ECREE

Extraordinary Claims Require Extraordinary Evidence (ECREE), Part 7: Christian Apologist Glenn Miller Agrees!

Not all theists or even Christians reject ECREE. One example of a Christian apologist who accepts ECREE is my friend Glenn Miller. Glenn writes: I personally agree with this principle…and so does God, apparently…why else would there be such an emphasis on it in the bible? The only issue I would have with the skeptic Extraordinary Claims Require Extraordinary Evidence (ECREE), Part 7: Christian Apologist Glenn Miller Agrees!

Extraordinary Claims Require Extraordinary Evidence (ECREE), Part 6: Is ECREE False? A Reply to Greg Koukl and Melinda Penner (continued)

(continued from Part 5) Penner’s Third Rebuttal: A third response to the demand recognizes that very extraordinary events happen all the time if the co-occurrence of several features in a state of affairs is evaluated probabilistically. I agree with this sentence (if “extraordinary events” means “improbable or very improbable events”), but this does not in Extraordinary Claims Require Extraordinary Evidence (ECREE), Part 6: Is ECREE False? A Reply to Greg Koukl and Melinda Penner (continued)

Extraordinary Claims Require Extraordinary Evidence (ECREE), Part 5: Is ECREE False? A Reply to Greg Koukl and Melinda Penner

In my first post in this series, I offered a Bayesian interpretation of the principle, “extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence” (ECREE). Greg Koukl, however, disagrees with ECREE. He recently explained why on his radio show (click here for audio); also, Melinda Penner, a member of Koukl’s staff, has written on the issue here and here. In Extraordinary Claims Require Extraordinary Evidence (ECREE), Part 5: Is ECREE False? A Reply to Greg Koukl and Melinda Penner

Index: Extraordinary Claims Require Extraordinary Evidence

“Part 1: The Bayesian Interpretation of ECREE“: a Bayesian interpretation and defense of ECREE “Part 2: Is ECREE False? A Reply to William Lane Craig“: Craig’s objection to ECREE is based upon an misinterpretation of ECREE. “Part 3: Is ECREE False? A Reply to Kurt Jaros“: ECREE emphasizes the common sense notion that the more Index: Extraordinary Claims Require Extraordinary Evidence

Extraordinary Claims Require Extraordinary Evidence (ECREE), Part 4: NT Reliability, Extraordinary Claims, and the Base Rate Fallacy

I want to re-visit the issue of “extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence” (ECREE), by considering a type or class of argument for miracles based upon the historical reliability of the New Testament (NT), hereafter “the argument.” According to this argument, the general historical reliability of the NT provides sufficient evidence to make the historicity of Extraordinary Claims Require Extraordinary Evidence (ECREE), Part 4: NT Reliability, Extraordinary Claims, and the Base Rate Fallacy

Extraordinary Claims Require Extraordinary Evidence (ECREE), Part 3: Is ECREE False? A Reply to T. Kurt Jaros

As a follow-up to my last post on extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence (ECREE), I’m going to respond to a blog post by T. Kurt Jaros. As in my previous posts,let B represent our background information; E represent our evidence to be explained; H be an explanatory hypothesis, and ~H be the falsity of H. Extraordinary Claims Require Extraordinary Evidence (ECREE), Part 3: Is ECREE False? A Reply to T. Kurt Jaros

William Lane Craig’s Critique of Bart Ehrman on the Probability of Miracles

As the saying goes, I have to “call ’em as I see ’em.” I just read, for the first time, the transcript of William Lane Craig’s debate with Bart Ehrman. I read, with great interest, Craig’s first rebuttal, where he makes extensive use of Bayes’s Theorem (BT) to critique two of Ehrman’s statements. Those two William Lane Craig’s Critique of Bart Ehrman on the Probability of Miracles

Extraordinary Claims Require Extraordinary Evidence (ECREE), Part 2: Is ECREE False? A Reply to William Lane Craig

In my last post, I offered a Bayesian interpretation of the principle, “extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence” (ECREE). William Lane Craig, however, disagrees with ECREE. In a response to philosopher Stephen Law, Craig wrote this. This sounds so commonsensical, doesn’t it? But in fact it is demonstrably false. Probability theorists studying what sort of evidence Extraordinary Claims Require Extraordinary Evidence (ECREE), Part 2: Is ECREE False? A Reply to William Lane Craig

Extraordinary Claims Require Extraordinary Evidence (ECREE), Part 1: The Bayesian Interpretation of ECREE

If you read this blog, chances are that you very familiar with the slogan, popularized by the late Carl Sagan, that “Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.” What I want to do is to offer a Bayesian interpretation and defense of that slogan. In order to make this a ‘self-contained’ post, I will need to repeat Extraordinary Claims Require Extraordinary Evidence (ECREE), Part 1: The Bayesian Interpretation of ECREE