moral argument

Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 8

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I am not impressed by Richard Taylor’s appeal to etymology as an argument for the claim that all duties and all obligations are ‘owed’ to some person or persons (see part 7 for my objections to that line of reasoning). However, to be fair to Craig, Taylor’s appeal to etymology is not specifically and explicitly … Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 8

Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 7

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Richard Taylor’s book Virtue Ethics: An Introduction (formerly published as Ethics, Faith, and Reason) provides a very readable and interesting defense of the view that the modern conception of morality originates with religion, especially with Christianity. William Craig quotes from Chapter 11 of this book as his primary support for his second objection to AMR. … Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 7

Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 6

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Some internet resources about  William Craig’s views on morality and Richard Taylor’s views on morality: Is The Basis Of Morality Natural Or Supernatural? A Debate Between Richard Taylor and William Lane Craig Union College, Schenectady, New York October 8, 1993 http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/craig-taylor0.html The Indispensability of Theological Meta-Ethical Foundations for Morality By Dr. William Lane Craig http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/meta-eth.html … Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 6

Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 5

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I am currently considering William Craig’s second objection to Atheistic Moral Realism (AMR): Second, the nature of moral duty or obligation seems incompatible with atheistic moral realism. (WIAC, p.76) The following is a third piece of the paragraph where Craig presents this objection: Who or what lays such an obligation on me?  As the ethicist Richard … Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 5

Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 4

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Here, once again, is William Craig’s MOVE (Moral Objective Values Exist) Argument: 1. If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist. 2. Objective moral values do exist. Therefore: 3. God exists. I am considering one possible objection, namely rejection of, or doubt about, premise (1). Atheists who are inclined towards moral realism … Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 4

Speaking in Seattle on Saturday

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I will be reprising my recent talk to the Central London Humanists, “Evidence About God: What Apologists Don’t Want You to Know,” but this time my audience will be the Creation Association of Puget Sound (CAPS). When: Saturday, May 11, 2013, 7:00PM Where: Avondale Bible Church, 17010 Avondale Road Northeast, Woodinville, WA Here is information … Speaking in Seattle on Saturday

Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 3

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William Craig’s MOVE argument is simple: 1. If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist. 2. Objective moral values do exist. Therefore: 3.  God exists. One obvious atheistic objection would be to reject or cast doubt on premise (2).  If one rejects or doubts that objective moral values exist, then this argument … Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 3

Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 1

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In his essay “Why I Believe God Exists”, William Craig gives three main reasons for believing in God (Why I am a Christian – hereafter: WIAC – edited by Norman Geisler and Paul Hoffman, Baker Books, 2001, p.62-80): One problem with the Kalam cosmological argument is that it fails to establish the existence of a … Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 1

Thoughts about Plantinga’s Interesting Paper on “Naturalism, Theism, Obligation, and Supervenience”

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I’ve been studying Plantinga’s very interesting paper, “Naturalism, Theism, Obligation, and Supervenience.” (See here for Ex-Apologist’s very brief post about it.) Plantinga’s stated goal is to show that metaphysical naturalism cannot accommodate realism about moral obligation by “displaying the failure of the most natural way of arguing” that metaphysical naturalism can accommodate moral realism, viz., … Thoughts about Plantinga’s Interesting Paper on “Naturalism, Theism, Obligation, and Supervenience”