Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 9
I have argued previously that Craig’s first two objections to AMR are weak at best. The third objection might not be as weak as the previous two. However, the third objection is the most unclear of the three, so if it turns out to be a strong objection, that will be because we help Craig … Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 9
Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 8
I am not impressed by Richard Taylor’s appeal to etymology as an argument for the claim that all duties and all obligations are ‘owed’ to some person or persons (see part 7 for my objections to that line of reasoning). However, to be fair to Craig, Taylor’s appeal to etymology is not specifically and explicitly … Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 8
Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 5
I am currently considering William Craig’s second objection to Atheistic Moral Realism (AMR): Second, the nature of moral duty or obligation seems incompatible with atheistic moral realism. (WIAC, p.76) The following is a third piece of the paragraph where Craig presents this objection: Who or what lays such an obligation on me? As the ethicist Richard … Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 5
Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 4
Here, once again, is William Craig’s MOVE (Moral Objective Values Exist) Argument: 1. If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist. 2. Objective moral values do exist. Therefore: 3. God exists. I am considering one possible objection, namely rejection of, or doubt about, premise (1). Atheists who are inclined towards moral realism … Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 4
Speaking in Seattle on Saturday
I will be reprising my recent talk to the Central London Humanists, “Evidence About God: What Apologists Don’t Want You to Know,” but this time my audience will be the Creation Association of Puget Sound (CAPS). When: Saturday, May 11, 2013, 7:00PM Where: Avondale Bible Church, 17010 Avondale Road Northeast, Woodinville, WA Here is information … Speaking in Seattle on Saturday
Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 3
William Craig’s MOVE argument is simple: 1. If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist. 2. Objective moral values do exist. Therefore: 3. God exists. One obvious atheistic objection would be to reject or cast doubt on premise (2). If one rejects or doubts that objective moral values exist, then this argument … Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 3
Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 2
I am going to engage in a bit of logic chopping now. But for those who do not have an appreciation for logic chopping, do not despair; my close examination of the bark on one tree will lead me to make some broader points that have significance for philosophy of religion, ethics, and serious thinking … Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 2
Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 1
In his essay “Why I Believe God Exists”, William Craig gives three main reasons for believing in God (Why I am a Christian – hereafter: WIAC – edited by Norman Geisler and Paul Hoffman, Baker Books, 2001, p.62-80): One problem with the Kalam cosmological argument is that it fails to establish the existence of a … Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 1
Materialism and Beauty
In response to a post by Victor Reppert, I left the following comments on his blog. Victor — I’m very late to this thread, but I hope you’ll respond to this comment. I read the linked article. Maybe I misunderstood it, but it seems to me that even if everything that article said were correct, … Materialism and Beauty
Skeptical Atheism and the Fine-Tuning Argument?
The multiple universes objection is a common objection to fine-tuning arguments for God’s existence. Paul Draper once wrote an interesting essay comparing that objection to that argument to the same objection applied to arguments from evil. What I’ve often wondered is this: what if we tried to draw another parallel between fine-tuning arguments and arguments … Skeptical Atheism and the Fine-Tuning Argument?