science

Did Jesus Rise from the Dead? Part 10: Looking at Luke 24

WHERE WE ARE In Parts 1 through 7 of this series,  I argued that at least six of Josh McDowell’s seven objections (in The Resurrection Factor; hereafter: TRF). against the Hallucination Theory FAIL. In Part 8 of this series, I began to examine McDowell’s one remaining objection: Objection TRF2 (“Very Personal”).  McDowell presents this objection in Did Jesus Rise from the Dead? Part 10: Looking at Luke 24

Did Jesus Rise from the Dead? Part 6: The NO FAVORABLE CIRCUMSTANCES Objection (TRF4)

WHERE WE ARE In the previous five posts of this series, I have shown that the best case scenario (for Christian apologetics) is that MOST of Josh McDowell’s objections against the Hallucination Theory in his book The Resurrection Factor (hereafter: TRF) are WORTHLESS CRAP: One problem that I pointed out with Objection TRF5 (No Expectancy) is Did Jesus Rise from the Dead? Part 6: The NO FAVORABLE CIRCUMSTANCES Objection (TRF4)

Did Jesus Rise from the Dead? Part 4: More Problems with Objection TRF5

WHERE WE ARE TRF5 is the fifth objection presented by Josh McDowell against the Hallucination Theory in his book The Resurrection Factor (hereafter: TRF). The objection TRF5 can be stated in terms of a brief argument: 1. Hallucinations REQUIRE that a person who has an hallucination of circumstance C previously had a hopeful expectation or wish Did Jesus Rise from the Dead? Part 4: More Problems with Objection TRF5

Did Jesus Rise from the Dead? Part 2: More Objections to the Hallucination Theory

In The Resurrection Factor (1981; hereafter: TRF), Josh McDowell raises seven objections against the Hallucination Theory, a skeptical theory that explains the origin of the early Christian belief that Jesus rose from the dead in terms of one or more of his followers having an “hallucination” (or non-veridical sensory experience) of Jesus being alive sometime Did Jesus Rise from the Dead? Part 2: More Objections to the Hallucination Theory

The Unmoved Mover Argument – Part 3: Norman vs. Bradley

I’m having fun with critical examination of Norman Geisler’s Thomist cosmological argument in When Skeptics Ask.  There is also a more detailed and in-depth presentation of this argument in Chapter 9 of Geisler’s much older book The Philosophy of Religion (1974). I previously thought that the first premise of his Thomist cosmological argument was obviously The Unmoved Mover Argument – Part 3: Norman vs. Bradley