Richard Dawkins and Moral Realism
Christian apologists who love to substitute quote-mining for actual argumentation are fond of quotations like the following, in order to conclude that atheism somehow undermines morality. In a universe of blind physical forces and genetic replication, some people are going to get hurt, and other people are going to get lucky; and you won’t find … Richard Dawkins and Moral Realism
Weighing Theistic Evidence Against Naturalistic Evidence
In the next-to-last paragraph of his book, C.S. Lewis’ Dangerous Idea: In Defense of the Argument from Reason, Victor Reppert makes a very interesting statement: However, I contend that the arguments from reason do provide some substantial reasons for preferring theism to naturalism. The “problem of reason” is a huge problem for reason, as serious or, I … Weighing Theistic Evidence Against Naturalistic Evidence
WLC Denies That Anyone Has Ever Died a Sincere Seeker Without Finding God
Can anyone sincerely lack belief in God? And even if they can, can anyone sincerely lack belief in God for the rest of their lives? Many people, including nontheists but not just nontheists, think the answer to both questions is plainly “yes.” But some (many?) theists, no doubt motivated by beliefs such as divine goodness, Biblical inerrancy, … WLC Denies That <I>Anyone</I> Has Ever Died a Sincere Seeker Without Finding God
Swinburne’s Argument from Religious Experience – Part 5
Here is a brief plot summary of the movie Harvey: Due to his insistence that he has an invisible six-foot rabbit for a best friend, a whimsical middle-aged man is thought by his family to be insane – but he may be wiser than anyone knows. James Stewart played Elwood P. Dowd, the “whimsical middle-aged man” … Swinburne’s Argument from Religious Experience – Part 5
Swinburne’s Argument from Religious Experience – Part 4
Although I have been considering the implications of the idea that the veridicality of a Theistic Religious Experience (TRE) is independent of the veridicality of other TREs, this is NOT the view of Swinburne. In fact, Swinburne clearly holds the opposite view, the view that the veridicality of a TRE is dependent on the veridicality … Swinburne’s Argument from Religious Experience – Part 4
G&T Rebuttal, Part 1: Introduction
The book’s introduction divides into six parts: (i) the crucial role that beliefs about God play in worldviews; (ii) an overview of three major “religious” worldviews; (iii) a discussion of the role of faith and facts in religion; (iv) three categories of problems with Christianity; (v) the faith of an atheist; and (vi) a high-level … G&T Rebuttal, Part 1: Introduction
Index: Rebuttal to Geisler’s and Turek’s “I Don’t Have Enough Faith to be an Atheist”
Review of Norman L. Geisler and Frank Turek, I Don’t Have Enough Faith to be an Atheist (Wheaton: Crossway, 2004). Like all apologetics books, both Christian and non-Christian, I Don’t Have Enough Faith to be an Atheist book takes a partisan approach to the philosophy of religion. Of course, by itself, the fact that it is a … Index: Rebuttal to Geisler’s and Turek’s “I Don’t Have Enough Faith to be an Atheist”
Swinburne’s Argument from Religious Experience – Part 3
Previously, I have only considered the very simple case where one person has a memory of having previously had a theistic religious experience (hereafter: TRE) of a generic sort–an experience in which it seemed (epistemically) to him/her that God was present. There were a couple of basic points made about probable inferences in contrast to … Swinburne’s Argument from Religious Experience – Part 3
Swinburne’s Argument from Religious Experience – Part 2
Richard Swinburne’s argument from religious experience (AFR) as given in The Existence of God (2nd ed.- hereafter: EOG) is based on three key epistemological principles: EXPERIENCE …(in the absence of special considerations), if it seems (epistemically) to a subject that x is present (and has some characteristic), then probably x is present (and has that characteristic)… (EOG, p. 303) … Swinburne’s Argument from Religious Experience – Part 2
F-Inductive Arguments: A New Type of Inductive Argument
In his extensive writings, the prestigious philosopher Richard Swinburne makes a useful distinction between two types of inductive arguments. Let B be our background information or evidence; E be the evidence to be explained; and H be an explanatory hypothesis. “C-inductive argument”: an argument in which the premisses confirm or add to the probability of the conclusion, i.e., … F-Inductive Arguments: A New Type of Inductive Argument