Month: September 2012

Wes Morriston’s The Moral Obligations of Reasonable Non-Believers: A special problem for divine command metaethics

The fact that many people do not believe that there is a God creates an obvious problem for divine command metaethics. They have moral obligations, and are often enough aware of having them. Yet it is not easy to think of such persons as “hearing” divine commands. This makes it hard to see how a Wes Morriston’s The Moral Obligations of Reasonable Non-Believers: A special problem for divine command metaethics

Disproof Atheism Society

“The Disproof Atheism Society, founded in 1994, is an independent, Boston-based, worldwide network of people interested in logic, science, and analytic philosophy who support the development of disproof atheism. We host monthly talks, discussions, and other events, primarily at Boston University and usually with a featured speaker. In 2010 we hosted the first-ever Disproof Atheism Disproof Atheism Society

Skeptic Blogs

Here is a link to John Loftus’s new blog aggregation site. Skeptic Blogs Your name Your email Subject Your message (optional)

Theism, Atheism, and Metaethics

In response to my comments on “Atheist Ethicist: Theism, Atheism, and Blame,” Keith Parsons rightfully pointed out an error and an inconsistency in my comments where I had denied that theism has metaethical implications. As is often (if not always) the case in philosophy, a lot of this depends on terminology. And although I responded Theism, Atheism, and Metaethics

Extraordinary Claims Require Extraordinary Evidence (ECREE), Part 7: Christian Apologist Glenn Miller Agrees!

Not all theists or even Christians reject ECREE. One example of a Christian apologist who accepts ECREE is my friend Glenn Miller. Glenn writes: I personally agree with this principle…and so does God, apparently…why else would there be such an emphasis on it in the bible? The only issue I would have with the skeptic Extraordinary Claims Require Extraordinary Evidence (ECREE), Part 7: Christian Apologist Glenn Miller Agrees!

Extraordinary Claims Require Extraordinary Evidence (ECREE), Part 6: Is ECREE False? A Reply to Greg Koukl and Melinda Penner (continued)

(continued from Part 5) Penner’s Third Rebuttal: A third response to the demand recognizes that very extraordinary events happen all the time if the co-occurrence of several features in a state of affairs is evaluated probabilistically. I agree with this sentence (if “extraordinary events” means “improbable or very improbable events”), but this does not in Extraordinary Claims Require Extraordinary Evidence (ECREE), Part 6: Is ECREE False? A Reply to Greg Koukl and Melinda Penner (continued)