Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 9
I have argued previously that Craig’s first two objections to AMR are weak at best. The third objection might not be as weak as the previous two. However, the third objection is the most unclear of the three, so if it turns out to be a strong objection, that will be because we help Craig … Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 9
Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 8
I am not impressed by Richard Taylor’s appeal to etymology as an argument for the claim that all duties and all obligations are ‘owed’ to some person or persons (see part 7 for my objections to that line of reasoning). However, to be fair to Craig, Taylor’s appeal to etymology is not specifically and explicitly … Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 8
Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 7
Richard Taylor’s book Virtue Ethics: An Introduction (formerly published as Ethics, Faith, and Reason) provides a very readable and interesting defense of the view that the modern conception of morality originates with religion, especially with Christianity. William Craig quotes from Chapter 11 of this book as his primary support for his second objection to AMR. … Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 7
Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 6
Some internet resources about William Craig’s views on morality and Richard Taylor’s views on morality: Is The Basis Of Morality Natural Or Supernatural? A Debate Between Richard Taylor and William Lane Craig Union College, Schenectady, New York October 8, 1993 http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/craig-taylor0.html The Indispensability of Theological Meta-Ethical Foundations for Morality By Dr. William Lane Craig http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/meta-eth.html … Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 6
Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 5
I am currently considering William Craig’s second objection to Atheistic Moral Realism (AMR): Second, the nature of moral duty or obligation seems incompatible with atheistic moral realism. (WIAC, p.76) The following is a third piece of the paragraph where Craig presents this objection: Who or what lays such an obligation on me? As the ethicist Richard … Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 5
Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 4
Here, once again, is William Craig’s MOVE (Moral Objective Values Exist) Argument: 1. If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist. 2. Objective moral values do exist. Therefore: 3. God exists. I am considering one possible objection, namely rejection of, or doubt about, premise (1). Atheists who are inclined towards moral realism … Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 4
Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 3
William Craig’s MOVE argument is simple: 1. If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist. 2. Objective moral values do exist. Therefore: 3. God exists. One obvious atheistic objection would be to reject or cast doubt on premise (2). If one rejects or doubts that objective moral values exist, then this argument … Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 3
Alex Rosenberg’s 2012 Argument for Nihilism
In his 2012 book, The Atheist’s Guide to Reality, Alex Rosenberg defends an argument for nihilism.[1] In this article I want to evaluate his argument. Definitions Before we turn to his argument, we first need to understand how Rosenberg defines his terms. Let us begin with the word “scientism.” In his own words, Rosenberg defines … Alex Rosenberg’s 2012 Argument for Nihilism
Atheist Ethicist on Evolution and Morality
The Atheist Ethicist has been writing a nice series on morality and evolutionary ethics. Posts (so far) include: Check them out! Your name Your email Subject Your message (optional)
Thoughts about Plantinga’s Interesting Paper on “Naturalism, Theism, Obligation, and Supervenience”
I’ve been studying Plantinga’s very interesting paper, “Naturalism, Theism, Obligation, and Supervenience.” (See here for Ex-Apologist’s very brief post about it.) Plantinga’s stated goal is to show that metaphysical naturalism cannot accommodate realism about moral obligation by “displaying the failure of the most natural way of arguing” that metaphysical naturalism can accommodate moral realism, viz., … Thoughts about Plantinga’s Interesting Paper on “Naturalism, Theism, Obligation, and Supervenience”