Recent Paper on Skeptical Theism and the Evidential Argument from Evil

I just discovered this. 

Justin P. McBrayer, “CORNEA and Inductive Evidence,” Faith and Philosophy 26 (2009): 77-86

Abstract:

One of the primary tools in the theist’s defense against “noseeum” arguments from evil is an epistemic principle concerning the Conditions Of ReasoNable Epistemic Access (CORNEA) which places an important restriction on what counts as evidence. However, CORNEA is false because it places too strong a condition on what counts as inductive evidence. If CORNEA is true, we lack evidence for a great many of our inductive beliefs. This is because CORNEA amounts to a sensitivity constraint on evidence, and inductive evidence is often insensitive. So unless a theist is also an inductive skeptic, she must abandon CORNEA in responding to this sort of argument from evil.