(A1) Evidential arguments from ‘evil’ say: known facts about the types, quantity, and distribution of good and evil are much more probable on naturalism than on theism. (O1) Critics of evidential arguments from evil say: we don’t know that. We have far too limited an understanding of the interconnectedness of things to make such a … When Are Appeals to Human Ignorance a Legitimate Defeater of an Evidential Argument?
One objection to fine-tuning arguments for God’s existence goes like this: simply showing that so-called ‘fine-tuning’ is more probable on theism than on atheism isn’t enough to show that God exists. One must also take into account the prior probability of theism. William Lane Craig responds to this objection in a recent Q&A on his … William Lane Craig on the Prior Probability of Theism and the Fine-Tuning Argument