“The Roman word res designates that which concerns somebody, … that which is pertinent, which has a bearing … In Enghsh ‘thing’ has still preserved the full semantic power of the Roman word: ‘He knows his things,’ he understands the matters that have a bearing on him … The Roman word res denotes what pertains to man, concerns him and his interests in any way or manner. That which concerns man is what is real in res … Meister Eckhart says, adopting an expression of Dionysius the Areopagite: love is of such a nature that it changes man into the things he loves (Heidegger PLT, T, 175-6).”

I’m concluding this study of Martin Heidegger’s first lecture course on Hölderlin’s poetry, devoted to an interpretation of the hymns “Germania” and “The Rhine.” Delivered in Freiburg in the winter semester of 1934–35, this course marks Heidegger’s first sustained engagement with Hölderlin’s poetizing, and is particularly important for understanding the works of Heidegger that follow in the mid- to late 1930s and beyond. Key works such as the Introduction to Metaphysics (1935), “The Origin of the Work of Art” (1936), and the Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event) (1936–38) receive essential illumination from the first Hölderlin course, as does the 1936 essay “Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry.”  I would like to end this blog series by connecting Holderlin to Nietzsche by moving from a self-realization ethics from the Greeks to a value-bestowing ethics of the Germans. 

The content and form of Holderlin’s poems are intimately connected, “Yet every line of Hölderlin’s is like this, so long as we do not look for a canvas of sounds, but hear each line out of the fullness of its truth, where sound and meaning are not yet torn asunder.”  (Heidegger, Martin. Hölderlin’s Hymns: “Germania” and “The Rhine” (Studies in Continental Thought) (p. 317). Indiana University Press. Kindle Edition.) – like what we see with the Greek tragic poets.

But Holderlin has broken off from the Greeks, “Its beyng is determined by its having broken off from the direction in which it commenced.” )Heidegger, Martin. Hölderlin’s Hymns: “Germania” and “The Rhine” (Studies in Continental Thought) (p. 319). Indiana University Press. Kindle Edition.).  This poetry of Holderlin is not trying to bring the divine back to the masses with metaphors, examples, and analogies, but rather Heidegger contrasts explaining and understanding:

“To explain something means to bring it back to something that is clear to us—that is, in this context, to whatever is handy and manageable. All explanation is always this escape into what is commonplace for us, that wherein we appease ourselves on a daily basis, that which we immediately have at our disposal at all times, that with which we are already familiar. This is why the discovery of an explanation is always satisfying, in the sense of providing the peacefulness and undisturbedness of an effortless possessing and having. This is why explanation always has that insulting aspect, because it brings that which is explained back to the level of what is readily familiar to everyone. (Cf. also from his perspective: Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, p.128.1) Where something has been explained, there is nothing more to understand. But that means, strictly speaking, that understanding has no place there and no right to be there. Understanding is authentically—regarded in its originary essence—knowledge of the inexplicable, not as though it would explain the latter and thus eliminate what had been explained; rather, understanding precisely lets what is inexplicable stand as such. Understanding an enigma, therefore, does not mean solving the enigma, but the converse: releasing the enigma as that concerning which and with regard to which we have no known counsel in the sense of our everyday, calculative means of disposal. The more originarily we understand, the further that which is unexplained and inexplicable extends and becomes unveiled as such.”  (Heidegger, Martin. Hölderlin’s Hymns: “Germania” and “The Rhine” (Studies in Continental Thought) (pp. 325-326). Indiana University Press. Kindle Edition.)

To explain means to bring back to what is commonplace and familiar to us, to fit it back into this. Where something has been explained, there is nothing more to be understood; everything already has the semblance of being understood. Explaining is the corrupted essence of understanding. Understanding the enigma, therefore, is not equivalent to solving it, but means precisely holding fast to that which is inexplicable and thus attaining a manner of authentic knowing.  Heidegger, Martin. Hölderlin’s Hymns: “Germania” and “The Rhine” (Studies in Continental Thought) (pp. 327-328). Indiana University Press. Kindle Edition.

Poetry does not mean a flowery presentation of someone’s feeling or the current Zeitgeist.  It rather opens up in transformation Beying:

In any case, he who—today—does something like ‘putting into verse the psychic import of our time’ is not a poet: not because such content would supposedly be something indifferent, nor because the poetic form and the mastery thereof would be insufficient, but because such poetic composition is not a founding, but rather—as poetic reporting—differs from the activity of a newspaper journalist only by degree. In the case of such reportage, it is always what is presently at hand, and not the historical, that provides an otherwise missing anchor point and ground for those who are without that necessity that comes only from that beyng that is to be founded.  Heidegger, Martin. Hölderlin’s Hymns: “Germania” and “The Rhine” (Studies in Continental Thought) (p. 331). Indiana University Press. Kindle Edition).

The first strophe does not give the poetic depiction of a process of nature, nor the description of the atmosphere of a landscape. For this reason, it is also not something like a graphic introduction to the subsequent poetizing of non-intuitable, abstract thoughts. What is said is not even a comparison—an ‘image,’ for instance, or ‘metaphor’—even though the poem begins with the words “As when . . .” and strophe II continues “So they stand. . . .” Yet what, then, in all the world is a ‘poetic comparison’ meant to be, if not this, where surely psychic lived experiences within the mind of the poet are compared with the material circumstances outside in nature?… Let us just look at the dubious apparatus of contemporary literary theory, where all the components of ancient poetics are at work in a corruption of their essence and in all sorts of guises, even if the orientation of their content changes. Until recently one was still searching for the psychoanalytic underpinnings of poetizing; now, everything is dripping with [talk of] national tradition [Volkstum] and blood and soil, but everything remains wedded to the old. ‘Poetic comparison’—what an unpoetic concept that is in the end! Yet people are so occupied with writing… Poetic comparison for . . . What is being compared to what? A process in nature to a lived experience in the spirit. What does ‘nature’ mean here, and what does ‘spirit’ mean?  (Heidegger, Martin. Hölderlin’s Hymns: “Germania” and “The Rhine” (Studies in Continental Thought) (p. 335). Indiana University Press. Kindle Edition.)

What Holderlin brings to word with the river is not a poetic metaphor, but a poetizing of the river itself,

The river now creates for the land a forged space and delimited locale for settlement and commerce, and for the people, land that can be cultivated and the sustaining of their immediate Dasein. The river is not a body of water that simply flows past the locale of human beings; rather, its flowing, as land-forming, first creates the possibility of grounding the dwellings of humans. The river is a founder and poet, not just metaphorically, but as itself.  (Heidegger, Martin. Hölderlin’s Hymns: “Germania” and “The Rhine” (Studies in Continental Thought) (p. 346). Indiana University Press. Kindle Edition.)

The old gods have become tired of themselves, “the final version says concisely and dismissively that they have enough of their own immortality.” (Heidegger, Martin. Hölderlin’s Hymns: “Germania” and “The Rhine” (Studies in Continental Thought) (p. 355). Indiana University Press. Kindle Edition.)  Holderlin writes “For often, when It becomes too lonely for the heavenly, That they remain Alone together . . .(357)”

What is to be done, “That is what is ‘paradoxical.’ In fighting the battle of the Greeks, but on the reverse front, we become not Greeks, but Germans.”  (Heidegger, Martin. Hölderlin’s Hymns: “Germania” and “The Rhine” (Studies in Continental Thought) (p. 383). Indiana University Press. Kindle Edition.)

Heidegger says the first philosopher of the Germans was Meister Eckhart, and the last was Nietzsche.  Section 983 of “The Will to Power,” where Nietzsche discusses the concept of the overman or Übermensch, describes this ideal figure as “a Roman Caesar with Christ’s soul.”  What does this mean and how does it fulfill reversing what was started with the Greeks?

For Heidegger along with many others the first German philosopher was Christian mystic Meister Eckhart who engaged with the Christian notion of love or agape, in distinction to Greek love or eros (typified by Achilles).  Jesus explained agape by saying “43 “You have heard that it was said, ‘You shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy.’ 44 But I say to you: Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you, (Matt 5:43).”  While eros is a way to chase after the lovable, agape transforms widow, orphan, stranger, and enemy to be loavable and so transforms you as well.  Basically, we see move from a self-realization ethics with the Greeks to a transformation Philosophy with the Germans starting with Eckhart.  Meister Eckhart’s teachings on self-transformation are deeply embedded in his mystical theology and philosophy, focusing on the journey of the soul towards union with God.

With Detachment (Gelassenheit), Eckhart often stressed the importance of “detachment” or “letting go” from all things, including one’s own will, desires, and self-concepts. This detachment is not about indifference but about freeing oneself to be wholly open to God. In his sermon “Blessed are the Poor,” he states, “The more completely you are emptied of the creature, the more fully you will be filled with the Creator.” In Becoming Nothing (Nichts), Eckhart speaks of the soul needing to become “nothing” to truly unite with God. This idea of becoming nothing is about emptying oneself of ego and personal desires to make room for divine presence. He famously said, “The soul must be stripped of all that is not God, and must become nothing, in order to be filled with God.”

Eckhart uses the metaphor of God being born in the soul, which signifies a transformation where the soul becomes a place where God can dwell. This transformation involves the soul becoming like God in purity and simplicity. He explains, “God is begotten in the most secret part of the soul, in the ground where there is no image.” Eckhart advocates for an internal transformation through spiritual practices, contemplation, and understanding. He describes this process as a kind of alchemy where the base self is transmuted into something divine. He notes, “The ground of the soul is untouched by time and flesh, reaching out to the eternal. There, God can make his dwelling place.”

Self-transformation, according to Eckhart, involves living fully in the present moment, where one can encounter God. He teaches that the soul should be “inwardly free” and “detached” to be truly present, which is a form of continuous transformation. Eckhart believes that through this transformative process, humans can achieve a state of “God-likeness,” not in essence but in virtue and love. This involves a radical shift from human to divine perspective, where one sees with the eyes of God.

Eckhart’s philosophy on self-transformation is about an internal revolution where the individual moves from a state of multiplicity and division to unity with the divine, where the self becomes a conduit for divine love and presence. His teachings suggest that this transformation is not merely a moral or ethical change but an ontological one, where the very nature of one’s being is altered to reflect the divine.

Regarding Nietzsche, Heidegger notes:

What Hölderlin here sees as the essence of historical Dasein—the conflictual intimacy of endowment and task—was discovered again by Nietzsche under the titles of the Dionysian and the Apollonian.  (Heidegger, Martin. Hölderlin’s Hymns: “Germania” and “The Rhine” (Studies in Continental Thought) (p. 384). Indiana University Press. Kindle Edition).  Nietzsche tried to rethink the Greeks and the eros of Achilles who suffered terrible boredom when there was no honor to chase after, to the value bestowing creativity of the historical Jesus as opposed to the judging Christ of Paul who Nietzsche hated. This has nothing to do with theology but rather the way Jesus transformed beings to be valuable. It is in this sense Heidegger says: “I am a Christian theologian in the sense that I am trying to think the truth of the Christian faith, but not in the sense of a confessional theologian.” (Heidegger, M. (1946). “Letter on Humanism.” In Pathmarks (edited by William McNeill), Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 251.)

As I said, Heidegger’s Nazi period was an attempted rethinking of the Greek polis culture in a German incarnation where there is no difference between the person and the state. The Hitler Youth movement is a good example of this. Heidegger thus had not thought the agape/eros love (desire as lack vs desire as surplus and creative) problem originally enough and so forever stained his philosophy (though in the Black Notebooks Heidegger retained some antisemitism). As my late friend Dr. David Goicoechea argued, if we trace Postmodernism back to Kierkegaard and then interpret Nietzsche in this light, we get a movement beyond the eros self-realization ethics to the Other-based agape ethics where the other is more important than self in thinkers like Derrida and Levinas.