Links: Two Metaethical Arguments for Atheism from John J Park
Park, John. “The Moral Epistemological Argument for Atheism.” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7, no. 1 (n.d.): 121. doi:10.24204/EJPR.V7I1.133. Abstract: Numerous supposed immoral mandates and commands by God found in religious texts are introduced and discussed. Such passages are used to construct a logical contradiction contention that is called the moral epistemological argument. It is shown how there is … Links: Two Metaethical Arguments for Atheism from John J Park
Morality does not depend on the existence of God
Some people believe (or claim to believe) that if God does not exist, then there are no objective moral truths (e.g., truths about what we are morally obligated to do or refrain from doing). This claim is false as the following argument shows: (1) Torturing a child causes the child to experience severe suffering. (2) … Morality does not depend on the existence of God
Matthew Flannagan and Jason Thibodeau Discuss the Euthyphro Dilemma
On Saturday (9/22) I was privileged to join Matthew Flannagan for a dialogue about the Euthyphro dilemma. Cameron Bertuzzi of Capturing Christianity hosted the dialogue and livestreamed it from the Capturing Christianity YouTube channel. I did my best to explain why I think that there are some compelling Euthyphro-inspired objections to divine command theory, and … Matthew Flannagan and Jason Thibodeau Discuss the Euthyphro Dilemma
Do our reasons depend on our desires?
NOTE: This post assumes an understanding of much of the terminology that I explain in my post, “On Reasons and What They Do?” In particular, this post uses the terms ‘reason,’ ‘objective,’ and ‘subjective’ in accordance with the explanations that appear in that article. Further, there are other important matters (such what it means for a reason to … Do our reasons depend on our desires?
The sense in which pain is objectively bad
NOTE: This post assumes an understanding of much of the terminology that I explain in my post, “On Reasons and What They Do?” In particular, this post uses the terms ‘reason,’ ‘objective,’ and ‘subjective’ in accordance with the explanations that appear in that article. Further, there are other important matters (such what it means for … The sense in which pain is objectively bad
On reasons and what they do
This post is something of a follow-up to my recent post about Sean Carroll’s views concerning meaning and purpose. As I indicated at the end of that post, I used some concepts and made some claims that require development and defense and I promised that I would provide that development and defense in a future … On reasons and what they do
Does anything really matter?
Does anything really matter? Some people say no. Such people are proponents of nihilism, the view according to which nothing matters. According to nihilists, there is no reason to care about anything whatsoever. Nihilists do not deny that people care about things, they claim only that there is no reason to care about anything. Other … Does anything really matter?
What could God’s commands do for morality?
Consider the following version of divine command metaethics (DCM): Our moral obligations are constituted by divine commands. In particular, F is morally obligatory = God has commanded that we F F is morally wrong = God has commanded that we not F F is morally permissible = God has neither commanded that we F nor … What could God’s commands do for morality?
Why the moral argument fails
Of all the arguments for the existence of God, there is one argument (or one style of argument) that I have never had any sympathy with and never understood why anyone has any sympathy with, and that is the moral argument. It seems to me and has pretty much always seemed to me (at least … Why the moral argument fails
God’s nature does not make his commands non-arbitrary
Many modern defenders of the divine command theory frequently claim that God’s commands are not arbitrary because they flow from his essential nature. Their argument is bad. That a commander issues consistent commands based on his/her own character does not mean that those commands are not arbitrary. Whether a command is arbitrary depends on whether … God’s nature does not make his commands non-arbitrary