Simplicity, Theism, and Naturalism
In a recent post on his blog, Alexander Pruss presents an interesting argument regarding simplicity, theism, and naturalism. He writes: I have argued elsewhere, as my colleague Trent Dougherty also has and earlier, that when we understand simplicity rightly, theism makes for a simpler theory than naturalism. However, suppose I am wrong, and naturalism is the … Simplicity, Theism, and Naturalism
God as a ‘Necessary Being’ – Part 4
Previously, I argued that it is not possible to become eternal. Recall that a person P is eternal if and only if P has always existed and P will always continue to exist. Here is a step-by-step proof showing that it is impossible for a person to become eternal: <————|———–|————–> …………….t1………..t2 1. At time t1 … God as a ‘Necessary Being’ – Part 4
God as a ‘Necessary Being’ – Part 3
Richard Swinburne analyzes the concept of ‘necessary being’ into two implications (COT, p.241-242): 1. It is not a matter of fortunate accident that there is a God; he exists necessarily. 2. God is necessarily the kind of being which he is; God does not just happen to have the properties which he does. In his … God as a ‘Necessary Being’ – Part 3
God as a ‘Necessary Being’ – Part 2
Although there is an extensive discussion of the meaning of the claim ‘God is a necessary being’ by Richard Swinburne in his bookThe Coherence of Theism (revised edition, hereafter: COT), the main passages that I’m interested in understanding are found in a shorter and more popular book: Is There a God? (hereafter: ITAG), also by … God as a ‘Necessary Being’ – Part 2
God as a ‘Necessary Being’ – Part 1
In his book The Coherence of Theism (Revised edition, hereafter: COT), Swinburne defends the claim that the sentence ‘God exists’ makes a coherent statement. In Part II of COT, Swinburne defends the coherence of the concept of “a contingent God”, which is basically the traditional concept of God minus the attribute of ‘necessary being’. In … God as a ‘Necessary Being’ – Part 1
Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 11
If I understand William Craig’s third objection to AMR, then he is basically offering an inductive teleological argument for the existence of God (similar to how Richard Swinburne argues for God) based on the assumption that there are objective moral values plus the claim that humans and the circumstances in which humans find themselves are … Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 11
Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 10
When I argue against the resurrection of Jesus, I generally take a two-pronged approach. First, I argue that there are various good reasons to doubt the claim that Jesus was alive and walking around on the first Easter Sunday. Second, I make a concession for the sake of argument; I grant the supposition that Jesus … Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 10
Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 9
I have argued previously that Craig’s first two objections to AMR are weak at best. The third objection might not be as weak as the previous two. However, the third objection is the most unclear of the three, so if it turns out to be a strong objection, that will be because we help Craig … Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 9
Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 7
Richard Taylor’s book Virtue Ethics: An Introduction (formerly published as Ethics, Faith, and Reason) provides a very readable and interesting defense of the view that the modern conception of morality originates with religion, especially with Christianity. William Craig quotes from Chapter 11 of this book as his primary support for his second objection to AMR. … Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 7
Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 6
Some internet resources about William Craig’s views on morality and Richard Taylor’s views on morality: Is The Basis Of Morality Natural Or Supernatural? A Debate Between Richard Taylor and William Lane Craig Union College, Schenectady, New York October 8, 1993 http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/craig-taylor0.html The Indispensability of Theological Meta-Ethical Foundations for Morality By Dr. William Lane Craig http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/meta-eth.html … Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 6