Richard_Swinburne

Did God Create Nuclear Weapons?

Christians and other believers in God often say, ‘God created everything.’  If we take this literally, as a young child would do, we might start thinking of some objections or possible counterexamples: ‘Did God create nuclear weapons?’ ‘Did God create the ebola virus?’ etc.  The doctrine of divine creation leads quickly to the problem of evil. Did God Create Nuclear Weapons?

Why I am Not Concerned about Christian Theist Philosophers of Religion

One reason I am not concerned about the prevalence of Christian theists in the field of philosophy of religion is that they do a nice job of arguing against each other. William Lane Craig’s favorite argument for the existence of God is the Kalam cosmological argument. I’m happy that there are some atheist philosophers who Why I am Not Concerned about Christian Theist Philosophers of Religion

God and Massive Deception about the Resurrection

Robert Cavin and Carlos Colombetti have written an article raising some significant objections to Richard Swinburne’s case for the incarnation and resurrection of Jesus: “Swinburne on the Resurrection” (Philosophia Christi, Vol. 15, No. 2; hereafter: SOR). LINK I’m fully on-board with their overall conclusion that “…Swinburne’s argument for the Incarnation and Resurrection…is seriously undermined by God and Massive Deception about the Resurrection

F-Inductive Arguments: A New Type of Inductive Argument

In his extensive writings, the prestigious philosopher Richard Swinburne makes a useful distinction between two types of inductive arguments. Let B be our background information or evidence; E be the evidence to be explained; and H be an explanatory hypothesis. “C-inductive argument”: an argument in which the premisses confirm  or add to the probability of the conclusion, i.e., F-Inductive Arguments: A New Type of Inductive Argument

Potential Objections to Swinburne’s Cosmological Argument

After studying inductive logic for so long, I’ve decided it is finally time to reread Richard Swinburne’s The Existence of God (second ed., New York: Oxford University Press, 2004) and reconsider his inductive case for God’s existence. In doing so, I think I may have discovered a new objection to his cosmological argument. This is very rough Potential Objections to Swinburne’s Cosmological Argument

Swinburne’s Cosmological and Teleological Arguments – Part 3

I am exploring a concern about, or potential objection to, Swinburne’s inductive cosmological and teleological arguments for the existence of God. The objection I have in mind is something like this, for the cosmological argument: Although the one factual premise of Swinburne’s cosmological argument is supposed to be the ONLY contingent factual claim or assumption Swinburne’s Cosmological and Teleological Arguments – Part 3