divine command theory

The Euthyphro Dilemma, Part 6: Arbitrariness and Normative Impotence

Here, again, are the two options of the Euthyphro dilemma: (I) The reason that God commands that we perform morally obligatory actions is that they are morally obligatory. (II) Morally obligatory actions are morally obligatory in virtue of the fact that God commands that we perform them. I have written five parts in this series The Euthyphro Dilemma, Part 6: Arbitrariness and Normative Impotence

Matthew Flannagan and Jason Thibodeau Discuss the Euthyphro Dilemma

On Saturday (9/22) I was privileged to join Matthew Flannagan for a dialogue about the Euthyphro dilemma. Cameron Bertuzzi of Capturing Christianity hosted the dialogue and livestreamed it from the Capturing Christianity YouTube channel. I did my best to explain why I think that there are some compelling Euthyphro-inspired objections to divine command theory, and Matthew Flannagan and Jason Thibodeau Discuss the Euthyphro Dilemma

Preliminary Remarks Concerning Euthyphro-style Ojections to the Divine Command Theory

This post is meant to set the stage for a follow-up post in which I will argue that the Euthyphro Dilemma provides a definitive (or as close to definitive as we can reasonably expect to get) objection to divine command metaethics (even the modern so-called modified divine command theories associated with Robert Adams, Edward Wierenga, Preliminary Remarks Concerning Euthyphro-style Ojections to the Divine Command Theory

Craig, Koons, and Divine Command Theory

Editor’s Note: This is a guest post by Taylor Carr republished on The Secular Outpost with permission. The original post may be found on his blog, The Godless Skeptic. In a recent episode of the Reasonable Faith podcast, William Lane Craig offers his thoughts on a 2012 paper by Jeremy Koons, Can God’s Goodness Save the Divine Command Theory from Euthyphro? Koons’ paper is another Craig, Koons, and Divine Command Theory