logic

Evidential Asymmetry, Scientific Confirmation of Prayer, and Horrific Evils

1. The General Case One of the most important (and equally most often forgotten) lessons that Bayes’s Theorem can teach us about evidence is that the strength of evidence is a ratio. To be precise, let H1 and H2 be rival explanatory hypotheses, B be the relevant background information, and E be the evidence to Evidential Asymmetry, Scientific Confirmation of Prayer, and Horrific Evils

Swinburne on the Resurrection: Negative versus Christian Ramified Natural Theology

ABSTRACT: We consider the impact of negative natural theology on the prospects of Christian ramified natural theology with reference to Richard Swinburne’s argument for the Incarnation and Resurrection. We argue that Swinburne’s pivotal claim—that God would not allow deceptive evidence to exist for the Incarnation and Resurrection—is refuted by key evidence from negative natural theology. We argue, further, Swinburne on the Resurrection: Negative versus Christian Ramified Natural Theology

Stan Stephens’s Categorical Misunderstandings of Atheism, Part 3

I’m now going to comment on Stan’s post, “What I Learned at Patheos.” Stan’s Integrity-Challenged Description of His Interactions at the Secular Outpost My foray into patheos–land is over. I don’t usually venture into other blogs because they are commonly infested with nasty hangers-on (PZ anyone?), but this one seemed different… at first. And it Stan Stephens’s Categorical Misunderstandings of Atheism, Part 3

Critical Thinking – Part 1

What is ‘critical thinking’? Why is it important? Why should anyone try to be a critical thinker? What does critical thinking have to do with secularism and humanism and naturalism? There are two main ideas to consider behind the term ‘critical thinking’. First, and most obviously, we should consider the ordinary meaning of the word Critical Thinking – Part 1

F-Inductive Arguments: A New Type of Inductive Argument

In his extensive writings, the prestigious philosopher Richard Swinburne makes a useful distinction between two types of inductive arguments. Let B be our background information or evidence; E be the evidence to be explained; and H be an explanatory hypothesis. “C-inductive argument”: an argument in which the premisses confirm  or add to the probability of the conclusion, i.e., F-Inductive Arguments: A New Type of Inductive Argument

Swinburne’s Cosmological and Teleological Arguments – Part 5

The Cosmological Argument (TCA) is the first argument in Swinburne’s inductive case for the existence of God. The arguments are presented in a specific order, each argument adding one more contingent fact (or specific set of contingent facts) to the facts presented in the premises of the previous arguments. Since TCA is the first argument, Swinburne’s Cosmological and Teleological Arguments – Part 5

Swinburne’s Cosmological and Teleological Arguments – Part 4

Richard Swinburne presents his inductive cosmological argument in Chapter 7 of his book The Existence of God (second edition, hereafter: EOG). I plan to start at the beginning of the chapter and go paragraph by paragraph, stopping to comment on each paragraph that includes either support for, or defense of, some part of the cosmological Swinburne’s Cosmological and Teleological Arguments – Part 4

Swinburne’s Cosmological and Teleological Arguments – Part 3

I am exploring a concern about, or potential objection to, Swinburne’s inductive cosmological and teleological arguments for the existence of God. The objection I have in mind is something like this, for the cosmological argument: Although the one factual premise of Swinburne’s cosmological argument is supposed to be the ONLY contingent factual claim or assumption Swinburne’s Cosmological and Teleological Arguments – Part 3