Matt DeStefano


An End to Philosophy of Religion?

John Loftus has issued a call for the end of philosophy of religion (POR) being taught in secular universities. He’s since written a few follow-up posts, but  I think there are two main points that Loftus makes: (1) Science has disproven religion, and philosophy ought to follow suit  (2) Philosophy of religion is dominated by Christian An End to Philosophy of Religion?

Randal Rauser Replies

His post: Do naturalists have more to lose? If not, why are they crucifying Thomas Nagel?  In order to prevent this from becoming a back-and-forth mess, I’ve replied in the comments there. He’s a good guy, so I don’t mind sending him more traffic. If you’re interested, the discussion can continue there.

Do Christians have more to lose?

In a recent blog post, Randal Rauser wonders about the prospects that atheists (or anyone, really) are “simply after the truth”. He begins by noting that many Christians (such as the popular Christian apologist Lee Strobel), assume that atheists reject God in order to give license to their poor behavior. He’s not sold on this Do Christians have more to lose?

Dualism is Unhealthy

No, seriously. (LINK) “The fact that the simple priming procedures used in the studies had an immediate impact on health-related attitudes and behavior suggests that these procedures may eventually have profound implications for real-life problems. Interventions that reduce dualistic beliefs through priming could be one way to help promote healthier — or less self-damaging — Dualism is Unhealthy

Boudry’s Hoax on “Sophisticated Theologians”

Dr. Maarten Boudry performs a ‘Sokal-style hoax‘ on two theology conferences. Here is the abstract: The Paradoxes of Darwinian Disorder. Towards an Ontological Reaffirmation of Order and Transcendence. Robert A. Maundy,  College of the Holy Cross, Reno, Nevada In the Darwinian perspective, order is not immanent in reality, but it is a self-affirming aspect of reality Boudry’s Hoax on “Sophisticated Theologians”

An Argument Against Moral Facts

In a seminar on Metaethics (h/t John Brunero) , I encountered an argument against moral facts that I hadn’t heard before. Here is a brief sketch: (1) We’re justified in believing in some fact only if it plays a role in the explanation of our observations and other non-moral facts. (2) Moral facts don’t play An Argument Against Moral Facts