Last time I did a reading of Plato’s Allegory of the Cave from the Republic guided by Heidegger’s interpretation of Plato’s cave pioneered in his The Essence of Truth: On Plato’s Cave Allegory and Theaetetus, a lecture course he did from 1932.

Today I’m going to look at the meaning three intersecting concepts, Ethics, Morality, and Freedom, under the guidance of Heidegger’s lecture course on Kant’s moral philosophy (1930), his book on Schelling and freedom (1936), and Nietzsche’s take on freedom (Twilight of the Idols, 1888).

Ethics/morality and freedom go together for Heidegger. There is going to be a “freedom from (free from oppressions, bigotry, enslavement, violence, etc that we want)” and a “freedom for” that “makes possible:” the mind unconsciously legislates the rule that I am morally accountable for my actions, unlike animals and certain mentally challenged people who are not responsible in that way. The dog is not evil because it bites you, and only humans have the freedom for/possibility of evil, can sink below animals in terms of depravity. Our freedom is unlike causality in nature where like causes result in like effects, and so triplets may grow up in the same abusive household where one results in severe PTSD, the next sibling is unaffected, and the third sibling is stronger for the abuse (that which does not kill me makes me stronger – Nietzsche).

Etymology (word history) is important in research because it takes us close to those who coined/created the concepts and experienced them in a virgin way, unlike us who have thousands of years of bias and tradition accumulated on top of them. What are the etymologies of freedom, morality and ethics and what do they illuminate about the phenomena?

Freedom (Old English frēodōm): from frēo (“free”) + -dōm (“state, condition, jurisdiction”). Frēo derives from Proto-Germanic frijaz (“beloved; not in bondage”), ultimately from PIE pri- (“to love”). The sense shifted from “dear/beloved” (applied to free clan members, as opposed to slaves) to “not in bondage,” “acting of one’s own will,” and later “exemption from arbitrary control” or “civil liberty.” Cognates include German Freiheit, Dutch vrijdom, and links to words for friendship, peace, and love (e.g., Gothic frijon “to love”).

This illuminates freedom as originally relational and affirmative rather than purely negative. It is not merely absence of external constraint (the “freedom from” oppression, enslavement, or violence), but a positive state of belonging, self-determination, and being “dear” enough to act from one’s own disposition—closer to a “freedom for” that opens possibilities. Unlike natural causality (like causes yielding like effects), this freedom allows divergent outcomes from the same conditions (as in the triplets example), because it involves a capacity for self-binding and response that animals lack. The love-root underscores why only humans can be accountable or sink into depravity: freedom is the ground that makes moral responsibility possible, not a mechanical product of it.

Etymologically, recovering this “virgin” sense cuts through later layers of political or legal accumulation, revealing freedom as the condition for authentic enactment rather than mere license.

Morality (late 14th c. moralite): from Old French moralité and Late Latin moralitas (“manner, character”), from Latin moralis (“of manners or morals; proper behavior in society”). Cicero coined moralis to translate Greek ēthikos, from mos/moris (“one’s disposition”; in plural, “customs, manners, morals”). The root of mos is uncertain (possibly linked to notions of will or mood). Meanings developed from “moral qualities/virtuous conduct” to “system of ethical duties” and “goodness.”

This points to morality as rooted in customary character and social manners—how one is disposed and conducts oneself within a community—rather than abstract rules imposed from outside. It highlights the phenomenon as lived disposition and accountability for actions (humans alone are “morally” responsible; a dog’s bite is not “evil”). The connection to freedom is direct: without the capacity for free self-determination, there is no morality, only causality or instinct. The etymology strips away later systematizing traditions to show morality as emerging from the free enactment of character amid customs, enabling both virtue and the possibility of falling below the animal (depravity requires the freedom that animals lack).

Ethics (c. 1600 as “science of morals”; earlier ethik): from Middle English/Old French et(h)ique, Late Latin ethica, from Greek ēthikē philosophia (“moral philosophy”), from ēthikos (“pertaining to character”), from ēthos (“moral character, habitual disposition, custom, habit, accustomed place”; plural “manners”). Related to ethos as the characteristic spirit or habitat of a people; Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics derives ethical virtue from ethos (habit). Proto – Indo – European links involve reflexive/self notions.

Ethics illuminates the phenomena as inquiry into character formed by habit and dwelling (ēthos as both moral nature and “accustomed place”). It is not primarily a code but the study of how free beings shape (and are shaped by) their habitual way of being. This aligns with the “freedom for” that makes possible moral accountability: ethics concerns the open space in which character is enacted, distinct from natural necessity. The Greek root, closer to original experience, reveals ethics as tied to one’s place and disposition rather than detached legislation—echoing how freedom (as self-binding possibility) grounds the moral law, not vice versa. Animals have habits but lack the free projection of character that allows ethical (or unethical) depth.

Together, these etymologies—recovering senses nearer to those who first experienced the concepts—show freedom, morality, and ethics as interwoven: freedom (from love/belonging to self-determined possibility) is the ontological condition that “makes possible” moral accountability and ethical character (rooted in custom, disposition, and habit). Only free beings can be responsible, choose (or fail) in ways that diverge from causal necessity, and thus rise to virtue or sink into evil. This resonates with the Heideggerian framing in which freedom grounds the ought and the manifestness of good/evil as possibilities for Dasein, rather than morality preceding or constraining freedom. The “virgin” roots cut through accumulated bias, revealing the phenomena as existential rather than merely juridical or behavioral.