Month: June 2012

A Brief Comment on Terminology

The purpose of this post is just to define terms used in my series on evidential arguments for naturalism. Before discussing specific arguments for and against atheism, I think it would be useful to define some terms. In doing so I will adopt the definitions put forth by Professor Theodore M. Drange in his excellent A Brief Comment on Terminology

The Evidential Argument from the History of Science (AHS)

Informal Statement of the Argument If there is a single theme unifying the history of science, it is that naturalistic explanations work. The history of science contains numerous examples of naturalistic explanations replacing supernatural ones and no examples of supernatural explanations replacing naturalistic ones. Indeed, naturalistic explanations have been so successful that even most scientific The Evidential Argument from the History of Science (AHS)

Gervais and Norenzayan: Analytical Thinking Promotes Religious Disbelief

Abstract: Scientific interest in the cognitive underpinnings of religious belief has grown in recent years. However, to date, little experimental research has focused on the cognitive processes that may promote religious disbelief. The present studies apply a dual-process model of cognitive processing to this problem, testing the hypothesis that analytic processing promotes religious disbelief. Individual Gervais and Norenzayan: Analytical Thinking Promotes Religious Disbelief