Naturalism, Theism, and Moral Ontology: A Reply to William Lane Craig
(Reposting since this seems to be so popular. So far as I am aware, neither WLC nor anyone else has responded to this.)Abstract: This paper considers William Lane Craig’s metaethical argument for God’s existence. Roughly, the argument is that the existence of objective moral values provides strong evidence for God’s existence. I consider one by one … Naturalism, Theism, and Moral Ontology: A Reply to William Lane Craig
Naturalism, Theism, and Moral Ontology: A Reply to William Lane Craig
Abstract: This paper considers William Lane Craig’s metaethical argument for God’s existence. Roughly, the argument is that the existence of objective moral values provides strong evidence for God’s existence. I consider one by one Craig’s various reasons in support of the argument’s major premise, namely, that objective moral values and the nonexistence of God are at … Naturalism, Theism, and Moral Ontology: A Reply to William Lane Craig
J.L. Mackie’s Argument from Queerness against Objective Values
In his highly significant book, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, the late Oxford philosopher J.L. Mackie rejected moral objectivism and instead defended an error theory.[1] Although Mackie admitted that ordinary moral language and first-level moral beliefs imply moral objectivism, he argued on empirical grounds that moral objectivism is false. Mackie called one of his anti-objectivist arguments … J.L. Mackie’s Argument from Queerness against Objective Values