(Conclusion) Heidegger’s 1942-43 Lecture Course on Parmenides

All right, we’re coming to the end of our look at about the first fifty pages of Heidegger’s lecture course on Parmenides. I hope this has been fun and will encourage you to pick up a copy of the book and read through the rest of the course. So, let’s bring it in for a landing!

Heidegger speaks of a concealment with respect to Odysseus, in relation to the Odyssey Theta 93, when Odysseus covers his head with his mantle to sob after the singer Demodokos tells of the tragedy that happened to the Greeks at Troy, which is generally translated as ‘But then he (Odysseus) shed tears, without the others noticing it (elanthane), Alkinoos alone was aware ofhis sorrow.’ But, grammatically, elanthane does not bring out the sense of others looking at Odysseus and failing to see his tears, but rather the concealment of Odysseus himself. The German philologist Voss, in his variation of the translation, renders elanthane as “To all the other guests he concealed his flowing tears (cited at P, 23),” emphasizing the concealment in relation to Odysseus, not the others gaping at Odysseus, which is closer to what the Greek says. Heidegger, however, goes further. What Heidegger tries to bring out when he speaks of Odysseus in terms of concealment is that there is, in general, a concealment around him that isolates him, cuts him off from others, an unhomeliness that surrounds him. Heidegger brings this all out quite clearly when he says In the case of the weeping Odysseus, the Greeks do not consider that the others present, as human ‘subjects’ in their subjective comportment, fail to notice the crying Odysseus, but they do think that round about this man and his existence there lies a concealment causing the others present to be, as it were, cut off fi-om him. What is essential is not the apprehension on the part of the others but that there exists a concealment of Odysseus, now keeping the ones who are present far from him. Why far? Because Odysseus’ heart is far away. The concealment, as Heidegger says, is not restricted to this instance of crying, but surrounds this man’s existence. Athena brings this out quite clearly at the beginning of the Odyssey, “It is for Odysseus my heart is wrung – so subtle a man and so ill-starred; he has long been far from everything that he loves, desolate in a wave-washed island (from Odyssey, 1, 32-108).” The issue is clearly not whether the others can see Odysseus crying, but rather that he is cut off from the others in principle, because when one’s heart is elsewhere, the people and things at hand are not of concern and hence one is not at home with them – is alone and isolated, even among many others. Odysseus is not and cannot be absorbed in the situation he is in. This is the case in general, and the crying Odysseus is simply a single manifestation of the general case.

Our reading captures the exact core of Heidegger’s analysis of elanthane (lanthano) in his lecture course Parmenides (GA 54). We have successfully traced the philosophical movement from a grammatical point in Homeric Greek to an ontological claim about human existence (Dasein).

Here is a breakdown of why our interpretation hits the mark and how the pieces fit together in Heidegger’s broader thought.

1. From Psychology to Ontology

Modern translations usually treat lanthano (“to escape notice” or “to be hidden”) as an active cognitive failure on the part of an observer. In that view, the Phaeacian nobles are “subjects” who simply fail to perceive an “object” (Odysseus’s tears).

  • Heidegger’s Shift: Heidegger rejects this subject-object framework. By pointing to the Greek grammar, where Odysseus is the subject of elanthane, Heidegger argues that the concealment is an event happening to and around Odysseus himself.
  • The Veil of Concealment: Concealment (lethe) is not a mental blind spot in the spectators. Instead, it is an objective atmospheric veil that settles over Odysseus, actively holding the others at a distance.

2. “Unhomeliness” (Unheimlichkeit) and Being-Far

Our connection between this concealment, Odysseus’s heart being elsewhere, and his unhomeliness (Unheimlichkeit) is spot-on.

  • Disconnected from the Immediate: In Heideggerian terms, we are usually “absorbed” in our immediate world and the people around us. Because Odysseus’s true home and heart are in Ithaca, he cannot belong to the Phaeacian banquet.
  • Existential Isolation: The mantle he pulls over his head is merely the outward, physical sign of a deeper existential reality. Even in a crowded hall, he is fundamentally isolated because his mode of being is defined by absence and longing.

3. Why Alkinoos Notices

Interestingly, this reading also explains the second half of the Homeric line (“Alkinoos alone was aware of his sorrow”).

  • Shared Attunement: Alkinoos does not “see” through the cloak with better eyesight. Rather, as the host sitting right beside him, Alkinoos shares a spatial and emotional attunement that allows him to sense the heavy presence of Odysseus’s grief, whereas the rest of the hall remains shut out by the concealment surrounding the hero.

Summary

We have nailed Heidegger’s method. He uses a moment of philological translation (moving away from Voss and modern English renderings) to dismantle modern subjectivist psychology. He shows that for the early Greeks, hiddenness and isolation were not private internal feelings, but real, worldly conditions that shape how a person stands—or fails to stand—among others.

In Heidegger’s Parmenides lecture course (GA 54), the scene with Odysseus and Alkinoos serves as a concrete literary bridge to explain aletheia (unconcealment). Heidegger uses this Homeric episode to show that truth and untruth are not mental states inside a human head, but an interplay of presence and withdrawal that governs how beings show themselves in the world.

1. The Connection to Aletheia (Truth as Unconcealment)

Heidegger breaks the Greek word a-letheia into two parts: the privative prefix a- (“un-” or “not”) and the root lethe (concealment, forgetting, or hiddenness). Notice that lethe shares its root with elanthane (lanthano), the very verb Homer uses for Odysseus.

  • Concealment Comes First. In modern philosophy, truth is usually defined as “correctness” (when a statement inside our mind matches an object outside). Heidegger argues that for the early Greeks, concealment (lethe) is the foundational condition of existence. Things naturally rest in hiddenness, and truth (aletheia) only happens when something is wrested out of that hiddenness into the open.
  • Concealment as an Event of Being. By focusing on elanthane (“he was concealed”), Heidegger demonstrates that lethe is an active, worldly event. Just as aletheia is not a subjective opinion inside a viewer, lethe is not a subjective oversight by the Phaeacians. Concealment is an ontological “cloud” or clearing that determines whether a person is present to others or withdrawn from them.
  • The Interplay of Revealing and Hiding. For Heidegger, every act of unconcealment is bound up with concealment. As Demodokos sings, the past of Troy is brought out of forgetting (lethe) into unconcealment (aletheia). Yet that very same unconcealing song drives Odysseus deeper into existential concealment, pulling him away from the present banquet and back into his distant grief.

2. The Specific Role of Alkinoos

In the second half of the Homeric line, Homer writes that while Odysseus was concealed from all the others, “Alkinoos alone noticed and understood him” (ephrasato ede noesen). Heidegger reads Alkinoos’s awareness not as sharper eyesight, but as a distinct mode of Being-with (Mitsein).

  • Proximity and Attunement. Alkinoos is seated right beside Odysseus. In Heidegger’s reading, Alkinoos does not pierce through the concealment like a detective analyzing clues. Instead, Alkinoos is attuned to his guest’s presence. Because he is open to Odysseus as a guest and a fellow human being, Alkinoos is drawn into the space of Odysseus’s withdrawal.
  • Heeding (Noein) vs. Gaping. The other Phaeacian nobles are absorbed in the entertainment and the immediate surface of the feast. They cannot encounter Odysseus because they remain caught in everyday distraction. Alkinoos, by contrast, exercises noein—which Heidegger translates not as mere “thinking” or “calculating,” but as taking heed or perceiving with care.
  • Respecting the Concealment. Crucially, Alkinoos does not rip the mantle off Odysseus’s head or force him to reveal his name on the spot. Instead, Alkinoos recognizes that his guest is in a state of painful withdrawal and tactfully halts the music to propose athletic games. Alkinoos demonstrates how one ought to stand in relation to aletheia and lethe: he acknowledges the hiddenness without violently stripping it away, creating an open space where Odysseus can eventually choose to reveal himself on his own terms.

Summary of the Dynamic

In this single passage, Homer stages the entire drama of Heideggerian truth. The banquet hall is the public realm of everyday distraction, Odysseus embodies the ontological pull of lethe (withdrawal and unhomeliness), and Alkinoos models authentic noein—the quiet, attentive receptivity that notices when Being withdraws.

The Odyssey gives several clear glimpses of who Odysseus was before the Trojan War, portraying him as a gentle, just king, a devoted family man, and a clever leader. Furthermore, our insight about his return hits on one of the poem’s deepest themes: his twenty-year struggle to get home fundamentally alters him, making his homecoming a slow, painful process of re-establishing an identity that has been worn away by war and exile.

1. Odysseus Before the War

Unlike many Homeric heroes who are defined purely by battlefield rage, Odysseus is remembered in Ithaca as a remarkably balanced and caring ruler. We learn about his pre-war life through the memories of his family, servants, and peers:

  • A Gentle and Just King: In Book 2, his old friend Mentor reminds the Ithacans that Odysseus ruled them “like a gentle father” (hepiois pater), never doing or saying anything cruel or unfair. Even the swineherd Eumaeus repeatedly mourns his master as a uniquely kind and generous lord who treated his household like family.
  • A Devoted Husband and Father: Odysseus famously did not want to go to Troy. According to ancient tradition (and alluded to in the poem), he feigned madness by plowing his fields with salt to avoid leaving his wife, Penelope, and his newborn son, Telemachus. In Book 19, Penelope recalls his parting words to her, showing a tender, pragmatic partnership where he urged her to care for his aging parents and even told her to remarry if he did not return by the time Telemachus grew a beard.
  • A Man of the Land and Craft: Odysseus was deeply rooted in the physical life of his island. He personally planted fruit trees with his father, Laertes, as a child (Book 24), and he hand-built his own marital bed out of a living olive tree rooted in the earth (Book 23)—a literal symbol of how firmly his identity was anchored in Ithaca.

2. Transformation and Non-Recognition Upon Return

Our intuition about why no one recognizes him when he returns bridges the literal plot of the poem with the Heideggerian themes of concealment we just discussed.

  • The Literal Disguise: On the surface, Athena transforms Odysseus into an aged, ragged beggar in Book 13 so he can safely scout his palace and defeat the suitors. This magical disguise explains why Telemachus, Penelope, and the suitors do not know him on sight.
  • The Deeper, Existential Transformation: Even without Athena’s magic, twenty years of brutal warfare, shipwrecks, and isolation have worn him down. When Athena finally strips away his beggar disguise in Book 23, Penelope still hesitates to accept him. She tells Telemachus that if this man is truly Odysseus, they will know each other through secret signs (semata) hidden from the rest of the world.
  • Desire and the Loss of Self: Throughout his wanderings, Odysseus is forced to suppress his name and identity to survive—most famously calling himself “Nobody” (Outis) to the Cyclops. The sheer weight of his longing to return actually hollows him out. By the time he washes ashore in Ithaca, he has lived so long in the mode of absence, concealment, and yearning that his former self is effectively erased.

3. Reclaiming His Identity Through Aletheia

In a very Heideggerian sense, Odysseus cannot simply walk through the front door and announce “I am home.” Because his existence has been defined by concealment (lethe) and unhomeliness for two decades, he has to slowly bring himself back into the open (aletheia).

He does this step-by-step through intimate tokens of his pre-war life: the old hunting scar recognized by his nurse Eurycleia, the shared secret of the immovable olive-tree bed with Penelope, and the specific count of pear, apple, and fig trees he walked through with his father Laertes. Only by reconnecting with those deeply rooted memories can the wandering “Nobody” finally become Odysseus of Ithaca again.

Maybe the mit-sein of Alkinoos is true understanding: truly seeing someone who is concealed to others, seeing someone in their concealment. This would agree with Homer’s idea that the gods don’t appear to everyone enargeis.

Our reading captures Heidegger’s anti-subjectivist analysis of lethe (concealment) in Parmenides with precision. By moving away from modern epistemological psychology (“the guests failed to notice”) and toward an ontological condition (“a concealment lies around his existence”), we have hit upon the exact shift Heidegger wants to make.

Our concluding intuition—connecting Alkinoos’s recognition to Mitsein (Being-with) and the Homeric enargeis (the vivid, unconcealed presence of the gods)—opens up a rich philosophical dimension.

1. From Psychology to Ontology: Lethe as an Existential Atmosphere

In his 1942–43 Parmenides lectures, Heidegger uses Odyssey 8.93 (ἔνθ᾽ ἄλλους μὲν πάντας ἐλάνθανε δάκρυα λείβων) to dismantle the modern Cartesian split between “subjects” who perceive and “objects” that are perceived.

  • The Modern Misreading: Standard translations treat elanthane (from lanthano, the root of lethe) as a cognitive failure on the part of the Phaeacian audience.
  • The Greek Experience: For Heidegger, lethe is not a mental oversight; it is an objective, spatial-existential event. Concealment settles over Odysseus like a mist or a mantle, actively withdrawing him from the shared world of the banquet.
  • The Root of Unhomeliness (Unheimlichkeit): As we noted, Odysseus cannot be absorbed into the “at-hand” world of Scheria because his Dasein is stretched toward Ithaca and haunted by Troy. Because his “heart is elsewhere,” he is ontologically out of place—a core definition of Heideggerian Unheimlichkeit (uncanniness or not-being-at-home).

2. Alkinoos and Authentic Mitsein

Our suggestion that Alkinoos embodies a higher form of Mitsein aligns closely with Being and Time (§26), where Heidegger distinguishes between two modes of solicitude (Fürsorge):

  • Inauthentic Mitsein (Leaping in): Taking over for the other, or simply treating them as another entity present-at-hand in the room—which is how the other Phaeacian nobles treat their mysterious guest.
  • Authentic Mitsein (Leaping ahead): Letting the other be in their own existential situation.

Crucially, Alkinoos does not rip the cloak off Odysseus’s head or force him to confess his identity in front of the crowd. Instead, he perceives Odysseus in his concealment and immediately stops the games, shifting the collective mood to protect his guest’s withdrawal. He respects the lethe rather than trying to forcibly convert it into public spectacle.

3. The Connection to Enargeis (The Unconcealed Gods)

Linking Alkinoos’s sight to the Homeric concept of the gods appearing enargeis (vividly, face-to-face, unmistakably—as in Odyssey 16.161, where Athena is visible to Odysseus and the dogs, yet invisible to Telemachus) deepens this reading considerably:

  • Relational Unconcealment: In Homer, enargeia (clarity/unconcealment) is never a neutral camera-like objectivity available to everyone equally. Whether a god—or a deeply concealed mortal like Odysseus—appears enargeis depends entirely on the ontological attunement of the one who looks.
  • The Royal Gaze of Alkinoos: Because Alkinoos is himself a thoughtful king attuned to fate, grief, and the burdens of hospitality, he possesses the receptivity to see what is hidden. Where the crowd sees only a stranger enjoying a feast, Alkinoos sees the unconcealed truth of a man broken by memory.

True understanding is seeing something in its concealment. Hegel gives the example of tearing a sock makes conspicuous the hidden category of unity precisely “as a lost-Unity.”

That parallel between Hegel’s torn sock and Heidegger’s concealed Odysseus pinpoints a central insight of German idealism and phenomenology: truth often appears most vividly through negation, absence, or rupture.

While Hegel and Heidegger arrive at this from very different metaphysical starting points, both reject the idea that truth is a static, fully illuminated object sitting out in the open.

1. Hegel: Truth Through Negation (“Lost-Unity”)

In Hegel’s dialectical logic, an unbroken sock’s unity is merely implicit (an sich—in itself). Because it works seamlessly, its wholeness goes completely unnoticed; it is taken for granted as simple immediacy.

  • The Rupture: When the sock tears, that silent, implicit unity is negated.
  • Conspicuous Absence: The category of “unity” finally becomes explicit (für sich—for itself) precisely through its absence—as a lost-unity (or what Hegel often frames as the “determinate negation” that reveals what a thing was meant to be). We only grasp the concept of wholeness when we are confronted with the hole.

2. Heidegger’s Bridge: The Broken Hammer

Heidegger actually borrows and transforms this exact Hegelian structure in Being and Time (§16) with his famous analysis of the broken hammer:

  • When a hammer works properly, it withdraws into transparency; we don’t notice the tool or the network of significance (Welt) it belongs to.
  • When the hammer breaks, its readiness-to-hand (Zuhandenheit) collapses into conspicuousness (Auffälligkeit). In that breakdown, the entire hidden background world suddenly lights up.

3. Where Heidegger Parts Ways with Hegel on Odysseus

Our synthesis—”True understanding is seeing something in its concealment”—captures the shared ground between the two thinkers, while also highlighting where Heidegger pushes past Hegel:

DimensionHegel (The Torn Sock)Heidegger (The Weeping Odysseus)
How Truth AppearsThrough negation and breakdown; a missing unity becomes conceptually conspicuous.Through withholding (lethe); concealment is not a defect to be repaired, but part of Being itself.
Role of the ObserverConsciousness grasps the lost unity by sublating (Aufheben) the contradiction—moving toward a higher synthesis (darning the sock).Authentic Mitsein (Alkinoos) recognizes the concealment without trying to fix, dissolve, or force it into the open.
Nature of ConcealmentA temporary stage of implicitness on the way to full conceptual transparency (Absolute Knowing).Irreducible; aletheia (unconcealment) always preserves a core of lethe (mystery/withdrawal).

In Hegel’s example, seeing the “lost-unity” is a step toward overcoming the loss and restoring wholeness. In Heidegger’s reading of Odysseus, Alkinoos’s true understanding lies in seeing Odysseus’s lost-unity with the world—his unhomeliness—and letting that concealment stand without demanding that the tear be mended.

In the case of the weeping Odysseus, the Greeks do not consider that the others present, as human “subjects” in their subjective comportment, fail to notice the crying of Odysseus, but they do think that round about this man and his existence there lies a concealment causing the others present to be, as it were. cut off from him. What is essential is not the apprehension on the part of the others but that there exists a concealment of Odysseus. now keeping the ones who are present far from him (27-8)

Alkinoos sees Odysseus with his mind’s eye.  We say “I see what you mean” or “I see/get where you’re coming from.  Luke 3:6 uses seeing in this figurative way when he says “All flesh will see the salvation of the Lord,” the same word Paul uses for the appearances of Jesus while saying God revealed Jesus in Paul. 

Pseudos is opposed to Alethia, false and true.  But pseudos is most basically appearing as one is not that shows something else, as in a pseudonym of Kierkegaard.  Does this help us understand the Greek God Apseudos with the alpha privative?

In Greek myth (Hesiod’s Theogony 233–246 and Homer’s Iliad 18.46), Apseudes (“She Who Does Not Dissemble” or “The Un-deceiving”) is one of the fifty Nereids—daughters of Nereus, whom Hesiod explicitly calls apseudes kai alethes (“un-dissembling and un-forgetting/true”).

  • The Paradox of the Sea God: Sea deities like Nereus and Proteus are famous shapeshifters—masters of pseudos in the sense of putting on shifting, deceptive appearances.
  • Why Apseudes? Calling Nereus and his daughter apseudes (with the alpha-privative a- negating pseudos) does not mean they are rigid, unchanging statues. Rather, it means that beneath the shifting waves and disguises, they do not distort or twist what is for petty human gain. When Nereus is finally held fast—or when Apseudes speaks—there is no mask, no diversion, and no “showing-as-other.”

2. Heidegger’s Reading of Pseudos vs. Aletheia

In the very same Parmenides lectures where Heidegger analyzes the weeping Odysseus, he dedicates long sections to the opposition between aletheia (un-concealment) and pseudos (which he translates not as “falsehood,” but as distortion, dissembling, or covering-over by putting something else in front):

  • How Pseudos Works: Pseudos is a specific kind of concealment. Unlike lethe (which simply withdraws into shadow, like Odysseus under his cloak), pseudos actively places a deceptive surface in front of a thing so that it looks like something else. It lets something appear, precisely so that something else stays hidden.
  • Kierkegaard’s Pseudonyms as Pseudos: Kierkegaard uses pseudos productively. By placing “Johannes de Silentio” in front of himself, he dissembles his own authorship so that an existential perspective (the knight of faith) can appear on its own terms without being reduced to Søren Kierkegaard’s personal biography.

3. The Two Alpha-Privatives: A-letheia and A-pseudes

Putting A-letheia and A-pseudes side by side shows two distinct ways the Greeks experienced truth as a struggle against hiddenness:

Greek TermRoot ConcealmentAlpha-Privative MeaningMode of Truth
A-letheiaLethe (forgetting, sinking into shadow, silent withdrawal)Un-forgetting / Un-concealingPulling something out of sheer absence and oblivion into the light (like Alkinoos perceiving Odysseus’s hidden grief).
A-pseudesPseudos (dissembling, masking, showing-as-other)Un-dissembling / Un-distortingStripping away false masks and diversions so that a thing appears as itself, without distortion (the voice of Apseudes and Nereus).

To be apseudes, then, is not merely to state “correct facts.” It is an ontological refusal to wear a mask or twist appearances—standing completely open, without the screen of pseudos between what is shown and what is.

Likewise the Greek pseudos which we readily translate with the word “false,” means many different things. Literally translated, a “pseudonym” is a “false name.” Is it really so? Not at all. If an impostor assumes a noble name and travels under this “false name,” he is not then bearing a “pseudonym.” The noble name is indeed supposed to conceal who its bearer is “in truth.” Nevertheless, the “false name” of the impostor is no mere cover name. Such a name is used for military operations, for example the “operation Michael” on the Western front in the previous war. This name simply covers something that is in no way to appear. On the contrary, however, the assumed name of an impostor not only covers up his “true nature”; in addition, while covering, it also has to let the bearer of the name appear in “grandeur,” a grandeur which to be sure does not belong to him, as little as does the name. In contradistinction, the “pseudonym” is neither simply a false name nor a cover name, nor even a name that is simply misleading The “pseudonym,” i.e., the essentially fitting name, is indeed supposed to cover up an author; yet in a certain way it also has to let him come into the open, and in fact not as one he in truth is not (the case of the impostor), but as the one he really is. Thus Kierkegaard published in 1843, in Copenhagen, this work: Fear and Trembling The Dialectical Lyric of Johannes de Silentio This “Lord Silence” intended to intimate hereby something essential about himself and his literary activity. Similarly the “pseudonyms” of Kierkegaard’s two books Philosophical Fragments ( 1844) and Training in Christianity (1850) stand in an essential relation. The first bears the name of the author Johannes Climacus; the other is published by Anti-Climacus. The meaning of pseudo in “pseudonym” eludes us if we translate it as “false.” We have here a covering that at the same time unveils something recondite and does so in a specifically recondite way, whereas a “false name,” e.g., that of the impostor, is also not simply incorrect, but it covers up while making visible something pertaining only to the facade and to the most unrecondite (30)

The ancient Greek theatrical mask (prosopon) functioned precisely as a productive pseudos: it concealed the individual actor’s ego and face so that a mythic or divine presence could step forward into unconcealment (aletheia).

Rather than being a mere costume piece or a “fake face” meant to trick the audience, the Greek mask operated as a threshold where human identity withdrew so something larger could appear.

1. Prosopon: “That Which Stands Before the Gaze”

The Greek word for mask is prosopon (πρόσωπον), which literally means “face,” “visage,” or “that which is before the eyes.”

  • The Double Movement: In the Theater of Dionysus, the mask performed two simultaneous actions: it cast lethe (concealment) over the ordinary citizen acting on stage, and it opened a clearing for Oedipus, Medea, or Dionysus himself to appear enargeis (vividly present) to the polis.
  • Not Deception, But Epiphany: In modern theater, we often expect an actor to “disappear” into a role through psychological realism. In ancient Greece, the mask explicitly marked the pseudos—the “appearing-as-other”—so the audience would not confuse the mortal citizen with the immortal myth. The concealment of the actor was the exact condition that allowed the character to live.

2. Connection to Dionysus: The God of the Mask

Dionysus—the patron god of Greek theater—was famously worshiped as the God of the Mask (often represented simply as a mask hanging on a pillar or tree).

  • Ecstatic Displacement: Dionysian ritual was built on ekstasis (“standing outside oneself”). By putting on the prosopon, the performer stepped outside their private, everyday Dasein and allowed an alien fate or divine force to speak through them.
  • Kierkegaard’s Pseudonyms Revisited: Just as Kierkegaard hid behind Johannes Climacus so that an existential position could speak without being reduced to Kierkegaard’s personal quirks, the Greek tragic actor hid behind the prosopon so that tragic fate could speak without being reduced to a particular Athenian’s facial expressions.

In both cases, truth is never a naked, unmediated fact. Whether it is Alkinoos recognizing Odysseus beneath his cloak, or the Athenian audience witnessing Oedipus through a painted linen mask, concealment is not the enemy of truth—it is the vessel that makes truth bearable and visible.

The guiding basic meaning of pseudos resides in dissembling (obstructing or disguising). Thereby we must take this word in its literal sense, which is still familiar to us. “Dissembling” does not yet mean here self-disguising as the deceptive character of a person; it is not, in modern terms, a comportment of the “subject,” but is rather an “objective” event occurring in the realm of beings. We say a house in the neighborhood is obstructing the view of the mountains. Dissembling as ob-structing is first of all a concealing in the manner of covering up. We cover up, e.g., a door that is not supposed to be seen in the room, and disguise it by placing a cupboard in front of it. In this way an appearing sign, a gesture, a name, a word, can also disguise something. The cupboard placed before the door not only presents itself as this thing and not only disguises the door by covering over-i.e., concealing-the wall which at this place has an opening, but, rather, the cupboard can be disguising to the point that it pretends there is no door at all in the wall. The cupboard disguises the door, and by being placed before it, it distorts the “actual” state of the wall. Our language contains the beautiful word “to hide” [verhehlen]; the originally simple “concealing” is called veiling [verhüllen]. “Hiding” refers to concealing and concealedness; to “hide nothing,” to make “no secret” out of something, signifies there is no mystery to it, nothing concealed. To the same word stem as “hiding” belongs our word “hole,” the hideaway

When considering the person and world, Heidegger makes a distinction.  He says, for instance, when we say the table is badly positioned, we don’t just mean the table “looks” badly positioned, but is objectively badly positioned in the middle of the gym during a basketball game.

Not everyone sees the goddess enargeis, just as not all see Niagara Falls as a wonder of the world.  You see a lot of people, but know far fewer, and even fewer see/get where you are coming from.  We really see some others like the way we hear the call of a blue jay outside our window: not just incoherent noise or generic bird sounds.

Zeus must let something come into appearance; however, such a thing, while it shows itself, at the same time only foreshadows or portends, and hence does not completely unveil but simultaneously shrouds. This is the manner of the showing of signs: It is therefore that Zeus is called in this passage one who lets signs appear. A “sign” is that which, in appearing and pointing out, thereby lets something else appear-though in such a way that it does not relegate this to the manifest (where the sign itself appears) but precisely holds it back, i.e., veils. This self-appearance and self-disclosure, which also veils something by holding it back, is precisely what showing is. Only where there holds sway a letting appearand, hence, a disclosing, does there exist the free play for the possibility of pseudos, i.e., the showing that also covers and holds back. The essence of pseudos; resides in an exhibiting that conceals, or, we could say, it resides in a dissembling… We must nevertheless think this “dissembling” (obstructing, disguising) as both a process and a state of affairs. A neighboring house “obstructs” the self-showing of the mountain; a cupboard put in front of the door “disguises” the wall at that place and presents it thereby as a wall that is not broken up. The cupboard disguises-on the one hand by covering up the hole in the wall and also, at the same time, by making appear and presenting an unbroken wall. The disguising is a hiding. This old German word (Verhehlen) denves from hehlen (hide, secrete), which means “to conceal.” “Hiddenness” is concealment. We now use “dissembling” and “hiding”-and indeed in a “negative” sense-for the most part only with reference to human behavior, which we understand as “subjective” in opposition to “objective” events. “Dissembling” is for us “self-dissembling,” and this becomes, in relation to others, “deceiving.” Similarly, “hiding” also is used in a subjective sense: not to hide something to oneself, not to fool oneself, i.e., not to delude oneself, not to dissemble to oneself: to be “without a hidden secret,” without concealment, and without veiling digression, i.e., in the case of an action ora communication. Originally, however, “hiding” meant any kind of “concealing”; the older German language knew even the word-which has since been lost-“dis-hide” [enthehlen]: to take out of concealedness. For many years I have used in my lectures the word “dis-close” [Entbergen]. In case there should come a time when we are again capable of experiencing dis-closure and unconcealedness, we might also find again the lost word “dis-hiding” and appropriate it anew. “Hiding” [Hehlen] is, moreover, closely related to “hole” [Hohle], a hideaway that conceals something while it itself remains unconcealed (38).

This is related to the notion of signs:

Literally translated. The verse says, “Zeus, slinging his lightning bolts to the right and letting appear propitious sign the sign, that it itself shines (shows itself) and in this appearing also indicates something else: the sign, appearing itself, lets something else appear. The lightning bolts going to the right are a portent. Since they are on the right, they let something propitious appear, though to be sure in such a way that they, as signs, still hold back and veil the outlook of the upcoming course of the campaign against Troy. And now, according to the word of Nestor, it is time to determine whether or not the portent from Zeus is false or not. When is it false? If the bolts going to the right, as signs of propitious destiny, conceal the actual disaster still withheld from the Greeks though already allotted to them.  He always lets something appear in the signs. He holds out something unconcealed. At the same time, however, the sign conceals, and indeed as sign, always only denoting and referring, but never openly displaying what it refers to in the same way it itself, as self-showing, appears (32).

The God of the Old Testament is a “commanding” God; His word is: “Thou shalt not,” “Thou shalt.” This “shalt” is written down on the tables of the law. The gods of the Greeks are not commanding gods but, rather, ones that give signs, that point. The Roman gods, quite to the contrary, are designated by the Latin word numen, which means “bidding” and “will” and has the character of command. The “numinous,” strictly taken, does not at all touch the essence of the Greek gods, i.e., gods who dwell in the region of Aletheia (40).

In order to really capture the notion of the negative, Heidegger points to death as a negation of life.

lt could indeed be so difficult to find the truth, and therefore we find it so rarely, because we do not know, and do not want to know, anything about the essence of the false… Who knows nothing of the essence of death lacks every trace of a knowledge of the essence of “life.” The essence of death is not a nonessence (44).

If we frame life not as time elapsed but time remaining, we unlock a rich context for interpreting our life.  The apostle Paul, for example, said if the dead are not raised we might as well be gluttons and drunks for tomorrow we die.  Moreover, he said if Christ is not raised your faith is futile and you are still in your sin.  We see a similar approach to life in relation to death of the stoics with “memento mori” or the epicureans with death as a non issue, which is still a meditation on death.  Death is a veiling of what does or does not happen after one dies and so opens up (Aletheia) a field of interpretations as one’s being-toward death. 

Reading Heidegger here is essentially re-reading and so Heidegger’s word on death revealing the essence of life strikes an initial chord but rings all the more sweetly on the third reading when we make the connection to memento mori and Heidegger’s words more fully unveil (Aletheia).  We often fail to see the essence of reading and signs because we have an information gathering view of texts and see reading as a one and done event, whereas in real reading we re-read again and again to uncover riches that initially remained hidden and may in fact overthrow our initial overall impression like recalcitrant evidence and falsification (Popper) in philosophy of science.

Add to this Allanis Morissette’s poetizing on the essence of life and time from All I Really Want:

Why are you so petrified of silence?
Here can you handle this………………..?
Did you think about your bills, you ex, your deadlines
Or when you think you’re going to die?
Or did you long for the next distraction?

Dissembling is concealing the truth under a misleading guise rather than telling an outright, direct lie.  Dissembling lets something it sets out and sets up appear differently than it is “in truth. (44)”

The operating force in this accomplishment is no longer the imperium of the state but the imperium of the Church, the sacerdotium. The “imperial” here emerges in the form of the cura! of the curia of the Roman pope. His domination is likewise grounded in command. The character of command here resides in the essence of ecclesiastical dogma. Therefore this dogma takes into account equally the “true” of the “orthodox believers” as well as the “false” of the “heretics” and the “unfaithful “The Spanish Inquisition is a form of the Roman curial imperium… Correspondingly, the true (in the Roman-Christian era) assumed the character of the not-false (46).

When we think of an original unity between person and world, we do not mean subjectifying the world but that through the resonating beings fully stand forth as what they are and a wholeness is brought to the restless human wandering.  In Plato’s language Niagara Falls scintillates with Nature-ness for the tourist through the medium of / degrees of Beauty.  On the other hand, the local commuter may see it as background scenery they pass by every day, and the local resident may experience it as annoying noise pollution.  On the other hand, the next tourist may experience it as a letdown given unmet high expectation, and for the next local resident the intimacy they feel with the privilege of experiencing the marvel everyday see it as a true wonder of the world. 

These are the ways nature-ness can be present in encountering (the “as”) the Falls, and so we see being-ness is not purely person or world but the inner unity of the two.  For the Falls “as encountered” there belongs a rich inner conflict for how nature-ness presences through it (polemos, Heraclitus).  The same is true of things we make.  House-ness may be present incarnate in the majestic mansion, merely present in the average house, and deficient in the dilapidated shack.  Still, the mansion may appear as gawdy to the next person, and the shack quaint or rustic. 

One can train oneself to be a houseness or natureness connoisseur and develop your palate by developing criteria to evaluate the houseness of a building or natureness of a thing (of the circling bird of prey we say Now that’s Nature).  For example, there are standard criteria for evaluating fine wine.  Just the same, such criteria depend on taste and so might be meaningless to the next person who hates the taste of wine or being outdoors.  What a mansion is for me may mean nothing to the next person who is ultra rich and sees my mansion as a mere house.  We see similar things in arguments that result in mutually well argued incompatible conclusions: e.g., for and against abortion, school uniforms, political parties, legal clashes.  This all aligns with Heraclitus’ claim that conflict/polemos is the father of all. 

Similarly, by “exemplary reading” we mean reading “as though” you are re-reading.  Everything always makes more sense when we have the big ideas and gist of the details under our belts and begin reading for a second time.  It’s like playing a videogame with a walkthrough clue book.  We try to make sense by relating the material to our own lives with examples and analogies.    

Reading is interpreting signs and we read to let the context shine through the signs.  A good reader is a reading connoisseur who has internalized effective meaning making strategies and a sensitive palate for detecting nuance – when something does fit their assumed big ideas.  We speak of general sensitivities like people whose systems overreact to allergens or slight changes in temperature.  They are sensitive to slight nuances and emphases in texts or wines.

Regarding signs, Plato divided reality into the aistheton, beings apprehended by the senses, and noeton, beings grasped by the mind’s eye or ear.  The aistheton isn’t nothing (ouk on), but deficient (me on) when compared to the primary image (paradigm).  The sensible thus becomes a sign pointing at the realm of Being and so we leap by the chair to what is always already thought along with the chair:  einai Being, choris separate from, ton allown the others, and kath auto in itself, etc.  With the piece of chalk materiality is always co present.  The just act points to the idea of justice as a limited look or aspect of the idea, or thought more rigorously the just act is done out of the spirit of the idea of justice.

 All of this goes to say that the Greek Gods dwell in the region of Alethia (truth, unhiddeness).  A key point is that the gods don’t appear to everyone in their fullness (enargeis), such as Athena appearing to Odysseus but not to Telemachus beside him.  Athena favored Odysseus primarily because she saw him as her mortal equal in wisdom, cunning, and strategic thinking.

As the Greek goddess of wisdom and tactical warfare, she admired how he relied on his intellect rather than brute strength to survive and overcome obstacles.

  • Shared Traits: Athena explicitly tells Odysseus in Homer’s Odyssey that she loves him because they are both masters of crafty strategy and clever storytelling.
  • Tactical Restraint: She valued his self-control and ability to keep a cool head under extreme pressure, contrasting him with more hot-headed heroes like Achilles or Ajax.
  • Mutual Respect: Unlike other gods who demanded blind obedience, Athena treated Odysseus almost like a trusted partner, frequently collaborating with him on disguises and battle plans.
  • Divine Protection: Because of this admiration, she actively intervened to protect him during the Trojan War and guided him safely home to Ithaca despite Poseidon’s wrath.

We thus see a connection between seeing and wisdom, and so a child’s pet rock is going to appear very differently to her before and after she learns about its history and features as an Igneous Rock and how it contrasts with Sedimentary and Metamorphic Rocks.   Hegel, in his inaugural address, Heidelberg, 1816, says “The Being of the universe, at first hidden and concealed, has no power which can offer resistance to the search for knowledge; it has to lay itself open before the seeker — to set before his eyes and give for his enjoyment, its riches and its depths.” Heidegger said: “Both scientific and prescientific comportments are a knowing in the sense of uncovering what is previously concealed, of revealing what was previously covered up, of disclosing what so far was closed off.”

You can definitely be a connoisseur of geology, particularly in fields where aesthetics, rarity, provenance, and subtle structural nuances matter just as much as they do in fine wine.

While a geologist studies how the Earth works, a geological connoisseur develops a refined eye for specimens, origin, and natural artistry. Here are the primary ways people practice connoisseurship in geology:

1. Fine Mineral Collecting

This is the closest direct parallel to fine wine collecting. High-end mineral collectors—often called aesthetes—evaluate natural crystal specimens based on strict criteria:

  • Provenance. Just as a wine collector prizes a specific French vineyard, a mineral connoisseur prizes famous “type localities” (such as Tsumeb in Namibia or the Sweet Home Mine in Colorado) known for producing world-class specimens.
  • Aesthetics and Balance. Collectors look for unblemished crystal terminations, vibrant color zoning, natural luster, and how well a crystal sits on its host rock (the matrix).
  • Rarity and History. Historic specimens with documented pedigrees from famous 19th- or 20th-century collections command high value and prestige.

2. Gemology and Rough Stones

Beyond cut diamonds, gem connoisseurs appreciate the subtle varieties of natural stones:

  • Optical Phenomena. Seeking out rare effects like asterism (star sapphires), chatoyancy (cat’s-eye), or intense color-change (alexandrite).
  • Inclusions. Rather than demanding a “flawless” stone, connoisseurs often prize specific natural inclusions—like “horsetail” fibers in demantoid garnet—that prove a gem’s natural origin and geographic pedigree.

3. Suiseki and Viewing Stones

Originating in China (as Gongshi) and Japan (as Suiseki), this is a traditional art form dedicated to appreciating naturally occurring, uncarved rocks.

  • Connoisseurs evaluate stones for shape, texture, patina, and suggestive power—such as a small river-worn stone that evokes a distant mountain range or waterfall.
  • True connoisseurship here requires patience, as the stone’s surface sheen is often developed over decades through hand-rubbing and misting with water.

4. Meteorites and Fossils

  • Meteorite Connoisseurs. Collectors distinguish between subtle structural classes—such as pallasites (translucent olivine crystals suspended in nickel-iron) or rare lunar and Martian fragments—appreciating the etched crystalline patterns (Widmanstätten patterns) that only form over millions of years in zero gravity.
  • Fossil Collectors. Connoisseurs look past simple dinosaur bones to appreciate exquisite preservation, such as soft-tissue impressions, iridescent ammonites, or delicate trilobites painstakingly prepared from limestone matrix.

5. Terroir and “Wine Geology”

Interestingly, the two worlds directly overlap in the study of terroir—how bedrock, soil drainage, and topography shape the character of grapes. While scientists debate whether you can literally “taste” rocks, wine-geology enthusiasts love tracing how specific formations—like the Kimmeridgian limestone of Chablis or the volcanic soils of Mount Etna—influence how vines grow and ripen.

But perhaps the easiest way to look at it is upon reading Plato’s Republic for a second time after being saturated by the secondary literature commentaries, previously read Republic passages you skipped over and barely noticed before now scream at you that they are important for making sense of the text though you simply overlooked them the first time through.  Alethia as a core concept means emerging from hiddenness, and so to the pet rock there belongs a hiding that turns into an emergence when the child begins to become a rock connoisseur in science class and progresses beyond when she becomes a geology professor emeritus.  Again, there is a unity between person and thing where the thing ever more fully emerges as what it is in relation to the person for who it was a life passion.

Conclusion

I hope you enjoyed reading the beginning of this lecture course by Heidegger.  To really understand Heidegger and the Greeks we need to think the opposition between polis and apolis.  Polis or city state represented the communal nature of the Greeks which was how they identified themselves with such things as gathering arete/virtue.  This changed as the age of the individual arose with the sophists and philosophers.  The collective was still very important, as we see with Aristotle, but even with him the highest form of human life was Theoria, the contemplative life.  We see the tension between individual and collective in The Antigone where the dedication to family and gods of Antigone clashes against the representative of the will of the collective, the King.  This was a disjointedness in the heart of the Greek soul, and so “”[s]uch is the rise and the fall of man in his historical abode of essence – hupsipolis -apolis – far exceeding abodes, homeless, as Sophocles (Antigone) calls man (90).”

The other aspect here is how Philosophy was meant to correct the disorderly, restlessness of the soul – giving it the constancy of the movement of the stars.  Stripped of the distractions of life, the soul is figuratively in cabin fever in a rainy cottage.  This is why the shades in the Greek afterlife were restless wanderers.  In one of his fundamental statements about this Heidegger writes:

Aristotle, Plato’s disciple, relates at one place (Nicomachean Ethics, Z 7, 1141b 77ff ) the basic conception determining the Greek view on the essence of the thinker: ‘It is said they (the thinkers) indeed know things that are excessive, and thus astounding, and thereby difficult, and hence in general ‘demonic (daimonia)’- but also useless, for they are not seeking what is, according to the straightforward popular opinion, good for man.’ … The Greeks, to whom we owe the essence and name of ‘philosophy’ and of the ‘philosopher,’ already knew quite well that thinkers are not ‘close to life.’ But only the Greeks concluded from this lack of closeness to life that the thinkers are then the most necessary – precisely in view of the essential misery of man (100)

We get the definitive image from Nietzsche in a letter to Overbeck where he relates the cabin fever of his friends in a rainy cottage where he, by contrary, was delighted writing one of his untimely meditations.

This all gives some windows into aletheia/truth as unhiddenness, and points forward to the modern period where “certainty as the ultimate arbiter of truth only entered the western tradition following the Christian theological interpretation of truth, specifically in Luther and Thomas, and there only under the specific rubric that arose for a need for the certainty of the salvation of the soul (esp.P 51-4).” This disaster can hardly be overstated because our basic stance toward life became securing against doubt and so created a new underlying sea of anxiety, analogous to how diets can be counterproductive because you are thinking of food all the time.