philosophy of religion

God and Massive Deception about the Resurrection

Robert Cavin and Carlos Colombetti have written an article raising some significant objections to Richard Swinburne’s case for the incarnation and resurrection of Jesus: “Swinburne on the Resurrection” (Philosophia Christi, Vol. 15, No. 2; hereafter: SOR). LINK I’m fully on-board with their overall conclusion that “…Swinburne’s argument for the Incarnation and Resurrection…is seriously undermined by God and Massive Deception about the Resurrection

Swinburne’s Cosmological and Teleological Arguments – Part 4

Richard Swinburne presents his inductive cosmological argument in Chapter 7 of his book The Existence of God (second edition, hereafter: EOG). I plan to start at the beginning of the chapter and go paragraph by paragraph, stopping to comment on each paragraph that includes either support for, or defense of, some part of the cosmological Swinburne’s Cosmological and Teleological Arguments – Part 4

Swinburne’s Cosmological and Teleological Arguments – Part 3

I am exploring a concern about, or potential objection to, Swinburne’s inductive cosmological and teleological arguments for the existence of God. The objection I have in mind is something like this, for the cosmological argument: Although the one factual premise of Swinburne’s cosmological argument is supposed to be the ONLY contingent factual claim or assumption Swinburne’s Cosmological and Teleological Arguments – Part 3

Do Christian Apologists Spend Too Much Time Focusing on their Weaker Opponents?

Refuting the “New Atheists” is all the rage among Christian apologists these days. Among professional philosophers of religion, however, it’s well-known that the new atheists are not the best representatives for atheism. So why do Christian apologists continue to harp on the new atheists and ignore what atheist professional philosophers of religion have to say? Do Christian Apologists Spend Too Much Time Focusing on their Weaker Opponents?

Playing The Mystery Card (incl. McGrath vs Dawkins) from my book Believing Bullshit

PLAYING THE MYSTERY CARD   Suppose critics point out that not only do you have little in the way of argument to support your particular belief system, there also seems to be powerful evidence against it. If you want, nevertheless, to convince both yourself and others that your beliefs are not nearly as ridiculous as Playing The Mystery Card (incl. McGrath vs Dawkins) from my book Believing Bullshit