moral argument

Erik Wielenberg: An Inconsistency in Craig’s Defence of the Moral Argument

Abstract. I argue that William Craig’s defence of the moral argument is internally inconsistent. In the course of defending the moral argument, Craig criticizes non-theistic moral realism on the grounds that it posits the existence of certain logically necessary connections but fails to provide an adequate account of why such connections hold. Another component of Erik Wielenberg: An Inconsistency in Craig’s Defence of the Moral Argument

An Explanatory Argument from Moral Ontology against Metaphysical Naturalism (v2.0)

(The following is a revised version of my “Arguing from Moral Ontology by Eliminating Nontheistic Alternatives.”)1. Definitions Moral ontology is the branch of meta-ethics concerned with the ontology or metaphysics of moral facts and properties.  Within the field of moral ontology, it is a commonplace that the nature of moral facts and properties fall into one An Explanatory Argument from Moral Ontology against Metaphysical Naturalism (v2.0)

Arguing from Moral Ontology to Theism by Eliminating Nontheistic Alternatives

1. Defintions Moral ontology is the branch of meta-ethics concerned with the ontology or metaphysics of moral facts and properties.  Within the field of moral ontology, it is a commonplace that the nature of moral facts and properties fall into one of three categories: natural, nonnatural, or supernatural.  Natural facts and properties are those facts Arguing from Moral Ontology to Theism by Eliminating Nontheistic Alternatives

J.P. Moreland’s 1993 Moral Argument for Theism

J.P. Moreland argues that traditional theism is the best explanation for the truth of ethical nonnaturalism in the broad sense, a correspondence theory of moral truth, and the falsity of ethical egoism.[1] Definitionsnon-natural property: an attribute that is not a scientific, physical characteristic of physics or chemistry (e.g., being a C fiber, having negative charge, J.P. Moreland’s 1993 Moral Argument for Theism

Wes Morriston’s The Moral Obligations of Reasonable Non-Believers: A special problem for divine command metaethics

The fact that many people do not believe that there is a God creates an obvious problem for divine command metaethics. They have moral obligations, and are often enough aware of having them. Yet it is not easy to think of such persons as “hearing” divine commands. This makes it hard to see how a Wes Morriston’s The Moral Obligations of Reasonable Non-Believers: A special problem for divine command metaethics

Flanagan’s Response to Me (Re: Jerry Coyne on Explaining Morality)

Matthew Flanagan has written a response to my post on Jerry Coyne and explaining morality. I am quoting his response in its entirety, with Flannagan’s permission. Hi Jeffery, I tried posting this on your site but couldn’t, feel free to do so. You write: ”I suspect that C.S. Lewis’ moral argument for God’s existence is Flanagan’s Response to Me (Re: Jerry Coyne on Explaining Morality)