Over the last year (or two?), I’ve had on-again and off-again exchanges on various blogs with reader “Crude” about the definition of metaphysical naturalism. I’d like to comment on his (?) recent objections in the combox on Victor Reppert’s blog start with the linked comment here and work your way down. Each time we’ve had an … The Nature of Naturalism
In a recent post on his blog, Alexander Pruss presents an interesting argument regarding simplicity, theism, and naturalism. He writes: I have argued elsewhere, as my colleague Trent Dougherty also has and earlier, that when we understand simplicity rightly, theism makes for a simpler theory than naturalism. However, suppose I am wrong, and naturalism is the … Simplicity, Theism, and Naturalism
In his extensive writings, the prestigious philosopher Richard Swinburne makes a useful distinction between two types of inductive arguments. Let B be our background information or evidence; E be the evidence to be explained; and H be an explanatory hypothesis. “C-inductive argument”: an argument in which the premisses confirm or add to the probability of the conclusion, i.e., … F-Inductive Arguments: A New Type of Inductive Argument
After studying inductive logic for so long, I’ve decided it is finally time to reread Richard Swinburne’s The Existence of God (second ed., New York: Oxford University Press, 2004) and reconsider his inductive case for God’s existence. In doing so, I think I may have discovered a new objection to his cosmological argument. This is very rough … Potential Objections to Swinburne’s Cosmological Argument
LINK If Christianity is true, then, of course, the answer has to be, “Yes.” But is it true? The philosophically significant question, however, is this: “Does naturalism or theism, including Christian theism, provide the best explanation for birth defects?” Here is an excellent by Paul Draper, taken from a lecture he recently gave at the … <I>Christianity Today</I> asks, “Are Birth Defects Part of God’s Plan?”
The multiple universes objection is a common objection to fine-tuning arguments for God’s existence. Paul Draper once wrote an interesting essay comparing that objection to that argument to the same objection applied to arguments from evil. What I’ve often wondered is this: what if we tried to draw another parallel between fine-tuning arguments and arguments … Skeptical Atheism and the Fine-Tuning Argument?