bookmark_borderWorldviews as Problem-Solving Proposals

Can a worldview be true (or false)?  I have been thinking of a worldview as a set of basic assumptions that contitute a philosophy of life, or a logical structure that approximates a philosophy of life.  On this conception of a worldview, it seems that a worldview is the kind of thing that could be true (or false).
However, I have also been thinking, for many years, that worldviews can be understood in terms of problem solving, especially as analogous to problem solving for medical issues.  One can analyze a worldview in the following terms:

  • Symptoms of the human situation
  • Diagnosis of the “Disease” that represents the root cause (or causes) of the Symptoms
  • Therapy or Prescription proposed to cure or alleviate the “Disease”
  • Prognosis providing predictions of what is likely to happen concerning Symptoms and  the “Disease” if the proposed Therapy or Prescription is followed, and if it is NOT followed.

Often, there is more than one therapy or prescription that could be used in an attempt to cure or alleviate a disease.  In such cases, the proposed therapy is not something that could be evaluated as “true” or “false”, but rather as “better” or “worse”,  particularly in terms of effectiveness and risk of bad side effects.
One therapy might be very effective, but also carry a high risk of bad side effects, while another therapy is less effective but also carries a lower risk of bad side effects, or perhaps an equal risk of less serious side effects.  There are generally various pros and cons to weigh along these lines.  A therapy that is completely ineffective might be said to be a “false” cure, in that it is false that this therapy will cure the disease or that it is likely to cure the disease.  But generally, we have to decide between alternative therapies each of which has some degree of effectiveness and also some degree of risk of bad side-effects.
To what extent can a problem-solving proposal be evaluated as true or false?
SYPMTOMS of an actual disease are factual and empirical in nature.  A person’s temperature can be measured to determine whether or not he/she has a fever.  Blood and urine samples can be colleted and objective facts can be determined from them, such as blood sugar level, the number of white blood cells/cubic centimeter, the presence of bacteria in the urine, and so on.  Claims about symptoms of disease are typically factual and empirical in nature.
A DIAGNOSIS that disease X is causing symptoms 1, 2, and 3, is typically based on evidence plus beliefs about the existence and nature of various diseases.  The beliefs about the existence and nature of a disease can be well-grounded in scientific observations and investigations.  So, a diagnosis can be well-grounded in both facts about a patient (e.g. symptoms and test results) as well as in scientific hypotheses and theories that are themselves well-grounded in empirical facts.  DIAGNOSIS incorporates observations, facts, theories, and reasoning that makes use of such information.
A THERAPY or PRESCRIPTION is in turn based on the diagnosis, plus information about the patient’s current health status, and information about the usual course of a disease condition as well as information about the effectiveness and risks of various potential therapies or prescriptions that is based on both scientific observation and investigation and on the experiences of the physician in dealing with that disease and/or similar diseases.  The judgement that a THERAPY or PRESCRIPTION ought to be implemented in the case of a particular patient is based on factual information, but involves more evaluative reasoning, the weighing or pros and cons to determine what is best for this particular patient.
Although this aspect of medicine involves evaluative reasoning, and is not purely factual in nature, there is a large degree of objectivity here, since humans universally prefer to be healthy rather than to be sick or diseased.  We all want to be cured when we have a disease, unless the cure is worse than the disease.  And “bad side effects” are universally undesirable.  Nobody wants to experience headaches, nasea, vomitting, cramps, loss of consciousness, or death, at least very few people would find such side effects to be desirable.
Subjectivity comes in, primarily, in terms of how much weight to give to the risk of various potential bad side effects versus how much weight to give the potential to cure or alleviate the disease and/or the symptoms of the disease.  The judgment that a particular THERAPY or PRESCRIPTION is best for a particular patient often requires weighing several pros and cons together to arrive at an all-things-considered conclusion.
A PROGNOSIS is more factaul and objective than the evaluative judgement proposing a therapy or prescription.  A PROGNOSIS is more like a DIAGNOSIS and involves not only factual data about the particular patient, but general information about the diagnosed disease that comes from scientific observations and investigations as well as from the experiences of the physician in dealing with that disease or similar diseases.
In conclusion, in the case of problem solving related to medical issues, there is a great deal of factaul and empirical information that is used, and the conclusions (Symptoms, Diagnosis, Therapy/Prescription, and Prognosis) are generally also of a factual nature, with the exception that the recommendation of a THERAPY or PRESCRIPTION involves evaluative reasoning, and a degree of subjectivity in terms of the weighting of each consideration (pros and cons) that is used to arrive at the recommendation.
Thus, at least with problem solving related to literal medical issues, the concepts of “true” and “false” clearly apply, although medical recommendations of a particular THERAPY or PRESCRIPTION do involve a degree of subjectivity.  Nevertheless, if a THERAPY or PRESCRPTION is based on a false DIAGNOSIS or on false beliefs about SYMPTOMS or on a false theory about a disease, then that THERAPY or PRESCRIPTION is clearly defective.
Furthermore, even if the factual information used to formulate the recommendation of a THERAPY or PRESCRIPTION is true, there can be faulty reasoning on the part of the physician which would also make the recommendation clearly faulty.  So, there can be clear-cut cases of bad or faulty THERAPY or PRESCRIPTION recommendations, and there can be clear-cut cases of good or justified THERAPY or PRESCRIPTION recommendations, so something akin to truth and falsehood has application to this aspect of medical problem solving.
To the extent that medical problem solving is analogous to what is going on in religious and secular worldviews, then truth and falsehood have application to the assumptions and beliefs that make up a worldview.

bookmark_borderOne Man’s Modus Ponens…Part 4

In A Companion to Philosophy of Religion, there is an article by Jeffrey Jordan on “Pragmatic Arguments”, that covers Pascal’s Wager. According to Jordan, there are at least three versions of Pascal’s Wager. In this post I will examine one of the three versions, which goes something like this:
1. Either God exists or it is NOT the case that God exists.
2. If God exists, then a person who believes in God will be much better off than a nonbeliever.
3. If it is NOT the case that God exists, then a person who believes in God will be no worse off than a nonbeliever.
Therefore:
4. In terms of practical considerations, a person who believes in God will in no case be worse off than a nonbeliever, and there is a chance (if God exists) that a person who believes in God will be much better off than a nonbeliever.
Therefore:
5. In terms of practical considerations, it is better to be a person who believes in God than a nonbeliever.
A similar argument can be made for the opposite conclusion:
1. Either God exists or it is NOT the case that God exists.
6. If it is NOT the case that God exists, then a nonbeliever will be better off than a person who believes in God.
7. If God exists, then a nonbeliever will be no worse off than a person who believes in God.
Therefore:
8. In terms of practical considerations, a nonbeliever will in no case be worse off than a person who believes in God, and there is a chance (if it is NOT the case that God exists) that a nonbeliever will be better off than a person who believes in God
Therefore:
9. In terms of practical considerations, it is better to be a nonbeliever than a person who believes in God.
Premise (6) asserts that nonbelievers have the advantage over people who believe in God, assuming that God does NOT exist. The most obvious point here is that nonbelievers can sleep in on Sunday morning, or as Steve Martin put it, we atheists can watch football in our underpants on Sundays:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wogta8alHiU
Of course being a believer in God does not necessarily mean that one is a devout Christian who goes to church every Sunday, but a person who believes in God is subject to various religious appeals, traditions, and practices, while a nonbeliever has little or no interest in such religious traditions or practices.
A person who believes in God is likely to have various concerns and even anxieties about God:
a. What does God expect of me?
b. Does God care about the happiness and well-being of individual humans?
c. If God does care about the happiness and well-being of individual humans, then why do so many people suffer? Why do so many people die of starvation? Why do so many people die of cancer and other diseases? Why is there so much war and violence in the world?
d. If God does not care about the happiness and well-being of individual humans, then how can we consider God to be a perfectly good person?
e. Has God attempted to communicate to human beings? Is there a book that contains divine revelation, messages of wisdom and guidance from God?
f. If so, which book among alleged divine revelations is truly a message from God?
g. If there is no such book or message from God, then how can we consider God to be a perfectly good person?
h. Is there a religion that is the true religion?
i. If there is a true religion, which of the many existing relgions is the true one?
j. If there is no true religion, then how can we believe that God is a perfectly good person?
k. Does God have a plan or mission for my life? or Does God just have general expectations or requirements for humans?
l. If God does have a specific plan or mission for my life, then how can I find out the contents of that plan?
These are just a few of the obvious questions and concerns that a person who believes in God is likely to take seriously, and ought to take seriously. If someone does not take these and similar questions seriously, then he or she probably does not actually believe in God, but only says so to avoid drawing attention to himself or herself.
A nonbeliever is free of these worries and concerns. If there is no God, then a person who believes in God has taken upon himself/herself a number of issues and concerns that are (assuming there is no God) irrelevant and useless, questions that have no bearing on reality. Belief in God is not strictly a theoretical position; it has practical and psychological implications; it comes with a cost. If there is no God, then one is better off by not taking on the practical and psychological costs involved with belief in God.
Furthermore, as a matter of fact, there is no clear and obvious solution to the problem of evil, and there is no clear and obvious answer to the question ‘Which alleged book of divine revelation is truly a divine revelation?’ nor to the question ‘Which of the many religions in the world is the true religion?’. So, the effort and level of anxiety involved in taking these questions seriously is significant. An authentic and thoughtful believer in God has a whole series of difficult issues to confront and work through, issues that nonbelievers can simply set aside as irrelevant to reality.
Premise (7) asserts that a nonbeliever is no worse off than a believer, even if God does exist. Pascal, and many modern Christians, would object that a believer in God can enjoy eternal life in heaven, while a nonbeliever will (if there is a God) be bound for eternal misery in hell.
But there are some serious problems with this objection. First, Pascal asserts that reason cannot determine whether God exists or not. But ‘heaven’ is understood to be God’s reward to righteous people, and ‘hell’ is understood to be God’s punishment of wicked people. So, if reason cannot determine whether God exists or not, then reason also cannot determine whether there is a heaven or a hell in the next life.
Pascal could reply that we are thinking hypothetically here. We are supposing that God does exist, and trying to figure out the implications of that supposition. If God did exist, then it seems likely that God would reward good people in an afterlife and punish evil people in an afterlife, in order to compensate for the injustices that we see in this life (where evil people sometimes have happy lives and good people sometimes have lives of sorrow and misery).
But being good and being bad is not the same as believing in God or being a nonbeliever. Bad people can believe in God, and good people can be nonbelievers. So, if we are concerned about God giving some people rewards in the afterlife for being good and giving punishments in the afterlife for being bad, then the distinction between believers and nonbelievers is largely beside the point.
Furthermore, Pascal was a Catholic, and Catholic theology does NOT teach that belief in God is what gets a person into heaven. According to Catholic theology, one must die in a state of grace in order to be certain of eternal happiness in heaven. Believing in God might be a necessary condition for dying in a state of grace, but it is clearly NOT a sufficient condition. One must accept other theological and metaphysical doctrines taught by the Catholic church, and one must be baptized, and one must have confessed one’s sins and received absolution, etc.
From a Protestant point of view, salvation is absurdly uncertain in Catholic teaching. One could be a completely devout Catholic every hour of every day for one’s entire life, for 100 years, and then in the last 60 seconds before death, commit a mortal sin and die before confessing or repenting of that sin, and such a person would end up being tortured in hell for all eternity, according to Catholic teaching. Obviously, belief in God accomplishes nothing for such a person.
More importantly, however, the doctrine of eternal punishment is clearly false. God is a perfectly good person, but even imperfect human beings can recognize that torturing a person is morally wrong, even if the person being tortured deserves to be punished for some morally wrong or evil action. It is even more obvious that torturing a person for eternity would be morally wrong, even if the person being tortured deserved some sort of punishment for evil actions. If God is a morally perfect person, then surely God would not stoop to torture, and the idea that God would stoop to torturing a person for an eternity is simply absurd.
So, thinking hypothetically, and supposing that there was a God, I am completely certain that there is no risk that God, who is a perfectly morally good person (based on the meaning of the word ‘God’), would ever consider torturing any human being eternally, not even Adolf Hitler deserves such a horrific fate.
I am also completely certain that a morally perfect person would never torture some people because they did not believe in God in their earthly lifetime, nor would a morally perfect person impose a serious punishment on a person for failing to believe in God. Being mistaken about the issue ‘Does God exist?’ is NOT a moral failing. It is, at worst, an intellectual failing.
A perfectly good and perfectly just deity would not seriously punish a human being for an intellectual failing, particularly if the person in question made a serious effort to figure out the correct and true answer to this question, but made some errors in reasoning, or failed to fully appreciate the force of a certain bit of evidence, and so on.
Yes, Jehovah, the god of the Bible, would send people to hell simply because they held an incorrect metaphysical or theological belief. But Jehovah is clearly a false god, precisely for that reason. I’m not concerned with the question ‘Does Jehovah exist?’, I’m concerned with the question ‘Does God exist?’, and we are NOT considering the hypothesis that Jehovah exists, but rather the supposition that God exists, and that suppostion means that we are thinking about the existence of a morally perfect person, a person who was utterly and completely a good person.
So, do atheist or nonbelievers have anything to fear, if it should turn out that they are mistaken on the metaphysical issue ‘Does God exist?’ No, because God, if God exists, is a perfectly good and just person, and so God, unlike Jehovah, would have absolutely no interest in punishing any human being simply for holding a mistaken metaphysical belief. Thus, atheists have no reason to think there is any chance that God would torture them in hell for being nonbelievers.
Furthermore, since a perfectly good and just deity would judge people in terms of morally relevant considerations (and NOT on basis of philsophical and metaphysical beliefs that were honestly held), nonbelievers have just as much chance of being granted eternal life in heaven as believers.
In fact, nonbelievers might have a better chance, given that God, if God exists, designed the human brain, and presumably wants humans to make good use of the brain he designed. To the extent that nonbelievers are critical thinkers who insist on thinking their own thoughts and arriving at their own conclusions, and refuse to follow religious authorities, refuse to be like sheep following a shepherd, God might well prefer the company of such people over the company of those who are happy to let others do their thinking for them.
If I were God, I would prefer the company of independent-minded critical thinkers to the company of sheeplike people who were credulous and who simply believe what they are told.
Given that God is a perfectly good and just person, we can rule out the doctrine of eternal punishment. Since God is just we cannot rule out punishments or rewards in the afterlife, if it turns out there is a God. But punishments and rewards from a perfectly good and just person would NOT be based on whether someone held particular metaphysical beliefs and theories. Believers in God can be evil people, and nonbelievers can be paragons of virtue, and the reality is that most people are somewhere in the middle, whether they believe in God or not.
Atheists and nonbelievers are therefore not in a worse position than believers concerning happiness in an afterlife, even if we assume that atheists are mistaken and that God does exist. Therefore, since atheists are better off than theists if there is no God, and atheists are not worse off if there is a God, then it is better to be an atheist than to be a theist.

bookmark_borderOne Man’s Modus Ponens…Part 2

Here is another argument for God, based on answered prayers:
1. If God exists, then it is very likely that prayers to God for healing from injury or disease would usually be immediately followed by instantaneous and complete healing, except when the injury or disease was the result of self-destructive, foolish, or morally wrong actions on the part of the person who is suffering from the injury or disease.
2. If it is NOT the case that God exists, then it is very unlikely that prayers to God for healing from injury or disease would usually be immediately followed by instantaneous and complete healing, except when the injury or disease was the result of self-destructive, foolish, or morally wrong actions on the part of the person who is suffering from the injury or disease.
3. Prayers to God for healing from injury or disease are usually immediately followed by instantaneous and complete healing, except when the injury or disease was the result of self-destructive, foolish, or morally wrong actions on the part of the person who is suffering from the injury or disease.
Therefore:
4. Other things being equal, it is probable that God exists.
This argument can be reformulated by asserting the negation of premise (3), thus turning the tables and making an argument against the existence of God:
1. If God exists, then it is very likely that prayers to God for healing from injury or disease would usually be immediately followed by instantaneous and complete healing, except when the injury or disease was the result of self-destructive, foolish, or morally wrong actions on the part of the person who is suffering from the injury or disease.
2. If it is NOT the case that God exists, then it is very unlikely that prayers to God for healing from injury or disease would usually be immediately followed by instantaneous and complete healing, except when the injury or disease was the result of self-destructive, foolish, or morally wrong actions on the part of the person who is suffering from the injury or disease.
5. It is NOT the case that prayers to God for healing from injury or disease are usually immediately followed by instantaneous and complete healing, except when the injury or disease was the result of self-destructive, foolish, or morally wrong actions on the part of the person who is suffering from the injury or disease.
Therefore:
6. Other things being equal, it is probable that God does NOT exist.

bookmark_borderOne Man’s Modus Ponens…

Here is an argument for the existence of God:
1. If there is a God, then it is very likely that there is a book that was written many centuries ago that is purported to be a divine revelation, and that is widely known about, and that is filled with nothing but true facts and wisdom and clear and sound moral guidance, and that provides great help for people to live good and happy lives.
2. If there is no God, then it is very unlikely that there is a book that was written many centuries ago that is purported to be a divine revelation, and that is widely known about, and that is filled with nothing but true facts and wisdom and clear and sound moral guidance, and that provides great help for people to live good and happy lives.
3. There is a book that was written many centuries ago that is purported to be a divine revelation, and that is widely known about, and that is filled with nothing but true facts and wisdom and clear and sound moral guidance, and that provides great help for people to live good and happy lives.
Therefore:
4. Other things being equal, it is probable that God exists.
I chose to structure this as a probability argument rather than as a modus ponens, but the saying ‘One man’s modus ponens is another man’s modus tollens.’ (a lovely skeptical principle) can be applied here, in a manner of speaking.
The first two premises seem plausible to me, but premise (3) is clearly false. So, the tables can be turned, and this argument can be reformulated to be used as a reason for rejecting or doubting the existence of God:
1. If there is a God, then it is very likely that there is a book that was written many centuries ago that is purported to be a divine revelation, and that is widely known about, and that is filled with nothing but true facts and wisdom and clear and sound moral guidance, and that provides great help for people to live good and happy lives.
2. If there is no God, then it is very unlikely that there is a book that was written many centuries ago that is purported to be a divine revelation, and that is widely known about, and that is filled with nothing but true facts and wisdom and clear and sound moral guidance, and that provides great help for people to live good and happy lives.
5. There is no book that was written many centuries ago that is purported to be a divine revelation, and that is widely known about, and that is filled with nothing but true facts and wisdom and clear and sound moral guidance, and that provides great help for people to live good and happy lives.
Therefore:
6. Other things being equal, it is probable that God does NOT exist.
Obviously, premise (5) is controversial and will require a fair amount of support (including criticism of the Old Testament, the Quran, the Vedas, etc.). But I am quite confident that a strong case can be made for (5), and that a reasonable and open-minded theist could be persuaded by facts and reasons that (5) is true.

bookmark_borderArrogant Atheists?

This is more than two months old, but I still think this is interesting.
https://blogs.elon.edu/servingatheists/?p=1535
What’s interesting to me is that, according to these survey results, there is a certain symmetry between, on the one hand, theistic stereotypes about atheists, and, on the other hand, atheistic stereotypes about theists.

  Dominant Theistic View Dominant Atheistic View
Morality of “Other” Side Atheists are less moral than theists Atheists are as or more moral than theists (99.5%)
    Religion is a force for bad in the world (87%)
Mental Health of “Other” Side Atheists are psychologically maladjusted Theists are less psychologically healthy than atheists (56%)
Stigmatization of “Their” Side   Atheists are Unfairly Stigmatized (86%)

If these survey results are accurate, then it would appear that many atheists are the secular equivalent of fundamentalist Christians.
(HT: Keith Augustine)

bookmark_borderThe Alpha course vs. Philosophy


Extract from my OUP book Humanism: A Very Short Introduction, which references the Alpha Course (it’s from chpt 7)
 

Religion vs. shallow, selfish individualism
 
Let’s now turn to religious practice. Setting aside the issue of whether God exists, perhaps it might still be argued that religious reflection or observance is required if our lives are not to be shallow and meaningless. Here is one such argument.
 
It is sometimes claimed, with some justification, that religion encourages people to take a step back and reflect on the bigger questions. Even many non-religious people suppose that a life lived out in the absence of any such reflection is likely to be rather shallow. Contemporary Western society is obsessed with things that are, in truth, comparatively worthless: money, celebrity, material possessions, etc. Our day-to-day lives are out often lived out within a narrow envelope of essentially selfish concerns, with little or no time given to contemplating bigger questions. It was religious tradition and practice that provided the framework within which such questions were once addressed. With the loss of religion, we have inevitably slid into selfish individualism. If we want people to enjoy a more meaningful existence, we need to reinvigorate religious tradition and practice (some would add that we need, in particular, to ensure young people are properly immersed in such practices in school).
 
There is some truth in the above argument. Religion can encourage people to take a step back and contemplate the bigger issues. It can help break the hypnotic spell that a shallow, individualistic culture can cast over young minds.
 
However, religion can itself also promote forms of selfishness – such as a self-interested obsession with achieving ones own salvation or personal enlightenment. And of course religion has itself been used to glorify material wealth, by suggesting that great wealth is actually a sign of God’s favour.
 
Is it true that only religion encourages us to think about the big questions? No. In chapter 1 we saw that there is another long tradition of thought running all the way back to the Ancient world that also addresses the big questions – a secular, philosophical tradition. If we want people, and especially children, to think about such questions, we are not obliged to take the religious route. We can encourage them to think philosophically.
 
Indeed, as I point out in chapter 6, there is evidence that introducing philosophy programmes into the curriculum can have a dramatic impact on both the behaviour of pupils and the ethos and academic standing of their schools.
 
Most contemporary humanists are just as concerned about shallow, selfish individualism as are religious people. They too believe it is important we should sometimes take a step back and consider the big questions. They just deny that the only way to encourage a more responsible and reflective attitude to life is to encourage children to be more religious.
 
If we want to encourage young people to really think about the big questions, philosophy is, arguably, a much more promising approach. The Church of England poses the question “Is this it?” on billboards and buses, promising those who sign up to their Alpha Course “An opportunity to explore the meaning of life”. However,when the religious raise such questions, they are often posed for rhetorical effect only. They are asked, not in the spirit of open, rational enquiry, but merely as the opening gambit in an attempt to sign up new recruits. Unlike religion, philosophy does not approach such questions having already committed itself to certain answers (though it does not rule out religious answers, of course).  Philosophy really does encourage you to think, question and make your own judgement – an approach to answering the Big Questions that, in reality, many religions have traditionally been keen to suppress.

 
Recommendation: If you are interested in exploring the meaning of life, an alternative to the Alpha Course is to get into Philosophy instead. Why not try this?!
 

 
 

bookmark_borderDoes Religion Cause More Harm Than Good?

I don’t know.

To be more precise, it seems obvious to me that religion causes both harm and good. What I don’t know is whether the harmful effects happen more often than the beneficial ones (or if the former somehow qualitatively outweigh the latter). Allow me to explain.

It seems to incredibly simplistic to say either “religion is always bad” or “religion is always good.” There are clearly people who are motivated, by religion, to do good things, such as donate their money to charity, do volunteer work, be honest, kind, compassionate, etc. The fact that such people exist disproves the claim that religion is always bad. (Nontheists may think that such theists are doing the right things for the wrong reasons, but that is irrelevant. Such people show that religion can be good.)

Of course, there are also people who are motivated, by religion, to do bad/evil things, such as fly airplanes into buildings, execute others who renounce their religion, oppose scientific progress, protest at funerals, etc. The fact that such people exist disproves the claim that religion is always good. (Theists may think such people are doing the wrong things for the wrong reasons, but that is irrelevant. Such people show that religion can be bad.)

This is why I think a better approach is to admit that both outcomes are possible and instead try to figure out what is more likely.

I’ve yet to find anything in writing which actually tackles this issue in an intelligent way. In my experience, what usually happens is some atheist will point to examples of bad things done in the name of religion; the theist will respond by saying the actions are inconsistent with the ethical teachings of the religion and/or point out atheist atrocities. What nobody seems to do is to analyze this in a statistically valid way, by figuring out what is representative of theistic behavior and secular behavior. That’s much harder than tossing out “what about the crusades?” and “Stalin killed millions of people!” epithets.

The fact that a claim is hard to justify doesn’t excuse making the claim without justification. The moral of the story is that people should stop making claims about whether atheism or theism lead to an overall balance of good (or evil) unless they can back up those claims.

As an epilogue, if anyone is aware of a study which does try to do this, I’d love to hear from you.

bookmark_borderBenjamin Beit-Hallahmi: Morality and Immorality among the Irreligious

Courtesy of Google books, the entire chapter by Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi is available online for free. 

Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, “Morality and Immorality among the Irreligious” in Atheism and Secularity (ed. Phil Zuckerman, ABC-CLIO, 2009), 113-148.

You may need a valid Google account in order to access the content. Also, you will probably need to scroll down to page 113 or search on the title in order to jump down to the content.

LINK