The purpose of this page is to provide an index for my blog series on Paul Draper’s classic 1989 article defending an evidential argument from evil which focuses on the biological role (and apparent moral randomness) of pain and pleasure.

• Part 1: summarizes key terminology for the argument, as well as the argument itself.
• Part 2: summarizes the first part of Draper’s argument, which purports to show that facts about pain and pleasure are more probable on the hypothesis of indifference (HI) than on theism (T).
• Part 3: summarizes Draper’s refutation of three theodicies which might be used to defeat the first half of his argument
• Part 4: summarizes Draper’s own views on the evidential significance of his argument, as well as reasons for thinking it will be very difficult for theists to offset the evidence about pain and pleasure.

See also:

• “In Defense of an Evidential Argument from Evil: A Reply to William Lane Craig” (2016) by Jeffery Jay Lowder