In the spirit of Ted Drange’s 1998 article, “Incompatible-Properties Arguments: A Survey,” I wish to sketch the following argument for consideration.
Suppose we define “God” as a being who has, among other things, the following attributes:
(m) essentially good; and
(n) morally responsible for His actions.
Using these definitions, we can construct the following argument.
- If God exists, then He is essentially good.
- If God exists, then He is morally responsible for His actions.
- An essentially good being lacks moral freedom, i.e., an essentially good being cannot choose between good and evil.
- A morally responsible being has moral freedom.
- Therefore, it is impossible for an essentially good being to be morally responsible for its actions. [from 3 and 4]
- Therefore, God does not exist. [from 1, 2, and 5]
In order to avoid any misunderstandings, I claim the argument is valid, but I do not know if the argument is sound.
Cf. Wes Morriston, “What Is So Good about Moral Freedom?” The Philosophical Quarterly, 50 (July 2000): 344-58.
This article is archived.