This video is based on a presentation that I gave to the Philosophy Club at Glendale Community College (in Glendale Arizona).
Suppose that I steal your laptop on Friday afternoon. As the weekend sets in, I begin to be plagued by guilt. Initially, taking your laptop seemed like a great idea. I need a new computer, and yours is much nicer than mine. It is newer, has a faster processor, more memory, a bigger screen, etc. … The Object of Moral Concern Problem for Divine Command Theory
Here, again, are the two options of the Euthyphro dilemma: (I) The reason that God commands that we perform morally obligatory actions is that they are morally obligatory. (II) Morally obligatory actions are morally obligatory in virtue of the fact that God commands that we perform them. I have written five parts in this series … The Euthyphro Dilemma, Part 6: Arbitrariness and Normative Impotence
This is the third in a series of posts about the Euthyphro dilemma. In this series, I am making a case that the Euthyphro dilemma provides the basis of a definitive objection to DCT. This case will take several posts to present fully. In part 1, I explained what the two options of the dilemma … The Euthyphro Dilemma, Part 3: Reasons and Moral Obligations
On Saturday (9/22) I was privileged to join Matthew Flannagan for a dialogue about the Euthyphro dilemma. Cameron Bertuzzi of Capturing Christianity hosted the dialogue and livestreamed it from the Capturing Christianity YouTube channel. I did my best to explain why I think that there are some compelling Euthyphro-inspired objections to divine command theory, and … Matthew Flannagan and Jason Thibodeau Discuss the Euthyphro Dilemma
I recently appeared as a guest on an episode of the Real Atheology podcast. The co-hosts, Ben Watkins and John Lopilato, and I talked about the Euthyphro dilemma and its implications for divine command theory. You can listen to the episode below. Ben and John are great hosts and I want to thank them for … Thibodeau on the Real Atheology podcast
Consider the following version of divine command metaethics (DCM): Our moral obligations are constituted by divine commands. In particular, F is morally obligatory = God has commanded that we F F is morally wrong = God has commanded that we not F F is morally permissible = God has neither commanded that we F nor … What could God’s commands do for morality?
This post is meant to set the stage for a follow-up post in which I will argue that the Euthyphro Dilemma provides a definitive (or as close to definitive as we can reasonably expect to get) objection to divine command metaethics (even the modern so-called modified divine command theories associated with Robert Adams, Edward Wierenga, … Preliminary Remarks Concerning Euthyphro-style Ojections to the Divine Command Theory
Last week I had an exchange with Matthew Flannagan on divine command theory (DCT) in the comments section of the post “Does William Lane Craig Actually Believe in Evil?” I raised some standard Euthyphro-type objections and asked for his response. He graciously replied even though he has treated the topic in much greater depth and … Divine Commands and Informative Identity
Editor’s Note: This is a guest post by Taylor Carr republished on The Secular Outpost with permission. The original post may be found on his blog, The Godless Skeptic. In a recent episode of the Reasonable Faith podcast, William Lane Craig offers his thoughts on a 2012 paper by Jeremy Koons, Can God’s Goodness Save the Divine Command Theory from Euthyphro? Koons’ paper is another … Craig, Koons, and Divine Command Theory