nontheistic metaethics

AdamHazzard’s Quick Parable Comparing Atheistic and Divine Command Theoretic Metaethics

I just read this in the combox on Randal Rauser’s blog. An atheist and a divine-command theorist are approached by someone who says to them, “God is telling me to kill my child. Am I crazy?” The atheist doesn’t hesitate. “Yes! You need to seek help immediately!” While the divine-command theorist shuffles his feet and AdamHazzard’s Quick Parable Comparing Atheistic and Divine Command Theoretic Metaethics

Humanism for Children: A Reply to William Lane Craig

William Lane Craig is right. There has been “a resurgence of interest in arguments for God’s existence.”  So-called “new atheists” aside, what he fails to mention is that there has also been a resurgence of interest in arguments against God’s existence by philosophers like J.L. Schellenberg, Quentin Smith, Paul Draper, Stephen Maitzen, Michael Martin, and Humanism for Children: A Reply to William Lane Craig

The Argument from First-Order Ethical Beliefs for Moral Realism

Definitions first-level moral belief: a belief that something is good or evil or that something is of equal or greater value than something else second-level moral belief: a belief about some or all first-level moral beliefs The Argument  As far as I can tell, the argument from ordinary language originated with John Post, but has The Argument from First-Order Ethical Beliefs for Moral Realism

Semantic vs. Ontological Ethical Naturalism vs. Divine Command Theory

Jonathan Berg, in his essay “How could ethics depend on religion?”, notes there are various versions of the ‘Divine Command Theory’ of ethics.  In its strongest form, the Divine Command Theory (DCT) is a theory about the very meaning of words, what Jonathan Harrison has called a linguistic theory.  After describing various problems with the Semantic vs. Ontological Ethical Naturalism vs. Divine Command Theory

Arguing from Moral Ontology to Theism by Eliminating Nontheistic Alternatives

1. Defintions Moral ontology is the branch of meta-ethics concerned with the ontology or metaphysics of moral facts and properties.  Within the field of moral ontology, it is a commonplace that the nature of moral facts and properties fall into one of three categories: natural, nonnatural, or supernatural.  Natural facts and properties are those facts Arguing from Moral Ontology to Theism by Eliminating Nontheistic Alternatives

J.P. Moreland’s 1993 Moral Argument for Theism

J.P. Moreland argues that traditional theism is the best explanation for the truth of ethical nonnaturalism in the broad sense, a correspondence theory of moral truth, and the falsity of ethical egoism.[1] Definitionsnon-natural property: an attribute that is not a scientific, physical characteristic of physics or chemistry (e.g., being a C fiber, having negative charge, J.P. Moreland’s 1993 Moral Argument for Theism