theistic metaethics

A Primer in Religion and Morality

My recent interview for the Atheistically Speaking podcast inspired me to compile this quick primer in religion and morality, in order to help clarify the many different concepts at play when we talk about morality with and without God. I consider this a work-in-progress so any constructive criticism would be appreciated. Update (5 May 2015): I have revised A Primer in Religion and Morality

Naturalism, Theism, and Moral Ontology: A Reply to William Lane Craig

Abstract: This paper considers William Lane Craig’s metaethical argument for God’s existence. Roughly, the argument is that the existence of objective moral values provides strong evidence for God’s existence. I consider one by one Craig’s various reasons in support of the argument’s major premise, namely, that objective moral values and the nonexistence of God are at Naturalism, Theism, and Moral Ontology: A Reply to William Lane Craig

G&T Rebuttal, Part 6: Chapter 7

Chapter 7. Mother Theresa vs. Hitler In this chapter, G&T present a version of the moral argument for God’s existence which I call the “Moral Laws Require a Moral Lawgiver Argument,” which they formulate as follows. Like the earlier arguments, this argument is deductively valid. Like the earlier chapters about this argument, I plan to G&T Rebuttal, Part 6: Chapter 7

What Explains God’s Moral Grounding Power? A Problem for Divine Command Ethics

The Divine Command Theory says that God possesses the power to ground or create moral obligations. Let’s call this power, in virtue of which God’s commands ground moral obligations, ‘moral grounding power’ (MG-power). Moral Grounding Power (MG-power): Being B has MG-power if and only if the commands of B ground moral obligations I want to What Explains God’s Moral Grounding Power? A Problem for Divine Command Ethics

More on the Arbitrariness Objection to the Divine Command Theory

I’ve been carrying on a conversation with Matthew Flannagan about the arbitrariness objection to the divine command theory. You can find my first post on the issue here and Matt’s response here. In this post I am going to continue my defense, against Flannagan’s objections, of the arbitrariness argument (AA): A very brief summary of More on the Arbitrariness Objection to the Divine Command Theory

Quentin Smith on Bertrand Russell on “Unyielding Despair” and the Meaning of Life

In his essay, “A Free Man’s Worship,” Bertrand Russell writes: Such, in outline, but even more purposeless, more void of meaning, is the world which Science presents for our belief. Amid such a world, if anywhere, our ideals henceforward must find a home. That man is the product of causes which had no prevision of Quentin Smith on Bertrand Russell on “Unyielding Despair” and the Meaning of Life

Important New (Advanced but) Must-Read Book on Ethics without God by Erik Wielenberg

Oxford University Press has just published the latest book by Erik Wielenberg, entitled Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism. Those of you who are regular readers of this blog know that I am a big fan of Wielenberg’s work; his previous books include Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe (Cambridge Important New (Advanced but) Must-Read Book on Ethics without God by Erik Wielenberg

Matthew Flannagan on The Arbitrariness Objection to Divine Command Ethics

There is a standard objection to the divine command theory (DCT) that runs as follows: I’ll call this the Arbitrariness Argument (AA).  You can find versions of this argument in Walter Sinnot-Armstrong’s book Morality Without God?  and in his article “Why Traditional Theism Cannot Provide an Adequate Foundation for Morality.” Here is a quote from the latter: Matthew Flannagan on The Arbitrariness Objection to Divine Command Ethics