argument from evil

Moti Mizrahi’s New Paper: “The Problem of Natural Inequality: A New Problem of Evil”

Forthcoming in Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel. Pre-publication copy available here. Abstract. In this paper, I argue that there is a kind of evil, namely, the unequal distribution of  natural endowments, or natural inequality, which presents theists with a new evidential (not logical or incompatibility) problem of evil. The problem of natural inequality is a Moti Mizrahi’s New Paper: “The Problem of Natural Inequality: A New Problem of Evil”

Christianity Today asks, “Are Birth Defects Part of God’s Plan?”

LINK If Christianity is true, then, of course, the answer has to be, “Yes.” But is it true? The philosophically significant question, however, is this: “Does naturalism or theism, including Christian theism, provide the best explanation for birth defects?” Here is an excellent by Paul Draper, taken from a lecture he recently gave at the <I>Christianity Today</I> asks, “Are Birth Defects Part of God’s Plan?”

Skeptical Atheism and the Fine-Tuning Argument?

The multiple universes objection is a common objection to fine-tuning arguments for God’s existence. Paul Draper once wrote an interesting essay comparing that objection to that argument to the same objection applied to arguments from evil. What I’ve often wondered is this: what if we tried to draw another parallel between fine-tuning arguments and arguments Skeptical Atheism and the Fine-Tuning Argument?

Thoughts on the “Logical vs. Evidential” Distinction

Chris Hallquist recently questioned the significance of the distinction between logical arguments from evil and evidential arguments from evil. He writes: In general, the insistence of people who follow these issues on classifying versions of the problem of evil as either “logical” or “evidential” is weird. It isn’t something you see with any other kind Thoughts on the “Logical vs. Evidential” Distinction

The Loftus-Torley Exchange

It seems to me that Torley clearly has the upper hand in this exchange so far. As a debate judge, I would “flow” the entire “debate” to Torley up to this point. But that doesn’t mean game over for Loftus, however. In each case, I think Loftus has strong replies available. Here are my brief The Loftus-Torley Exchange

Recent Paper on Skeptical Theism and the Evidential Argument from Evil

I just discovered this.  Justin P. McBrayer, “CORNEA and Inductive Evidence,” Faith and Philosophy 26 (2009): 77-86 Abstract: One of the primary tools in the theist’s defense against “noseeum” arguments from evil is an epistemic principle concerning the Conditions Of ReasoNable Epistemic Access (CORNEA) which places an important restriction on what counts as evidence. However, Recent Paper on Skeptical Theism and the Evidential Argument from Evil

William Lane Craig: “Animals aren’t aware that they’re in pain”

Recently, some theists have attempted to deal with that part of the problem of evil generated by horrendous animal suffering found in nature – including hundreds of millions of years of animal suffering before we humans even showed up – by saying that animals aren’t aware that they are in pain. They maintain this is William Lane Craig: “Animals aren’t aware that they’re in pain”

Index: The Evidential Argument from Evil: the Biological Role of Pain and Pleasure

The purpose of this post is to provide an index for all posts regarding Paul Draper’s version of the evidential argument from evil which focuses on the biological role of pain and pleasure (APP).“The Argument from the Biological Role of Pain and Pleasure“: an introduction to the argument“Silver’s Defense of Draper’s Argument from the Biological Index: The Evidential Argument from Evil: the Biological Role of Pain and Pleasure