William Lane Craig’s Logic Lesson – Part 4
In the March Reasonable Faith Newsletter William Craig asserted this FALSE principle about valid deductive arguments that have premises that are probable: … in a deductive argument the probability of the premises establishes only a minimum probability of the conclusion: even if the premises are only 51% probable, that doesn’t imply that the conclusion is only … William Lane Craig’s Logic Lesson – Part 4
William Lane Craig’s Logic Lesson – Part 3
I had planned to discuss counterexamples (to Craig’s principle) that were based on dependencies existing between the premises in some valid deductive arguments. But I am putting that off for a later post, in order to present a brief analysis of some key concepts. It seems to me that an important part of understanding the relationship … William Lane Craig’s Logic Lesson – Part 3
William Lane Craig’s Logic Lesson – Part 2
I admit it. I enjoyed pointing out that William Lane Craig had made a major blunder in his recent discussion of the logic of deductive arguments (with premises that are probable rather than certain). However, there are a variety of natural tendencies that people have to reason poorly and illogically when it comes to reasoning about … William Lane Craig’s Logic Lesson – Part 2
William Lane Craig’s Logic Lesson
The March Newsletter from Reasonable Faith just came out, and it includes a brief lesson in logic from William Lane Craig. However, the lesson presents a point that is clearly and obviously WRONG, and it promotes bad reasoning that could be used to rationalize UNREASONABLE beliefs. It appears that WLC is himself in need of … William Lane Craig’s Logic Lesson
I Don’t Care – Part 6
Aquinas is often thought of as a rigourously logical and systematic thinker. This is only half-true. There is a good deal of vaguness, ambiguity, and illogical thinking in his book Summa Theologica, as far as I can see. Here is a cautionary note from a philosopher who is an expert on Aquinas: From the concept of … I Don’t Care – Part 6
How Not to Debate ‘the’ Moral Argument: Reply to PZ Myers
(Redated post originally published on 8 June 2012) In a recent post, PZ Myers complains that a couple of atheists botched their response to ‘the’ moral argument for God’s existence.[1] He writes: There is a common line of attack Christians use in debates with atheists, and I genuinely detest it. It’s to ask the question, … How Not to Debate ‘the’ Moral Argument: Reply to PZ Myers
For Victor Reppert: The Metaethical Objections to Craig’s Moral Argument Which His Sophisticated Critics Use, But Craig Never Acknowledges in Debate Opening Statements
(Redated post originally published on 21 June 2012) This is a quick follow-up to my last reply to Victor Reppert. The title of Reppert’s post is, “The Moral Argument that Christians don’t use, but atheists always rebut.” In reply, we can point to “The Metaethical Objections to Craig’s Moral Argument Which His Sophisticated Critics Use, … For Victor Reppert: The Metaethical Objections to Craig’s Moral Argument Which His Sophisticated Critics Use, But Craig Never Acknowledges in Debate Opening Statements
I Don’t Care – Part 5
The famous Five Ways passage by Aquinas in Summa Theologica does not contain five arguments for the existence of God. Rather, it contains ZERO arguments for the existence of God. There is actually only one argument for the existence of God in the Summa Theologica, and the reasoning in the Five Ways passage only represents a … I Don’t Care – Part 5
Doug Geivett’s Turnaround Argument on Evil as a Departure from the Way Things Ought to Be
(Redating post last published on 31 October 2011) (Redating this post due to clarification from Geivett regarding his argument) For those of you who don’t know of him, Doug Geivett is a Christian philosopher at Biola University. I had the opportunity to meet him in 1997 at the I.I.-sponsored debate on the existence of God … Doug Geivett’s Turnaround Argument on Evil as a Departure from the Way Things Ought to Be
Victor Reppert on the Argument from Evil as a Reductio
(Redated post originally published on 12 June 2012) Can atheist who rejects moral realism press the argument from evil? Many theists, including William Lane Craig and Ravi Zacharias, have argued that the answer is “no.” In my old critique of one of Zacharias’s books, I wrote the following. Zacharias presents two objections to AE. First, … Victor Reppert on the Argument from Evil as a Reductio