Month: July 2012

Aan petition

There’s a petition to the White House, to “Call upon the Indonesian government to respect the freedom and dignity of all its citizens and to free Alexander Aan.” Aan is the Indonesian currently imprisoned because of announcing he is an atheist on Facebook. If you haven’t signed it yet, what are you waiting for? There Aan petition

LINK: Aikin and Talisse’s Atheistic Argument from Ugliness

LINK (HT: Ex-Apologist) Since the authors note that the argument from beauty is one type of teleological argument and the argument from ugliness is the atheistic twin of the argument from beauty, perhaps I will need write a post on this argument for my series about atheistic teleological arguments.

The Evidential Argument from Moral Agency (AMA) Revisited

I want to revisit Paul Draper’s very interesting argument from moral agency against metaphysical naturalism.[1] Informal Statement of the Argument We know that moral agents exist. If we ignore for a moment the evidence for moral agents–i.e., independent of the evidence for moral agents–we have much more reason on theism than on naturalism to expect The Evidential Argument from Moral Agency (AMA) Revisited

Index: The Evidential Argument from the History of Science (AHS)

Informal Statement of the Argument If there is a single theme unifying the history of science, it is that naturalistic (i.e., non-supernatural) explanations work. The history of science contains numerous examples of naturalistic explanations replacing supernatural ones and no examples of supernatural explanations replacing naturalistic ones. Indeed, naturalistic explanations have been so successful that even Index: The Evidential Argument from the History of Science (AHS)

The Evidential Argument from the History of Science, Part 3: Reply to Rauser on Defining Metaphysical Naturalism

Randal Rauser really doesn’t like the argument from the history of science (AHS). After I refuted his initial objections to AHS, he seems to have abandoned those objections. Instead, he now takes issue with the definition of metaphysical naturalism itself, a point he makes over the course of no less than three separate, additional replies. The Evidential Argument from the History of Science, Part 3: Reply to Rauser on Defining Metaphysical Naturalism