Problems With TASO – Part 2: My Favorite Objection
TASO The third inductive argument in Swinburne’s case for God is TASO (the Teleological Argument from Spatial Order): Teleological Argument from Spatial Order (e3) There exists a complex physical universe which is governed by simple natural laws, and in which the structure of the natural laws and of the initial conditions are such that they make the … Problems With TASO – Part 2: My Favorite Objection
Kreeft’s Case for God – Part 13: Analysis of Argument #2
EVALUATION OF KREEFT’S CASE SO FAR I began this series by considering the last ten arguments in Peter Kreeft’s case for God in Chapter 3 of Handbook of Christian Apologetics (hereafter: HCA). Those arguments appear to be ones that Kreeft viewed as weaker than his earlier arguments. NONE of those last ten arguments turned out … Kreeft’s Case for God – Part 13: Analysis of Argument #2
Kreeft’s Case for God – Part 12: The Argument for (3a)
THE EVALUATION OF ARGUMENT #1 SO FAR In Part 11 we saw that Argument #1 is UNSOUND, because it is based on the premise (F), and because Kreeft provides no support for (F), and because we have good reason to believe (F) to be FALSE. In this current post, I will examine the core argument in support … Kreeft’s Case for God – Part 12: The Argument for (3a)
Problems With TASO: Part 1
INTRO TO TASO For several years, I have been working on an article about Richard Swinburne’s case for God. I’m currently revising the section of that article dealing with the third argument in Swinburne’s case: TASO (the Teleological Argument from Spatial Order). In working on that section of the article, I noticed that my favorite … Problems With TASO: Part 1
Kreeft’s Case for God – Part 11: Evaluation of Argument #1
THE CONTEXT Peter Kreeft and his co-author Ronald Tacelli open their Handbook of Christian Apologetics (hereafter: HCA) with these words about their “reasons for writing this book”: Kreeft and Tacelli believe that heaven and hell are in the balance for every human being, when it comes to acceptance or rejection of “the Christian faith”. So, it … Kreeft’s Case for God – Part 11: Evaluation of Argument #1
Kreeft’s Case for God – Part 10: Analysis of Argument #1
ANALYSIS OF PHASE 1 In Part 9, I began to analyze and clarify the logic of Argument #1 (The Argument from Change) in Peter Kreeft’s case for God from Chapter 3 of Handbook of Christian Apologetics (hereafter: HCA). My analysis focused on the first phase of the argument. Here is my understanding of the logical … Kreeft’s Case for God – Part 10: Analysis of Argument #1
Kreeft’s Case for God – Part 9: The Argument from Change
MY EVALUATION OF THE SECOND HALF OF KREEFT’S CASE In Part 1 and Part 2 I argued that eight out of ten (80%) of the last ten arguments in Peter Kreeft’s collection of twenty arguments (from Handbook of Christian Apologetics, Chapter 3; hereafter: HCA) are AWFUL arguments that are not worthy of serious consideration, that we should thus toss them aside, and ignore … Kreeft’s Case for God – Part 9: The Argument from Change
Feser’s Case for God – Part 8: Actualization of a Potential
FESER’S ANALYSIS OF CHANGE A key idea in Chunk #1 of Feser’s Aristotelian argument is his analysis or understanding of change: A. The occurrence of any change C presupposes the actualization of a potential of some thing or substance S which changes. There are three phrases that constitute the key components of Feser’s analysis of change: the actualization of… …a … Feser’s Case for God – Part 8: Actualization of a Potential
2017 in the Rearview Mirror
I had hoped to answer the question “Does God exist?” in 2017, at least to my own satisfaction. No such luck. That was a bit too aggressive of a goal. However, I did make some good progress. I learned that Norman Geisler’s case for God (in When Skeptics Ask) is a steaming pile of dog … 2017 in the Rearview Mirror
Feser’s Case for God – Part 5: Potential Attributes vs. Contingent Attributes
POTENTIAL ATTRIBUTES VS. CONTINGENT ATTRIBUTES I think (i.e. strongly suspect) it is important to understand the relationship between Edward Feser’s concept of the potential attributes of X and logical possibility. Feser does not provide clarification on this point, at least not in Chapter 1 of his book Five Proofs of the Existence of God (hereafter: … Feser’s Case for God – Part 5: Potential Attributes vs. Contingent Attributes