Bayes Theorem

Link: Matthew Ferguson on “Understanding the Spirit vs. the Letter of Probability”

A while back, I wrote a brief commentary on William Lane Craig’s critique of Bart Ehrman on the probability of miracles. Matthew Ferguson recently weighed in. He agrees with my conclusions, but greatly amplified them by writing an entire essay expounding on supporting points. I highly recommend his essay to anyone interested in the topic Link: Matthew Ferguson on “Understanding the Spirit vs. the Letter of Probability”

Repost: Extraordinary Claims Require Extraordinary Evidence (ECREE), Part 2: Is ECREE False? A Reply to William Lane Craig

(This article was originally published on this blog on June 21, 2012. I am reposting because William Lane Craig recently tweeted a link to a video in which he objects to ECREE.) In my last post, I offered a Bayesian interpretation of the principle, “extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence” (ECREE). William Lane Craig, however, disagrees with Repost: Extraordinary Claims Require Extraordinary Evidence (ECREE), Part 2: Is ECREE False? A Reply to William Lane Craig

YouTube Video of Today’s Miller-Cavin Debate on Jesus’ Resurrection

Here is the link to the YouTube video of today’s debate between Callum Miller and Robert Greg Cavin on the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection. Also, the Secular Outpost YouTube Channel has a playlist for all of Cavin’s debates on Jesus’ resurrection. Related Links: MUST READ: Greg Cavin’s Case Against the Resurrection of Jesus Cavin and YouTube Video of Today’s Miller-Cavin Debate on Jesus’ Resurrection

Matthew Ferguson: History, Probability, and Miracles (2013)

Historian Matthew Ferguson uses Bayes’ Theorem to analyze the historicity of miracle claims. Among other things, Ferguson compares the historical evidence for a purported miracle by Vespasian to the historical evidence for the purported resurrection of Jesus. LINK Note: as always, links do not constitute endorsement.

Evidential Asymmetry, Scientific Confirmation of Prayer, and Horrific Evils

1. The General Case One of the most important (and equally most often forgotten) lessons that Bayes’s Theorem can teach us about evidence is that the strength of evidence is a ratio. To be precise, let H1 and H2 be rival explanatory hypotheses, B be the relevant background information, and E be the evidence to Evidential Asymmetry, Scientific Confirmation of Prayer, and Horrific Evils