“Suppose Wykstra is right that, if there is a God, then we shouldn’t expect to know what God’s reasons for producing or allowing certain evils are. Then it follows that our ignorance of those reasons (i.e. the failure of the project of theodicy) is not strong evidence against theism. It does not follow, however, that the evils themselves (or other things we know about them) are not strong evidence against theism, nor does it follow that the Humean is mistaken in claiming that the observed distribution of benefits and harms to sentient beings is much more to be expected given some serious atheistic hypothesis like naturalism than it is given theism.”

Paul Draper, “Meet the New Skeptical Theism, Same as the Old Same Skeptical Theism,” in Skeptical Theism: New Essays (ed. Trent Dougherty and Justin McBrayer, New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 164.