Bayesian_argument

William Lane Craig Endorses My Argument from Scale against Theism!

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He doesn’t mention by name, of course, and may not have even had my argument in mind, but the sort of Bayesian considerations he raises support my Bayesian argument from scale, in two ways. First, he agrees with me about the “direction” the evidence points (against theism). Second, he agrees with me about the “magnitude” … William Lane Craig Endorses My Argument from Scale against Theism!

Spot the Fallacy #2: Fine-Tuning and the Prior Probability of Theism

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Note: This post is another post in our series of articles designed to engage non-philosophers. Despite the title, you don’t need to literally name a fallacy assuming there is one. What these posts are really designed to do is to get you to describe, in plain English, why the argument (or objection) presented isn’t successful. … Spot the Fallacy #2: Fine-Tuning and the Prior Probability of Theism

Evidential Asymmetry, Scientific Confirmation of Prayer, and Horrific Evils

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1. The General Case One of the most important (and equally most often forgotten) lessons that Bayes’s Theorem can teach us about evidence is that the strength of evidence is a ratio. To be precise, let H1 and H2 be rival explanatory hypotheses, B be the relevant background information, and E be the evidence to … Evidential Asymmetry, Scientific Confirmation of Prayer, and Horrific Evils

Swinburne on the Resurrection: Negative versus Christian Ramified Natural Theology

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ABSTRACT: We consider the impact of negative natural theology on the prospects of Christian ramified natural theology with reference to Richard Swinburne’s argument for the Incarnation and Resurrection. We argue that Swinburne’s pivotal claim—that God would not allow deceptive evidence to exist for the Incarnation and Resurrection—is refuted by key evidence from negative natural theology. We argue, further, … Swinburne on the Resurrection: Negative versus Christian Ramified Natural Theology

F-Inductive Arguments: A New Type of Inductive Argument

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In his extensive writings, the prestigious philosopher Richard Swinburne makes a useful distinction between two types of inductive arguments. Let B be our background information or evidence; E be the evidence to be explained; and H be an explanatory hypothesis. “C-inductive argument”: an argument in which the premisses confirm  or add to the probability of the conclusion, i.e., … F-Inductive Arguments: A New Type of Inductive Argument

Loftus’s Outsider Test for Faith viewed in HD with Bayes’s Theorem

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In a recent post, I mentioned that anyone interested in the discussion regarding “atheism versus faith” should be reading John Loftus. Particularly, I noted an argument from his excellent Why I Became an Atheist, the “Outsider’s Test for Faith” (OTF), which he is elaborating upon in a new book of that title to be published … Loftus’s Outsider Test for Faith viewed in HD with Bayes’s Theorem