it as noise pollution. We “encounter as/to be,” according to an understanding of Being. Aristotle uses “enargeia” (the noun form of “enargeis”) to describe vividness in language or imagery, where a speaker or writer makes their descriptions so clear and lifelike that the audience can almost see the events unfolding. This vividness is meant to persuade or to make an argument more compelling. Aristotle discusses how poetry should aim for universality and clarity, making the events of the narrative clear to the audience in a way that feels real or vivid – this can be seen as a form of “enargeia” where the action is presented in a way that is clear and impactful to the viewer or reader. Heidegger says [f]or us, what characterizes existence is not self-comportment, neither taking the self as a person nor otherwise as one’s own body and one’s own soul; instead, it is the comportment as such, i.e., the standing in relation to beings, whereby beings as such manifest themselves in one way [manner] or other (Heidegger, 65).” So, it is the openness to the appearing of beings that constitutes the personhood of the person for Heidegger. Houseness, for instance, appears incarnate in the mansion, is merely present in the average house, and is deficient in the old shack. On the other hand, the mansion might appear gaudy to a person used to mansions, and the shack to them might appear quaint. We can lose ourselves in beings, especially if they appear radiant to us, but we also can have them in our view just as beings. And so the three types of houses may appear in very different ways for us, but from another point of view are just beings. Our being is determined by this two-fold nature of comportment. The universal applicability of the designation “houseness” to all appropriate beings is certainly not necessary so it belongs to how we are with beings. We have already leapt over beings in encountering them as beings as they are and how such and such they are. For example, we know how to question beings in terms of what and how they are though we generally have no idea why we do it in this way. We relate do beings “as though” they were “what” and “how.”
“Manner” refers to the way in which something is done or happens; in this context, it describes the style or mode of the ghost’s appearance. The word “spooky” before “manner” further specifies that the ghost’s way of appearing was eerie or frightening. The use of “manner” here suggests a deliberate or characteristic way of appearing, adding a layer of intentionality or personality to the ghost’s action. There is an ambiguity at the heart of “manner” that both implicates the person and excludes the person, and so I say the table appears badly positioned meaning it looks out of place to me, but also “the table is badly positioned at the center of the gym during the basketball game” which is a truth of the table not dependent on my seeing.