apologetics

God and Massive Deception about the Resurrection

Robert Cavin and Carlos Colombetti have written an article raising some significant objections to Richard Swinburne’s case for the incarnation and resurrection of Jesus: “Swinburne on the Resurrection” (Philosophia Christi, Vol. 15, No. 2; hereafter: SOR). LINK I’m fully on-board with their overall conclusion that “…Swinburne’s argument for the Incarnation and Resurrection…is seriously undermined by God and Massive Deception about the Resurrection

Stan Stephens’s Categorical Misunderstandings of Atheism, Part 3

I’m now going to comment on Stan’s post, “What I Learned at Patheos.” Stan’s Integrity-Challenged Description of His Interactions at the Secular Outpost My foray into patheos–land is over. I don’t usually venture into other blogs because they are commonly infested with nasty hangers-on (PZ anyone?), but this one seemed different… at first. And it Stan Stephens’s Categorical Misunderstandings of Atheism, Part 3

Stan Stephens’s Categorical Misunderstandings of Atheism

Stan Stephens has finally decided to respond to my list of sixteen (16) lines of empirical evidence which favor naturalism over theism. Here is the first sentence of his reply. Jeffery Jay Lowder provided a list of empirical proofs. (emphasis added) I’ve emphasized Stan’s use of the word “proofs” because it exposes a fundamental misunderstanding Stan Stephens’s Categorical Misunderstandings of Atheism

Swinburne’s Cosmological and Teleological Arguments – Part 5

The Cosmological Argument (TCA) is the first argument in Swinburne’s inductive case for the existence of God. The arguments are presented in a specific order, each argument adding one more contingent fact (or specific set of contingent facts) to the facts presented in the premises of the previous arguments. Since TCA is the first argument, Swinburne’s Cosmological and Teleological Arguments – Part 5

Swinburne’s Cosmological and Teleological Arguments – Part 4

Richard Swinburne presents his inductive cosmological argument in Chapter 7 of his book The Existence of God (second edition, hereafter: EOG). I plan to start at the beginning of the chapter and go paragraph by paragraph, stopping to comment on each paragraph that includes either support for, or defense of, some part of the cosmological Swinburne’s Cosmological and Teleological Arguments – Part 4

Swinburne’s Cosmological and Teleological Arguments – Part 3

I am exploring a concern about, or potential objection to, Swinburne’s inductive cosmological and teleological arguments for the existence of God. The objection I have in mind is something like this, for the cosmological argument: Although the one factual premise of Swinburne’s cosmological argument is supposed to be the ONLY contingent factual claim or assumption Swinburne’s Cosmological and Teleological Arguments – Part 3