theism

Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 5

I am currently considering William Craig’s second objection to Atheistic Moral Realism (AMR): Second, the nature of moral duty or obligation seems incompatible with atheistic moral realism. (WIAC, p.76) The following is a third piece of the paragraph where Craig presents this objection: Who or what lays such an obligation on me?  As the ethicist Richard Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 5

Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 4

Here, once again, is William Craig’s MOVE (Moral Objective Values Exist) Argument: 1. If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist. 2. Objective moral values do exist. Therefore: 3. God exists. I am considering one possible objection, namely rejection of, or doubt about, premise (1). Atheists who are inclined towards moral realism Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 4

Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 3

William Craig’s MOVE argument is simple: 1. If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist. 2. Objective moral values do exist. Therefore: 3.  God exists. One obvious atheistic objection would be to reject or cast doubt on premise (2).  If one rejects or doubts that objective moral values exist, then this argument Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 3

Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 1

In his essay “Why I Believe God Exists”, William Craig gives three main reasons for believing in God (Why I am a Christian – hereafter: WIAC – edited by Norman Geisler and Paul Hoffman, Baker Books, 2001, p.62-80): One problem with the Kalam cosmological argument is that it fails to establish the existence of a Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 1

The Atheist named Richard Swinburne

I was reading the Martyrdom of Polycarp recently, which is “the oldest written account of a Christian martyrdom outside the New Testament.” (The Apostolic Fathers, updated edition, edited and revised by Michael Holmes, p.222; hereafter: TAF). Polycarp was killed between 155 and 160 C.E: The Martyrdom of Polycarp sets out quite clearly both the issue The Atheist named Richard Swinburne