Does Darwinism Make Morality Fictional?
Larry Arnhart always writes terrific blog posts; this one from 2013 is no exception. (If you’re a regular reader of the Secular Outpost but not of his blog, then you should start reading his blog.) In this post, he takes issue with (among others) Michael Ruse’s claim that evolutionary naturalism undermines the foundations of morality. … Does Darwinism Make Morality Fictional?
What *Is* the Logical Structure of Mackie’s Anti-Moral Realism Argument?
Although the contemporary metaethics literature contains many references to (and discussions of) the late J.L. Mackie’s arguments against moral realism, I’ve never seen anyone formally analyze its logical structure. (If I’m mistaken and someone has done that, please provide a citation in the combox.) The goal of this post is to try to take first … What *Is* the Logical Structure of Mackie’s Anti-Moral Realism Argument?
Why I am Not Concerned about Christian Theist Philosophers of Religion
One reason I am not concerned about the prevalence of Christian theists in the field of philosophy of religion is that they do a nice job of arguing against each other. William Lane Craig’s favorite argument for the existence of God is the Kalam cosmological argument. I’m happy that there are some atheist philosophers who … Why I am Not Concerned about Christian Theist Philosophers of Religion
Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 11
If I understand William Craig’s third objection to AMR, then he is basically offering an inductive teleological argument for the existence of God (similar to how Richard Swinburne argues for God) based on the assumption that there are objective moral values plus the claim that humans and the circumstances in which humans find themselves are … Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 11
Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 10
When I argue against the resurrection of Jesus, I generally take a two-pronged approach. First, I argue that there are various good reasons to doubt the claim that Jesus was alive and walking around on the first Easter Sunday. Second, I make a concession for the sake of argument; I grant the supposition that Jesus … Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 10
Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 9
I have argued previously that Craig’s first two objections to AMR are weak at best. The third objection might not be as weak as the previous two. However, the third objection is the most unclear of the three, so if it turns out to be a strong objection, that will be because we help Craig … Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 9
Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 8
I am not impressed by Richard Taylor’s appeal to etymology as an argument for the claim that all duties and all obligations are ‘owed’ to some person or persons (see part 7 for my objections to that line of reasoning). However, to be fair to Craig, Taylor’s appeal to etymology is not specifically and explicitly … Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 8
Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 7
Richard Taylor’s book Virtue Ethics: An Introduction (formerly published as Ethics, Faith, and Reason) provides a very readable and interesting defense of the view that the modern conception of morality originates with religion, especially with Christianity. William Craig quotes from Chapter 11 of this book as his primary support for his second objection to AMR. … Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 7
Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 6
Some internet resources about William Craig’s views on morality and Richard Taylor’s views on morality: Is The Basis Of Morality Natural Or Supernatural? A Debate Between Richard Taylor and William Lane Craig Union College, Schenectady, New York October 8, 1993 http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/craig-taylor0.html The Indispensability of Theological Meta-Ethical Foundations for Morality By Dr. William Lane Craig http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/meta-eth.html … Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 6
Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 5
I am currently considering William Craig’s second objection to Atheistic Moral Realism (AMR): Second, the nature of moral duty or obligation seems incompatible with atheistic moral realism. (WIAC, p.76) The following is a third piece of the paragraph where Craig presents this objection: Who or what lays such an obligation on me? As the ethicist Richard … Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 5