A Primer in Religion and Morality
My recent interview for the Atheistically Speaking podcast inspired me to compile this quick primer in religion and morality, in order to help clarify the many different concepts at play when we talk about morality with and without God. I consider this a work-in-progress so any constructive criticism would be appreciated. Update (5 May 2015): I have revised … A Primer in Religion and Morality
Some Thoughts on Naturalism and Morality
It is supposed, by some, to be difficult for naturalism to account for moral properties (both axiological properties like goodness and badness and deontic properties like rightness and wrongness). William Lane Craig and Paul Copan, have each argued incessantly that naturalism cannot account for moral properties. Craig has offered the following argument: This argument has … Some Thoughts on Naturalism and Morality
What Explains God’s Moral Grounding Power? Part II
In an earlier article, I wrote about a question for divine command metaethics, a question that I called the Moral Grounding Question. Moral Grounding Question (MGQ): In virtue of what do God’s commands ground moral obligations? (or, in virtue of what does God have MG-power?) In that previous post, I explained the moral grounding question … What Explains God’s Moral Grounding Power? Part II
Naturalism, Theism, and Moral Ontology: A Reply to William Lane Craig
Abstract: This paper considers William Lane Craig’s metaethical argument for God’s existence. Roughly, the argument is that the existence of objective moral values provides strong evidence for God’s existence. I consider one by one Craig’s various reasons in support of the argument’s major premise, namely, that objective moral values and the nonexistence of God are at … Naturalism, Theism, and Moral Ontology: A Reply to William Lane Craig
On Atheism and Brightness
I’m often told that atheists are really smart when it comes to religion. Then I read their replies to moral arguments for God’s existence and cry out, “WTF?” Take this argument: If no G, then no O. But O. Therefore, G. Why the f&*^ would anyone think it’s even relevant to bring up X, Y, … On Atheism and Brightness
G&T Rebuttal, Part 6: Chapter 7
Chapter 7. Mother Theresa vs. Hitler In this chapter, G&T present a version of the moral argument for God’s existence which I call the “Moral Laws Require a Moral Lawgiver Argument,” which they formulate as follows. Like the earlier arguments, this argument is deductively valid. Like the earlier chapters about this argument, I plan to … G&T Rebuttal, Part 6: Chapter 7
What Explains God’s Moral Grounding Power? A Problem for Divine Command Ethics
The Divine Command Theory says that God possesses the power to ground or create moral obligations. Let’s call this power, in virtue of which God’s commands ground moral obligations, ‘moral grounding power’ (MG-power). Moral Grounding Power (MG-power): Being B has MG-power if and only if the commands of B ground moral obligations I want to … What Explains God’s Moral Grounding Power? A Problem for Divine Command Ethics
Paul Copan’s Noseeum Argument Against Ethics Without God
Over the last fifteen or so years, Paul Copan has written a variety of articles, chapters, and books which argue against ethics without God. (To be precise, Copan argues against atheistic or naturalistic metaethics.) As I interpret him, Copan offers several independent arguments against ethics without God. I call one of those arguments “Copan’s Noseeum … Paul Copan’s Noseeum Argument Against Ethics Without God
An Incompatible-Properties Argument against Objective Values
In this post I want to sketch an argument against objective values (moral or otherwise). I shall first analyze the noun “value” and then the expression “moral value.” Finally, I will use these definitions to explicitly formulate an argument that objective values, so defined, have logically incompatible properties. In other words, the concept of an … An Incompatible-Properties Argument against Objective Values
More on the Arbitrariness Objection to the Divine Command Theory
I’ve been carrying on a conversation with Matthew Flannagan about the arbitrariness objection to the divine command theory. You can find my first post on the issue here and Matt’s response here. In this post I am going to continue my defense, against Flannagan’s objections, of the arbitrariness argument (AA): A very brief summary of … More on the Arbitrariness Objection to the Divine Command Theory