Video: The Euthyphro Problem for Divine Command Theory
This video is based on a presentation that I gave to the Philosophy Club at Glendale Community College (in Glendale Arizona). Your name Your email Subject Your message (optional)
The Object of Moral Concern Problem for Divine Command Theory
Suppose that I steal your laptop on Friday afternoon. As the weekend sets in, I begin to be plagued by guilt. Initially, taking your laptop seemed like a great idea. I need a new computer, and yours is much nicer than mine. It is newer, has a faster processor, more memory, a bigger screen, etc. … The Object of Moral Concern Problem for Divine Command Theory
The Euthyphro Dilemma, Part 6: Arbitrariness and Normative Impotence
Here, again, are the two options of the Euthyphro dilemma: (I) The reason that God commands that we perform morally obligatory actions is that they are morally obligatory. (II) Morally obligatory actions are morally obligatory in virtue of the fact that God commands that we perform them. I have written five parts in this series … The Euthyphro Dilemma, Part 6: Arbitrariness and Normative Impotence
The Euthyphro Dilemma, Part 4: Why is it a dilemma?
In part I of this series, I showed that the Euthyphro dilemma consists of the following two options: (I) The reason that God commands that we perform morally obligatory actions is that they are morally obligatory. (II) Morally obligatory actions are morally obligatory in virtue of the fact that God commands that we perform them. … The Euthyphro Dilemma, Part 4: Why is it a dilemma?
The Euthyphro Dilemma, Part 3: Reasons and Moral Obligations
This is the third in a series of posts about the Euthyphro dilemma. In this series, I am making a case that the Euthyphro dilemma provides the basis of a definitive objection to DCT. This case will take several posts to present fully. In part 1, I explained what the two options of the dilemma … The Euthyphro Dilemma, Part 3: Reasons and Moral Obligations
The Euthyphro Dilemma, Part 2: Arbitrariness
In the first post in this series, I pointed out that when we apply the Euthyphro question to DCT, we get the following options (I) The reason that God commands that we perform morally obligatory actions is that they are morally obligatory. (II) Morally obligatory actions are morally obligatory in virtue of the fact that … The Euthyphro Dilemma, Part 2: Arbitrariness
The Euthyphro Dilemma, Part 1: The Question and the Options
The Euthyphro dilemma has been used for centuries as a basis for undermining theories that account for moral value in virtue of God’s will, activities, and/or nature, including various versions of Divine Command Theory (DCT)[1]. Beginning in the latter half of the 20th century the arguments directed against DCT that are grounded in this dilemma … The Euthyphro Dilemma, Part 1: The Question and the Options
Matthew Flannagan and Jason Thibodeau Discuss the Euthyphro Dilemma
On Saturday (9/22) I was privileged to join Matthew Flannagan for a dialogue about the Euthyphro dilemma. Cameron Bertuzzi of Capturing Christianity hosted the dialogue and livestreamed it from the Capturing Christianity YouTube channel. I did my best to explain why I think that there are some compelling Euthyphro-inspired objections to divine command theory, and … Matthew Flannagan and Jason Thibodeau Discuss the Euthyphro Dilemma
Does anything really matter?
Does anything really matter? Some people say no. Such people are proponents of nihilism, the view according to which nothing matters. According to nihilists, there is no reason to care about anything whatsoever. Nihilists do not deny that people care about things, they claim only that there is no reason to care about anything. Other … Does anything really matter?
What could God’s commands do for morality?
Consider the following version of divine command metaethics (DCM): Our moral obligations are constituted by divine commands. In particular, F is morally obligatory = God has commanded that we F F is morally wrong = God has commanded that we not F F is morally permissible = God has neither commanded that we F nor … What could God’s commands do for morality?