Cosmological argument

An Experiment in ‘Steelmanning’: Let’s Try to Formulate a Good Argument from Cosmology Against Naturalism

In the spirit of my last post, I think it would be interesting to engage in some inquiry about whether the kalam cosmological argument is onto something. Rather than try to repair the kalam cosmological argument as it stands, I think it would be interesting to channel Richard Swinburne or Paul Draper and see if An Experiment in ‘Steelmanning’: Let’s Try to Formulate a Good Argument from Cosmology Against Naturalism

Hinman’s Opening Argument for God

Joe Hinman has published his opening argument for God on his blog site: http://metacrock.blogspot.com/2017/07/opening-argument-resolved-that-belief.html Here is his argument in summary form: 1. All naturalistic phenomena are contingent and temporal. 2. Either some aspect of being is eternal and necessary unless or something came from nothing (creation ex nihilo) 3. Something did not come from nothing. Hinman’s Opening Argument for God

William Lane Craig: 36 Years of Equivocation – Part 2

One reason why it should be OBVIOUS that Craig’s Kalam Cosmological Argument (hereafter: KCA) involves the fallacy of equivocation, is that Aquinas commits a very similar fallacy of equivocation in his cosmological arguments for God. Every (or almost every) introduction to philosophy of religion course includes at least a brief examination of Aquinas’s Five Ways William Lane Craig: 36 Years of Equivocation – Part 2

Swinburne’s Cosmological and Teleological Arguments – Part 3

I am exploring a concern about, or potential objection to, Swinburne’s inductive cosmological and teleological arguments for the existence of God. The objection I have in mind is something like this, for the cosmological argument: Although the one factual premise of Swinburne’s cosmological argument is supposed to be the ONLY contingent factual claim or assumption Swinburne’s Cosmological and Teleological Arguments – Part 3