The VICTIMs of Christian Apologetics
My latest video, “The VICTIMs of Christian Apologetics: The Things Apologists Falsely Say Depend on God, But, if God Exists, God Depends on Them,” is now available on YouTube. It is a narration of some of the many hundreds of PowerPoint slides I created in preparation for my recent debate with Frank Turek on naturalism vs. … The VICTIMs of Christian Apologetics
Ethical Subjectivism and the Argument from Outrage
In arguing for the superiority of theistic ethics over secular ethics, apologists sometimes present some version of an argument like this: 1. If theism is not true, then ethics is subjective. 2. Ethics is not subjective. 3. Therefore, theism is true. I think this is a bad argument because I think premise 1 is false. … Ethical Subjectivism and the Argument from Outrage
Correction to “Are Atheism and Moral Realism Logically Incompatible?”
The introduction to my post, “Are Atheism and Moral Realism Logically Incompatible?”, probably gave readers an impression I did not intend, namely, that, in my exchange at Victor Reppert’s Dangerous Idea blog, Steve linked arguments from moral ontology (for theism) and arguments from evil (from atheism). Steve didn’t do that there and I’m sorry if I created that … Correction to “Are Atheism and Moral Realism Logically Incompatible?”
Moral Arguments for God and Coining a Name for a Common but Fallacious Objection
In response to Wintery Knight’s recent blog post on the plausibility of objective morality on atheism, I posted a comment in the combox on his site. The comment consisted solely of a link to my YouTube video, “Naturalism, Theism, and Moral Ontology: A Reply to William Lane Craig.” In response to that link, WK wrote … Moral Arguments for God and Coining a Name for a Common but Fallacious Objection
Wes Morriston’s God and the Ontological Foundation of Morality
(Redated post originally published on 7 September 2012) Ouch! LINK Your name Your email Subject Your message (optional)
How Not to Debate ‘the’ Moral Argument: Reply to PZ Myers
(Redated post originally published on 8 June 2012) In a recent post, PZ Myers complains that a couple of atheists botched their response to ‘the’ moral argument for God’s existence.[1] He writes: There is a common line of attack Christians use in debates with atheists, and I genuinely detest it. It’s to ask the question, … How Not to Debate ‘the’ Moral Argument: Reply to PZ Myers
Christian Apologists Ignore the Best Objections to the Moral Argument
(Redated post originally published on 2 August 2014) To be precise, there are many kinds of moral arguments for theism. The question in the title is really talking about what we might call “ontological” or “metaphysical” moral arguments, the kind which claim that we need God in order to have an “ontological foundation” for objective … Christian Apologists Ignore the Best Objections to the Moral Argument
For Victor Reppert: The Metaethical Objections to Craig’s Moral Argument Which His Sophisticated Critics Use, But Craig Never Acknowledges in Debate Opening Statements
(Redated post originally published on 21 June 2012) This is a quick follow-up to my last reply to Victor Reppert. The title of Reppert’s post is, “The Moral Argument that Christians don’t use, but atheists always rebut.” In reply, we can point to “The Metaethical Objections to Craig’s Moral Argument Which His Sophisticated Critics Use, … For Victor Reppert: The Metaethical Objections to Craig’s Moral Argument Which His Sophisticated Critics Use, But Craig Never Acknowledges in Debate Opening Statements
Doug Geivett’s Turnaround Argument on Evil as a Departure from the Way Things Ought to Be
(Redating post last published on 31 October 2011) (Redating this post due to clarification from Geivett regarding his argument) For those of you who don’t know of him, Doug Geivett is a Christian philosopher at Biola University. I had the opportunity to meet him in 1997 at the I.I.-sponsored debate on the existence of God … Doug Geivett’s Turnaround Argument on Evil as a Departure from the Way Things Ought to Be
Victor Reppert on the Argument from Evil as a Reductio
(Redated post originally published on 12 June 2012) Can atheist who rejects moral realism press the argument from evil? Many theists, including William Lane Craig and Ravi Zacharias, have argued that the answer is “no.” In my old critique of one of Zacharias’s books, I wrote the following. Zacharias presents two objections to AE. First, … Victor Reppert on the Argument from Evil as a Reductio