Wes Morriston

The Essentially Good-vs.-Morally Responsible Argument for Atheism

In the spirit of Ted Drange’s 1998 article, “Incompatible-Properties Arguments: A Survey,” I wish to sketch the following argument for consideration. Suppose we define “God” as a being who has, among other things, the following attributes: (m) essentially good; and (n) morally responsible for His actions. Using these definitions, we can construct the following argument. The Essentially Good-vs.-Morally Responsible Argument for Atheism

G&T Rebuttal, Part 2: Chapter 3

Chapter 3. In the Beginning There Was a Great SURGE G&T tell us that the “Cosmological Argument is the argument from the beginning of the universe” (74). That is sloppy; G&T have conflated the family of arguments known as ‘the’ cosmological argument with one specific version of that argument (the kalām cosmological argument). But let G&T Rebuttal, Part 2: Chapter 3

Can Atheism Support Ethical Absolutes? A Reply to Roger Olson

Roger Olson, a fellow Patheos blogger who can be found in the Evangelical channel on Patheos, has recently written a post entitled, “Can Atheism Support Ethical Absolutes? Is Ethics without Absolutes Enough?” In that post, he appeals to what has been called “Karamazov’s Thesis,” which is the claim (attributed to Dostoyevsky), that “If God does not exist, Can Atheism Support Ethical Absolutes? A Reply to Roger Olson